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In the early 1980's several developing countries introduced liberalisation policies in their 
economies. One of the reforms they implemented was to develop their stock markets. The 
theoretical justification for the liberalisation process was provided by the work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Their model follows neo-classical assumptions on 
savings and investment. Other researchers later completed their model with respect to the 
stock market, and claimed that its' development could benefit the emerging economies 
[Cho (1986)]. The aim of this thesis is to empirically examine if stock market 
development in a sample of emerging countries assisted economic growth or not. To 
examine this, we form three research questions. The first question is: what is the direct 
impact of stock market development on economic growth in developing countries? The 
second question refers to the indirect impact of stock market development on the 
economy via stock price volatility. The question is: has stock market volatility increased 
following liberalisation policies or not? The third question is: have the emerging stock 
markets become more integrated with each other and with developed markets following 
liberalisation? Stock market integration is a result of stock market development so we 
should expect these stock markets to become more integrated after they were liberalised. 
In examining these issues, we take into account the special circumstances surrounding 
each country. To this end we provide an overview of some of the emerging economies we 
examine and discuss the implications of their individual characteristics for our analysis. 
We carry out a literature survey which suggests that research in this area has been scarce. 
The few empirical evidence on these questions are mixed. This thesis aims to contribute 
to this growing literature by providing additional evidence on the questions we posed and 
by overcoming some of the problems which are inherent in the methodologies followed 
by previous researchers who examined these issues. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
In the early 1980s, several developing countries were unable to service their sovereign 
debts. The result was the well known debt crisis, which several academics and 
professionals feared would bring a severe crisis in the banking sector of the developed 
countries. This crisis has yet to materialise. The developing countries however, were 
faced with a credibility problem which prevented them from borrowing the funds they 
needed from abroad, and when they did, it was at high interest rates. In order to attract 
funds from abroad, several developing countries encouraged the development of stock 
markets and implemented a series of liberalisation policies. These aimed at making these 
economies attractive to foreign investors. During the last two decades, several of these 
countries managed to attract large funds from abroad. It is doubtful, however, if this 
inflow of foreign investment resulted in higher levels of economic growth for these 
countries or not. Research on the effect on this sudden foreign investment influx on the 
developing economies became important during the last twenty years. Prior to the 1980s, 
such literature was almost non-existent and would have been irrelevant. Few studies have 
empirically examined the effect of the liberalisation policies on these economies, mainly 
because of the scarcity of macroeconomic data. The aim of this thesis is to contribute to 
this growing literature by examining some of the issues involved. 
On a theoretical basis, the liberalisation process is supported by the pioneering work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). They each developed a theoretical model to 
demonstrate the adverse effect of financial repression on the developing economies' 
growth. McKinnon and Shaw argued that once a country liberalised its financial markets, 
interest rates would rise, increasing savings. The money saved would then be available 
for investment, which should become more efficient because of the higher interest rates. 
Under financial repression, interest rates are kept artificially low, so projects which would 
not be profitable otherwise could go ahead because of the low cost of financing. Demand 
for credit is very high and banks resort to credit rationing. 
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The McKinnon-Shaw theory was perceived as a valid argument to transform protectionist 
economies to market based ones. One of the transformations that took place was the 
development of stock markets in these economies and - in many cases - the opening up of 
the stock markets to foreign investors. However, neither McKinnon nor Shaw advocate 
the development of a stock market in their framework. Actually, Shaw argues that the 
development of a stock market in the early stages of development may be very expensive 
for the developing economies. A role for the stock market is provided by Cho (1986) who 
develops a model to show that credit markets cannot act efficiently in the absence of a 
stock market. Furthermore, some models of endogenous growth [e. g. Boyd and Smith 
(1996)] show that both bank and equity finance can make a positive contribution to the 
economic development of a country. In turn, as the economy develops, both the banking 
sector and the stock market develop. The relationship between the economy and the 
financial markets is therefore, positive and bi-directional. 
On an empirical level, there are hardly any studies examining this relationship for 
developing economies. A recent study by Arestis and Demetriades (1997) examines this 
relationship for South Korea and find that financial repression in South Korea had a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, Arestis and Demetriades recognise that 
South Korea is a unique case and in other countries financial repression had the opposite 
effect. Earlier studies [e. g. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995)] find that financial 
development may lead to lower growth levels in the absence of an adequate regulatory 
framework. Considering that almost every developing country which liberalised its 
economy followed a different path of reforms, examining in which countries the financial 
sector enhances economic growth, becomes more important because it can provide us 
with evidence as to which liberalisation process is more `appropriate'. 
One of the adverse effects of liberalisation may be increased volatility in the stock 
market. Several of the developing countries' stock markets have offered very high returns 
compared to developed countries. This was one of the `pull' factors which attracted 
foreign investors [e. g. Gooptu (1993)]. However, the emerging stock markets (ESMs) are 
very volatile. It became therefore, very important for institutional investors to know when 
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to pull out of a market. The sudden inflow and outflow of funds in these countries may 
have resulted in higher volatility in their stock markets. From a neo-classical perspective, 
increased investment in the stock market should result in lower volatility because of 
increased production and dissemination of information. This process should make the 
market more efficient and thus, less volatile. Keynesians [e. g. Singh (1997)] argue that 
opening the developing stock markets to foreign investors will transform them into 
casinos and increase volatility. The increased volatility could damage the growth of the 
economy because it will become more unstable. Another view is provided by Lamoureux 
and Lastrapes (1990a) who argue that volatility may increase as a result of more 
information production. In other words, inactive stock markets will become active in 
pricing assets, and therefore more efficient. So, the increased volatility should not have an 
adverse effect on the economy. 
There are very few empirical studies examining whether volatility increased in 
developing stock markets after they opened to foreign investors and they present 
contradictory results. A study by Richards (1996) shows that volatility actually fell after 
liberalisation while studies by Aitken (1996) and Grabel (1995) show that volatility 
increased. A problem with some of these studies is that they use static models to estimate 
volatility, and the cut off periods do not correspond to actual periods of transition. 
Another issue concerning liberalisation in developing countries is the effect of the reform 
policies on the integration of the ESMs. Financial liberalisation could in principle 
enhance integration thereby assisting stock market and economic development. The only 
factor which should cause rates of return to differ across stock markets should be their 
individual risk. Integrated national stock markets should offer a common reward for the 
same risk [Bekaert (1995)]. If national stock markets are well diversified and perfectly 
integrated then similar assets should offer similar rewards. Stock markets which open up 
to foreign competition -should follow a, common trend with other open national stock 
markets in the long run, as a result of increasing integration [Kasa (1992)]. 
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1.2. Research Objectives 
This thesis aims to empirically provide answers to the following questions: 
i) Has stock market development assisted economic growth in developing countries? 
ii) Has the volatility of developing stock markets increased following the opening up to 
foreign investors? 
iii) Have the national ESMs become more integrated after liberalisation? 
The first question refers to the effect of the banking sector and the stock market on the 
economic growth of developing countries. We examine if there is a positive relationship 
between the two financial sectors and the economy. We also examine if this relationship 
is bi-directional. This is particularly important because it can give us an insight on the 
dynamics within an economy. It can also help us understand better the 1997 crisis of the 
South East Asian economies. For example, in South Korea, the financial market was used 
to provide finance to the chaebol, the big conglomerates which were the base of the South 
Korean `economic miracle'. To this end, the financial sector was never allowed to 
develop based on market forces. It was always under the guidance of the Ministry of 
Finance. Under these circumstances, we should expect that the financial sector does not 
develop with the economy. This can have a detrimental effect on an economy, as it 
became apparent in 1997. The countries for which this hypothesis is tested are: Chile, 
India, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan. 
The second question is rather straightforward. Volatility is examined before and after 
important liberalisation policies were introduced in selected developing countries. We 
examine if volatility changed, and if it did, how it changed. These countries are: 
Argentina, Chile, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. 
The third question refers to the integration of selected developing stock markets during 
the 1980s and 1990s. This is the period when most liberalisation policies were introduced 
in most developing economies. The countries in our sample are: Chile, India, Mexico, 
Pakistan, Philippines and South Korea. 
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The contribution of this thesis to the economic literature is to provide additional evidence 
concerning the above questions. All three issues have been barely examined, as we shall 
see in chapter 3, where we review the existing literature. Also, most of the few studies in 
the area suffer from problems which the methodologies we use, overcome. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organised as follows: the second chapter is an overview of the development 
of Latin American and Asian financial markets and economies. The first part of the 
chapter, presents data on the foreign investment flows to the two regions as well as data 
on stock market characteristics for the two regions, such as market capitalisation and 
liquidity. The second part of the chapter, discusses the social, political and economic 
developments in Chile, India, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan, during the last twenty 
years. In the discussion there is an explicit reference to the development of the banking 
sector and the stock market(s) in these countries. 
The third chapter discusses the theoretical background of financial liberalisation and 
stock market development. We begin by presenting a simple schematic outline of the 
main theoretical approaches. Then we consider the implications of each one of these 
approaches for financial liberalisation and discuss the main theoretical advances in this 
area. 
The fourth chapter reviews the academic literature on emerging economies. The literature 
review does not cover only the issues examined on this thesis. It is a summary of the 
research carried out in most topics concerning emerging economies. The literature review 
is rather general, in order to establish a better understanding of the functioning of the 
stock markets in emerging economies, the special issues concerning them and the 
developments of the academic research on this area. The fifth chapter discusses the 
methodologies we utilise in each of the following chapters and the data we use. ' 
In the sixth chapter we empirically examine the relationship between the financial sectors 
and the real economy in selected emerging markets. The countries examined were 
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especially chosen because they cover a range of liberalisation paths and other 
characteristics. Chile and Mexico liberalised their economies to a very high degree. Chile, 
however, kept one restriction: repatriation of foreign funds was not allowed freely. This 
shielded the country from sudden outflows which other countries experienced. India 
implemented some reforms, but it did not go as far as the other countries in the sample. 
The Indian economy is still protectionist - up to a certain degree. South Korea is a 
particular interesting case because its development has always baffled advocates of the 
free market. It is a heavily regulated economy with respect to foreign investment, and 
restrictions on the capital account would change depending on the country's needs; when 
foreign reserves accumulated, the capital account was liberalised, and when foreign 
reserves fell, the capital account liberalisation was reversed. Taiwan is another interesting 
case because of its spectacular development and the structure of its market. Unlike South 
Korea, the Taiwanese market consists of thousands of small businesses, so in effect the 
financial sectors' development could be quite different from other countries. The sample 
period differs according to data availability. It covers a period from the late 1970's to 
1997. To examine the relationship between the financial market and the economy we use 
cointegration analysis, in which the banking sector and the stock market are explicitly 
modelled. 
The seventh chapter examines the effect of financial liberalisation on stock market 
volatility. We utilise two methodologies. The first is a generalised autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity process (GARCH). The ARCH family processes have been 
proved to be very effective tools for modelling volatility. A feature of the GARCH 
process is that it is dynamic and allows us to examine the changes in the nature of 
volatility as well as the changes in volatility per se (which is the unconditional volatility 
implied by the process). We estimate the GARCH process for each country's stock 
market returns before and after liberalisation, and compare the results. The second 
methodology, utilises the exponential GARCH (EGARCH) process, from which we 
derive the news impact curves for each country before and after liberalisation. The news 
impact curve relates current volatility to past shocks. Changes in the curves will provide 
evidence about the change in volatility after liberalisation. 
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In the eighth chapter, we conduct two tests to examine integration across national ESMs. 
First we use cointegration analysis to examine if the indexes of selected ESMs follow a 
common trend before and after liberalisation. Cointegration implies integration across the 
markets. The second test examines integration with respect to risk. We estimate the 
financial risk premium for selected developing countries, for every year from 1984 to 
1996 (except from South Korea where the sample ends- in 1994 due to data 
unavailability). To estimate the financial risk premium, we utilise the options pricing 
formula for European options, to calculate the market value of the countries' residents 
equity. In other words, we value the countries' foreign debt in the same way as corporate 
debt. Using the results from the options pricing formula, we can calculate the cost of debt 
and then the financial risk premium. This methodology uses macroeconomic variables 
specific to each country, so that the result is based on the each country's economic 
situation. Since we estimate the financial risk premium for every year during the sample 
period, we can see how it changes during the liberalisation period in each country. 
Finally, the ninth chapter discusses the findings of this thesis and draws some 
conclusions. It also identifies areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EMERGING MARKETS - AN OVERVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
At this stage, it is useful to present some information about the Asian and Latin American 
financial markets. The aim of this overview is to provide the reader with information 
about the functioning and some characteristics of the markets involved in the analysis. 
This should help our understanding of some of the problems and some of the issues 
involved in emerging financial markets. It should also help to put the results presented in 
the next chapters into perspective. This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part 
presents some aggregate statistics on the development of direct and indirect investment in 
Asian and Latin American countries. The second part is a profile of the social, economic 
and political recent history of some of the countries in our analysis. 
2.2 Stock Markets in Emerging Countries 
Since the early 1980s there has been a tremendous increase in the amount of investment 
flows to emerging economies. Historically, the biggest proportion of investment to 
emerging markets was in the form of debt. As we see in Figure 2.1, during the early 
1980s net investment in equity to all emerging markets was very small. In 1984, private 
debt flows to emerging economies was $25.9 billion while equity flows was only $0.15 
billion. By the end of the 1980s this trend had began to reverse. In 1993, net equity flows 
to emerging markets was $45 billion, $1 billion more than private debt. After 1993, 
private debt flows were more than portfolio investment but, the amount of money 
entering emerging markets had increased dramatically. By 1997, net private debt flows 
reached $103.2 billion, a fourfold increase since 1984. Net equity flows in 1997 were 
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Figure 2.1. Net private debt and portfolio investment flows to emerging markets (billion 
of dollars). 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
One of the reasons ESMs became very attractive to investors was the extraordinary 
returns they offered. Several of the ESMs offered annual returns of 100% or more in 
dollar terms. In 1989, the Argentinean, the Taiwanese and the Thai stock market indexes 
increased by more that 100% in dollar terms. Obviously, this was a great opportunity for 
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Figure 2.2. Annual real growth in GNP per capita for selected emerging markets. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
9 
Although direct and indirect investment increased in emerging economies, it is not clear 
whether these economies grew as a result of this. Figure 2.2. shows the annual real 
growth rates of GNP per capita for several emerging economies. The annualised growth 
rates are reported for two periods: from 1985 to 1993 and from 1990 to 1996. As we see 
from Figure 2.1, investment in ESMs picked up after 1993. However, as it shown in 
Figure 2.2, there is not an obvious trend of real GNP growth for the later period. While 
for six countries real GNP per capita is higher during the second period, for five countries 
it is higher during the first period. The relationship between economic growth and stock 
market development is the subject of the next chapter where the issue will be examined 
empirically. 
2.2.1. Latin American Economies 
Several Latin American economies liberalised their stock markets in order to attract 
foreign capital. During the early 1990s most Latin American stock markets became very 
active. Figure 2.3 shows the market capitalisation of Latin American' stock markets 






Figure 2.3. Market Capitalisation of selected Latin American stock markets (billion of 
dollars). 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
The countries included are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
10 
N It 110 _ rIt 
00 00 00 0o Q U1 CO 
Up to 1990, the value of stock traded in Latin American countries was lower than $100 
billion. During the 1980s, the highest value of the Latin American stock markets was in 
1989 when it reached $81.7 billion. In 1991, the stock market capitalisation of these 
countries almost tripled (it went from $67.2 billion in 1990 to $191.3 billion at the end of 
1991). Since then the value of stock traded in these markets has continue to increase 
rapidly. In 1997, the stock market capitalisation of Latin American countries had reached 
$562.8 billion; about 15 times up since 1980 when it was $37 billion. 
Although the value of the listed stock increased, the number of the companies listed did 
not. As we see from Figure 2.4, the number of listed companies in the sample countries 
actually fell. In 1980, there were 1,228 companies listed on Latin American stock 
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Figure 2.4. Number of listed companies in selected Latin American stock markets. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
In 1997, there were 1,165 companies listed on Latin American stock markets. Therefore, 
the increase in stock market capitalisation was not the result of an increase in the number 
of companies listed on these stock markets. 
The increase in the market capitalisation of these countries came in two ways: first, the 
value of the companies which were listed increased several times. Second, most of the 
Latin American countries in the sample implemented privatisation programmes as a 
result of which, several public utility companies were listed on the stock market. These 
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companies - most of which remained state controlled - are considered giants compared to 
other companies in these countries. The public utility companies and a handful of other 
very big companies account for a large part of the capitalisation in Latin American stock 
markets. Figure 2.5 presents the share of market capitalisation held by the ten largest 
stocks in each country, in 1989 and in 1997. 
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Figure 2.5. Share of market capitalisation held by the ten largest stocks in selected Latin 
American countries. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
In all the countries except from Brazil, the market was less concentrated in 1997 than in 
1989. The biggest change in concentration happened in Colombia where the ten largest 
stocks accounted for 71.7% of the total market capitalisation in 1989 but for 49.8% in 
1997. However, these markets are still heavily concentrated compared to developed stock 
markets (in 1989 the same figures for the UK and the US were 21.9% and 13.7% 
respectively). 
The development of the Latin American stock markets resulted in an increase in trading, 
as shown in Figure 2.6. During the 1980s trading in Latin American stock markets was 
relatively low. For that decade, the highest value traded for one year was in 1986, when 
$33.3 billion were traded. In 1991, there is a sharp increase in trading which continues 
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Figure 2.6. Value Traded in selected Latin American stock markets (billions of dollars). 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
Increases in trading mean that the market is becoming active which is a prerequisite for 
market efficiency. However, this increased activity has to apply to most stocks, which is 
not the case in the Latin American countries of our sample. 
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Figure 2.7. Share of value traded held by the ten most active stocks in Latin American 
countries. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
Figure 2.7 shows the share of value traded held by the ten most active stocks. In all 
countries the ten most active stocks accounted for more than 50% of value traded in 
1997, except for Mexico where they accounted for 45.6%. In most countries the 
concentration of value traded increased. While in most countries it increased by a little, in 
Brazil it went up by 32.7%. Such heavy concentration means that although the markets 
are becoming more active, not all companies benefit from that. Since a handful of 
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companies account for most of the trading in these stock markets, the majority of stocks 
are relatively inactive. This suggests that investors are only interested in very few 
companies, limiting thus the role of the stock market in making the markets more 
efficient. This is especially true for Argentina where the concentration of value traded is 
extremely high: in 1997 it was 85.4%, up 1.9% from 1989. 
2.2.2. East Asian Economies 
The East Asian economies were not liberalised at the same extent as Latin American ones 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Most governments in the region decided to keep several of 
the restrictions on foreign investment and capital flows in order to control their 
economies and avoid shocks. All East Asian economies took some steps towards 
liberalisation, but the process was slow and frustrated Western investors who wanted 
freedom of movement for their capital. However, equities in these markets were in great 
demand until the 1997 crisis because of the rapid growth rates experienced by these 
countries and the potential they offered. Figure 2.8 shows the development of the market 
capitalisation of several stock markets in that region. We can see that market 
capitalisation in these countries grew at a very rapid pace. In 1980, market capitalisation 
stood at $35.1 billion, about the same as in the Latin American markets. In 1996, market 
capitalisation was $1,033.2 billion, more than twice that of the Latin American countries. 
In 1997, due to the severe crisis which hit the region, market capitalisation fell to $617.5 
billion. During that year, only India, Pakistan and Taiwan were not seriously affected. 
The other countries in the sample saw their stock market capitalisation shrinking to less 
than half the 1996 level. 
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Figure 2.8. Market Capitalisation of selected East Asian stock markets (billion of 
dollars). 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
Stock prices in several of these countries were increasing rapidly. Taiwan and Philippines 
have repeatedly being referred to in the press as casinos. The potential for the companies 
in these countries was to attract capital (foreign or domestic) relatively cheap. This 
resulted in a large increase in the number of listed companies in the stock markets of the 
region. As we can see from Figure 2.9 3, the number of listed companies grew steadily at a 
fast pace since the late 1980s. In 1980, there were 1,222 companies listed on East Asian 
stock markets. By 1997, that figure had almost tripled; there were 3,321 listed companies 
in the region. 
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Figure 2.9. Number of listed companies in selected East Asian stock markets. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
In Figure 2.9, India is not included. 
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Market Capitalisation 
The stock markets in East Asia exhibit large differences in terms of concentration. In 
1989, the stock markets in India, Korea and Pakistan were less concentrated than the UK 
stock markets. The ten largest companies in the markets held 20.8% of the total market 
capitalisation in India, 19.2% in Korea and 19.3% in Pakistan. The other four markets 
were more concentrated but still the level of concentration was relatively low compared 
to other emerging markets. As it is shown in Figure 2.10, in every market, the ten largest 
stocks held less than 40% of total market capitalisation in 1989. However, by 1997, this 
picture changed. Except for Malaysia and Taiwan, in the other countries market 
concentration increased. The biggest change occurred in Pakistan were the ten largest 
stocks in 1997, held 66.8% of total market capitalisation; the Pakistani stock market 
changed from being a very low concentrated market to becoming a very highly 
concentrated market. Considering that the number of listed companies increased, it seems 
strange that market concentration should increase, too. The explanation is probably the 
same as in the Latin American countries. Part of the liberalisation process was the 
privatisation of public utilities, which compared to other companies in these markets, are 
giants. Once public utility companies are listed on the stock market, they dominate it. 
That is why market concentration increased in these countries although more and more 
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Figure 2.10. Share of market capitalisation held by the ten largest stocks in selected East 
Asian countries. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
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As it is expected, stock market development also increased the value traded in these 
markets. This increase is shown in Figure 2.114. In 1980, only $12.6 billion worth of 
shares were traded in the East Asian countries of our sample. This is roughly the same 
amount as for Latin American countries the same year. For four consecutive years, from 
1986 to 1989, value traded tripled every year. In 1985, value traded was $16.9 billion; 
value traded for 1989 was $1,127.3 billion. Trading in Taiwan accounted for most of this 
increase. In 1989, value traded in the Taiwanese stock market was $965.8 billion. 
Although the other countries in the sample had much smaller amounts of equity traded, 
trading was steadily increasing in all countries. In 1997, value traded in the region was 
$1,711.5 billion; it had increased 136 times since 1980. 
The good news for companies is that trading was not very concentrated in a few 
companies. Only in India and Pakistan is trading very concentrated (Figure 2.12). In 
1980, the ten largest stocks accounted for 47.3% of total value traded in India and 18.2% 
in Pakistan. In 1997, the same figures were 81.1 % for India and 90.5% for Pakistan. 





Figure 2.11. Value Traded in selected East Asian stock markets (billions of dollars). 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
Again, we see that the Pakistani stock market became very concentrated following 
liberalisation. Concentration in the other markets is rather low. In Philippines and 
Thailand the ten largest stocks account for about 35% of equity traded throughout the 
In Figure 2.11, Pakistan is not included. 
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sample period and in the remaining countries trade concentration is around or below 
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Figure 2.12. Share of value traded held by the ten most active stocks in East Asian 
countries. 
Source: IFC Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 
2.2.3. Regional differences 
The above statistics present a picture of the development of the stock markets in several 
Latin American and East Asian countries during the last two decades. In every country 
the operations of the stock market expanded considerably during the sample period. 
Although most of the statistics exhibit a strong upward trend, there are several differences 
between the Latin American and the East Asian countries. Although Latin American 
stock markets developed, their development was much slower than in East Asia. In both 
regions stock market capitalisation, value traded and the number of listed companies were 
roughly in the same level in 1980. By 1997, market capitalisation in East Asian countries 
was 10% more than in Latin America. The difference was only 10% because of the 1997 
crisis. In 1996, the same percentage was 250%. Value traded in 1997 in East Asia was 
about 6 times that in Latin America and the number of listed companies was 3 times 
more. These differences reflect the different growth rates experienced by these countries. 
Active trading does not imply efficiency but activity in the stock market is one of the necessary 
conditions for market efficiency. 
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Most of the Asian `tigers' were growing at rates of 6% per year in real terms. The Latin 
American countries failed to reach such growth levels (except a few, like Chile). For 
most of the sample period these countries were trying to overcome the problems 
generated during the 1970s which resulted in the debt crisis at the beginning of our 
sample period. 
Having praised the rapid development of the East Asia countries, we should also consider 
the 1997 crisis and its effect on these economies. In terms of their stock markets, we can 
see in Figure 2.8 that the stock market capitalisation in these countries almost halved in 
1997. Value traded increased dramatically, but this probably reflects the liquidation of 
equities by investors. Therefore, for most of our sample period the East Asian countries 
performed extremely well but, to get a better picture of their current situation we would 
need to look at 1997 and at the aftermath of the crisis. 
2.3. Countries profile 
2.3.1. Chile 
In 1974, the Pinochet regime started a big scale liberalisation. Banks were denationalised, 
interest rates were freed, reserve requirements were scaled down, preferential credit was 
drastically reduced and the refinancing rate of existing credit was raised to market level6. 
The regime increased the role of the markets and open the economy to foreign trade. It 
also introduced a tax reform and reduced government spending7. In 1978, the exchange 
rate became the main instrument of stabilisation and an active pre-announced crawling 
peg was introduced. By June 1979, the rate of the crawl became zero and the peso was 
fixed to the dollar. Because domestic inflation was higher than international inflation, the 
peso appreciated greatly. Furthermore, wage indexation was based on lagged changes of 
the CPI so, because of decreasing inflation real wages increased. The difference in 
domestic and international interest rates, accelerated demand for foreign borrowing. In 
1982 capital inflows were reduced and the overvalued peso resulted in the collapse of the 
6 For a review of the economic reforms in Chile during that period see: Corbo (1993) and Corbo and 
Fischer (1993) 
For a discussion on the economic policies adopted in Chile during 1974-84 see: Corbo V. in Corbo and 
DeMelo (1985). 
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fixed exchange rate system and a 14.3% drop of GDP. In June 1982, the peso depreciated 
by 18% against the dollar and a new system pegged it against a basket of currencies. The 
government announced a further 0.8% monthly devaluation with respect to the basket of 
currencies for the next 12 months. Also, the wage indexation was suspended. 
A casualty of the 1982 crisis was the banking sector. Prior to the crisis, the government 
had left the banking sector to its own devices. It offered no protection in case of a 
banking run or bankruptcy. Since the financial system was liberalised the debt 
accumulated by the private sector grew dramatically. The ratio of debt to the banking 
system increased from 5% of GDP in 1974 to 61.7% in 1982. After the crisis, most banks 
were unable to service their foreign debt and were bailed out by the government. The 
government provided them with emergency loans and subsidised credit and the Central 
Bank purchased some of their risky loans with the provision that the banks will buy them 
back in 10 to 50 years. The Central Bank also provided interest rate guidance and in 
whole the sector was regulated and slowly recovered. Competition in the banking sector 
was encouraged and foreign banks could compete equally with the local banks. By 1988 
there were 39 commercial banks in Chile, of which 23 were foreign. During the 1990s 
different sources of finance had developed in the country (e. g. private pension funds, life 
insurance companies and shares issuance either locally or in the US in the form of 
American Depository Receipts). The trend in that period was mergers between banks and 
focus on other areas of business (e. g. consumer credit and housing loans). 
The stock market in Chile developed fast in the decade after the crisis. Several factors 
contributed to that: diminished political risk after a peaceful transition from dictatorship 
to democracy, persistent economic growth, decreasing inflation and a decreasing foreign 
debt which had been rescheduled. During the late 80's and early 90's the stock market 
was performing very well. Although listing on the Bolsa increased, it remained heavily 
concentrated. In 1996, the electricity and telecommunications companies accounted for 
two thirds of the stock market capitalisation. 
Foreign investors could not liquidate their stocks and take them out of the country 
whenever they pleased. From the foreign funds entering the country, 30% had to be 
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deposited in the Central Bank for one year interest free; this served as a tax on short term 
investments. This "tax" was lowered to 15% in 1997. This restriction was part of a 
wider set of restrictions on the capital account - which have been eased but not abolished 
- to protect the country from capital flight after the 1982 crisis. 
Since the crisis, the Chilean economy grew fast due to several reasons. Foreign investors 
have been welcomed in the country. Legislation gave foreign investors and domestic 
businessmen equal rights so foreign investors could compete on equal terms with the 
locals. Also, the government tried to pursue export led growth. To that end, Chile entered 
or still tries to enter several free trade agreements (NAFTA, Mercosur, APEC and a trade 
agreement with the European Union), as well as bilateral agreements (with Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela and others). While copper accounted for 
more than 70% of exports in the 1970s, it accounted for about 40% of exports a decade 
later. As a result, the trade balance became healthier. 
The government also managed to reduce the fiscal deficit to negligible amounts and 
generate a fiscal surplus every year after 1989. The tight fiscal policy was good for the 
economy although it had a social cost. The sectors affected the most were health and 
education. Monetary policy is set by the Central Bank which was given full independence 
in 1989. The Pinochet regime followed an extensive privatisation scheme which was 
continued by the socialist government elected in 1989. One of the most famous reforms 
was the privatised pension funds designed to free the government from paying pensions. 
It is not clear yet if this controversial scheme is beneficiary for the country or not. The 
policies adopted by the military regime were continued by the 1989 elected government 
with few changes (the major change was the increase in social spending to provide much 
needed improvement to the health and education sectors). 
The economic success of Chile was brought to a halt in 1997 because of the Asian crisis 
The country was well equipped to absorb external shocks thanks to prudent fiscal 
management, tight banking supervision, capital controls to avoid massive capital 
outflows and a stabilisation fund created by gains from high copper prices standing at 
$1.85 billion in early 1998. However, 33% of its exports went to Asia. Although only 
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10% went to countries which were in deep trouble, the crisis reduced demand -for all 
goods. The price of copper fell from $1.19 a pound in June 1997 to 75 cents in March 
1998. The economic slowdown though is seen as a temporary problem. Guillermo Perry, 
the World Bank's chief economist for Latin America, said that Chile was better placed 
than any other country in the region to absorb external shocks (Economist, 7 March 
1998). 
2.3.2. India 
When India gained its independence on August 15th 1947 the government introduced a 
licensing system which dictated how many companies would exist in each industry and 
how much they produced. Exports were not regarded important as India tried to achieve 
self sufficiency. Labour laws commanded that employees in large companies (i. e. 
companies with more than 100 employees) could not be fired without government 
permission and to keep them in a job, companies could not close down. These are some 
of the basic features of the socialist system established by Nehru after independence. In 
1966 Indira Ganghi became prime minister. She increased price and trade controls, 
nationalised banks and several industries and squeezed foreign investment. Imports were 
restricted as well: consumer goods' imports were forbidden and imports of intermediate 
and capital goods were regulated depending on the nature of each particular good and 
whether it was available in the country or not. 
Since the 1950s, the Indian economy has been growing slowly (what economist call the 
"Hindu rate of growth"). In 1987, less than 1% of the population were employed in 
Indian factories (Economist, 9 May 1987). At the end of 1987, there' were 160,000 "sick 
enterprises" in India and their number kept growing. However, they were prohibited 
from closing down and they were faced with limited options. Takeovers and mergers 
were tightly controlled and the simplest cases took at least six months to get permission. 
Asset and land sales were also controlled - and often impossible - and no worker could be 
sacked. In most cases, problematic companies were kept alive by subsidies which in 
1987 accounted for almost 20% of all outstanding loans of India's financial institutions. 
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India has a poor record of health and education. The level of educated Indians is around 
50%, which is one of the lowest in the world. The health sector also suffers: 300,000 
children a year die of diarrhoea and in 1994 there was an outbreak of pneumonic plague. 
The infrastructure is also in need of money. For example, there are daily power cuts all 
over the country. Although investment is needed in infrastructure, public spending on it is 
declining. Between 1990 and 1995, central government spending went up by 6% in real 
terms. Current spending increased by 13% while capital spending fell by 19%. 
Political risk is high in India. It has a democratic system, unlike most third world 
countries, but political scandals and instability is the trend. In 1996, an ex-minister was 
fined 5 million rupees for fraud and Narasimha Rao, who was an ex-prime minister was 
charge with criminal conspiracy to cheat a businessman. In 1997, Lallo Prasad Yadav, 
the ruling party's president, was prosecuted in connection with a racket. Also, several 
politicians have been assassinated, including Rajiv Gandhi while he was serving as a 
prime minister. 
Although economic conditions in India are better now that four decades ago, India 
remains one of countries with the worst record in poverty. Determining exactly how 
many Indians live in poverty depends on who one believes. In 1996, the government 
estimated that 18.9% of the population lives in poverty but a group of Indian economists 
estimated the figure to be 37%. If this is the true figure, then more than 300 million 
Indians are poor. 
India also has a long history of violence, both internal and external. India is a country 
divided by different languages, religions, castes and nationalistic tendencies. Violent 
confrontations in the country are common. The fighting usually takes place between 
Hindus and Muslims. Regional chauvinism is another cause of trouble for Indians. One 
example is the oil blockade from the state of Assam by the United Liberation Front of 
Assam (ULFA) (Economist, 1 September, 1990). Even more serious are the problems 
between India and Pakistan. The two countries have already fought three wars since 
independence and are constantly on the brink of another war over the Kashmir valley. 
The Indian side of Kashmir is mainly Muslim territory and the Muslims there want either 
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independence or to join Pakistan. The tension between the two countries escalated in 
1998 when both countries carried out nuclear tests. 
Traditionally, in order to sustain its policies, the government imposed high tax rates. 
During Indira Gandhi's early years the top rate of income tax was 97.5%. When tax 
revenues fell as a percentage of GDP, the government switched to excise duties. The 
Janata Party government in 1977 began to relax the most stringent controls. Import 
quotas were replaced with import tariffs which in 1987 were as high as 200%. This 
provided the exchequer with increased revenues. The liberalisation policies were 
continued after Indira Gandhi was assassinated. In 1984, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, came to 
power but his liberalisation policies were inconsistent. However, on the whole the market 
became more liberal during the early 80's with some industries freed from licences, 
overall taxes drastically lowered and import of capital goods made easier. Also, foreign 
investment in India was made easier during that period. However, the rising 
government's spending forced it to borrow heavily both internally and externally. This 
raised its international rate of borrowing from 0.25% above LIBOR in 1990 to 3% above 
LIBOR in 1991. It was downgraded several times by S&P's to a BB-plus. Its foreign 
debt stood at $71 billion, with $5.5 billion being short term debt. The foreign reserves 
had fallen in April 1991 to $1.2 billion which was barely three weeks' imports( 
Economist, 8 June 1991). The government had to accept a loan from IMF and to sell 
gold abroad. Rajiv Gandhi's successor, Narasimha Rao, devalued the rupee and 
introduced radical reform policies. Since 1991 the government relaxed more and more its 
control on the Indian economy but the process was criticised by the IMF as very slow. 
Foreign investors welcomed the liberalisation process and increasingly invested in the 
country. In 1995, foreign direct investment stood at $10 billion (Economist, 29 July, 
1995). The liberalisation programme stopped short of creating a market economy. For 
example, the labour law did not change. During the years after 1991, the Indian economy 
grew at a faster pace than before, with the highest being 7% in 1995-96. There is also 
some evidence provided by the government suggesting that poverty fell in the years after 
the reforms from 25.5% in 1987 to 18.9% in 1993, but these figures are disputed by other 
Indian economists. 
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India has 22 stock exchanges. The two biggest by far are the Bombay Stock Exchange 
(BSE) which was established in 1885 and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). Although 
the state is the larger part of the economy, there are more than 6,000 companies (not all 
actively traded) listed in India's stock markets. Until recently, the microstructure of 
India's stock markets was rather obsolete: the share settlement system was paper based 
and computers were not introduced in the stock markets function. Also, the BSE has a 
history of not enforcing its rules and allowing market manipulation. After a big financial 
scandal in 1992, the authorities decided to promote a competitor to the BSE, the NSE. 
Competition between the two exchanges has resulted in the modernisation of both. In 
September 1992, the government allowed foreign institutional investors to buy Indian 
shares. Investors could buy up to 5% of any company's shares and all foreign portfolio 
investors could not hold more than 24% of any company. Some of the restrictions were 
further relaxed later on. Despite the restrictions foreign investors poured money into the 
stock market: the market capitalisation grew from 1,110 billion rupees in 1990 to 3,980 
billion rupees in 1993. However, it is not clear how this money was invested. In 1992, 
Indian companies were putting 3% of their funds into stocks and bonds and 52% into 
fixed assets; in 1993 they put 22% into the markets and only 47% into fixed assets. Also, 
much of the capital raised was used for restructuring of finance; they exchange expensive 
bank credit for equity. 
Most Indian banks were nationalised in two waves, in 1969 and 1979-80 by Indira 
Gandhi. The restrictions imposed on them made them unprofitable. Until 1992 they had 
to hold 38.5% of their net liabilities in government securities at very low yields. In 1992, 
this figure was changed to 30%. They also had to lent money to borrowers whom the 
government considered worthy, again at very low rates. The banks' staff were public 
employees who could not be fired and their union was one of the stronger in the country. 
In 1992, state owned banks employed 900,000 workers whose average pay was four 
times the usual pay of other workers. The union had the power to dictate the banks' 
operations. It refused to let the use of computers in more than one branch of every bank. 
In 1993, the union agreed to the introduction of computers at the rate of 1% per year for 
banks with fewer than 500 branches and 0.5% per-year for banks with more than 500 
branches. The profitability of the banks was eroded; in 1990 their profits were 1% of 
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capital employed. In contrast, foreign banks which were allowed to operate in the 
country were doing a lot better because the above rules did not apply to them. Since 1991, 
the banking sector has been included in the liberalisation agenda and changes have been 
made. The government bailed out problematic banks with re-capitalisation bonds; fresh 
capital for the banks while the government assumes their bad loans. The total bad loans 
of all 27 state banks in 1997 was 396 billion rupees, or 17% of their loan books. Since 
the reform started, the banks followed stricter accounting rules, have strong balance 
sheets and most have reported profits. The state banks could also issue shares and the 
foreign stock offering by the State Bank of India in 1997 was a big success. Many 
foreign financial institutions, such as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs, have pursue 
partnerships with Indian financial firms because the financial market in India is 
undeveloped and it has a great potential. Foreign banks have also helped Indian firms to 
raise capital abroad in the form of Global Depository Receipts. Since 1992, more than $5 
billion were raised by Indian firms this way. 
2.3.3. Mexico 
In 1928, the National Revolutionary Party - which today is named the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party - was established and has been in power ever since. It is the world's 
longest governing political party. Some of the party's economic policies was 
protectionism and import substitution. Mexico's growth rates for the last thirty years were 
low when compared to other developing countries. In the 15 years to 1981, Mexico's 
GDP grew by an average of 6.7% a year. From 1970 to 1982, Mexico's presidents - Luis 
Echeverria and Jose Lopez Portillio - followed expansionary policies which led to high 
inflation and deterioration of the balance of payments. Although government revenue 
grew in 1978 because of a high oil price, public spending grew even more. From 32% of 
GDP in 1978, public spending was raised to 48% of GDP in 1982. To cope with the 
increased spending, Mexico had to borrow from abroad. In the three years from 1979 to 
1982, Mexico debt increased from $50 billion to $90 billion, which was about 60% of 
GDP or 335% of annual exports. In the three years to 1981, the economy grew fast but 
inflation rose to 100%. The peso was fixed against the dollar so it became overvalued. To 
lower inflation, the government responded with controls in prices and imports. In 1981- 
82, the price of oil fell and the US, which was the main market for Mexican exports, went 
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into a recession (US short term interest rates jumped from 9% in 1978 to 17% in 1982). 
Mexican revenues fell and the dollar denominated national debt became more expensive. 
Foreign reserves dried up and the government imposed stiff import controls. Imports fell 
by 40% after the quota were imposed and economic growth stopped. In August 1982 
Mexico declared a moratorium on its debt repayment. 
Since then Mexico has been praised by world economists but its economic recovery has 
not been stable. After 1982, the Mexican government tightened fiscal and monetary 
policy, devalued the peso and implemented liberalisation policies suggested by the IMF. 
In 1984, the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR) was 8% of GDP, down from 
17% in 1982. As the economy was recovering, in 1985 an earthquake flattened Mexico 
City and in 1986 the oil price collapsed. The PSBR widened and the current account 
went back into deficit. In the two years to mid-1987, the peso was devalued by 45% 
giving a boost to exports but sending inflation to 160% in December 1987. One of the 
measures took by the government to combat inflation, was to freeze wages and salaries 
through the Economic Solidarity Pact of December 1987. This was an agreement with 
trade unions and businessmen to freeze wages and prices. By December 1988 inflation 
was down to 50%. The government continued its tight fiscal policy. In 1989, the budget 
deficit was 5.8% of GDP, down from 16% in 1986. The peso was devalued again in 1988 
by 20%. Between 1982 and 1988, GDP declined by an average 2% per year. Since 1988 
the country experienced some economic growth but not as high as it hoped for (for the 
period 1988 to 1993 the economy grew by an average of 3.5% per year). In 1993, the 
government push up interest rates and the economy went into recession. By 1994, 
inflation was very low (below 8%) and the budget was in surplus. However, interest rates 
were very high and small and medium companies which could not find finance outside 
Mexico had to pay real interest rates of 15-20%, driving thousands of them bankrupt. 
Mexico's exchange rate policy was to fix the peso against the dollar and at times it 
devalued the peso at a constant daily rate (e. g. in 1989 the peso was devalued at an annual 
rate of 14%). That rate of devaluation was much lower than the rate of inflation and 
although it reduced inflationary expectations it resulted in an overvalued peso. At times 
when the peso looked very expensive residents sent their capital abroad forcing the 
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government to raise interest rates in order to keep foreign exchange into the country (in 
1989 the real interest rate was 35%). Eventually the government was forced to devalue 
the peso in December 1994, in the wake of a major crisis which spread in other Latin 
American countries (the `tequila' effect). The 1994 crisis was devastating for Mexico. 
GDP fell by almost 7% in 1995. The country did not have enough foreign reserves to 
service its debt. Eventually, it was bailed out by a US $40 billion rescue plan. After the 
devaluation, exports rose sharply and by 1996 the country showed strong signs of 
recovery. The peso was allowed to float freely against the dollar so that a devaluation 
would not have to happen again. 
Since 1982 the Mexican government implemented reform policies. The first step for 
Mexico was to join the GATT in 1986 and liberalise its trade. This forced Mexican 
companies to compete with foreign companies. Between 1982 and 1994 the Mexican 
economy was completely transformed. The protectionist, state-led country became an 
open country with market oriented policies. Import quotas were abolished and tariffs 
were lowered from an average of 45% in 1982 (and ranging up to 200%), to an average of 
11% in 1987 (and ranging up to 20%). In 1982,95% of imports needed licences and in 
1987 only 6% of imports needed licences. Personal income tax was cut from 50% to 35% 
and corporate tax from 56% to 35%. Tax loopholes were closed. President Salinas set up 
an anti-regulation agency, whose job was to scrap regulation which made opening and 
operating a business difficult. The Salinas government also liberalised foreign investment 
so that every investment of less than $100 million was automatically approved, unless it 
was in industries of strong national interest such as banking and oil. The central bank was 
given independence. The agricultural sector was also reformed. Until then, land in 
Mexico was given to farmers through the ejidos; collective firms where the farmers did 
not own the land. This system made sure that all farmers had land. The problem with the 
system was that farmers did not have any incentive to invest in the land since they were 
not assured of its use. Throughout the 80's investment in agriculture was less than 2% of 
output. Under the reform system, farmers would have ownership of their land and they 
could seek joint ventures with foreign investors. 
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In 1994, Mexico joined the North America Free Trade Area. Another part of the reforms 
was the privatisation programme. The government tried to limit its involvement in the 
market by selling or closing down state owned companies. From the 1,155 parastatals in 
1982,230 were privatised raising $3 billion and hundreds of others were closed by 1990. 
Between June 1991 and July 1992, the 18 state national commercial banks were 
privatised yielding $12.4 billion. Most of the privatisation proceeds were used to pay the 
country's debt. 
Banks were nationalised in 1982 for $600 million by President Jose Lopez Portillio. 
About ten years later the government decided to privatise them again. The main reason 
banks were nationalised was because after the 1982 crisis most banks were technically 
bankrupt. Throughout the 80's companies and consumers had very little access to finance 
because most banks were unable to lend any money. Most of the credit during that period 
was provided by the government. At the end of 1991, M4 as a percentage of GDP was 
about 46% when in other countries it was more than 100%. At that time there was only 
one branch per 18,000 people compared with one for every 2,000 in Western Europe. 
Consumer loans in Mexico represented about 5% of GDP compared with about 50% in 
Canada. Investors realised that the banking sector in Mexico had enormous potential and 
paid more than three times book value to buy into the banks during the privatisation 
programme. After the privatisation in 1992, bank loans grew by 25%. Banks were 
allowed to compete with each other since interest rates were liberalised in two stages in 
1988 and 1989. More than half the banks were bought by securities firms and formed 
financial groups. After liberalisation, it seemed that banks were still taking the same risks 
that nearly made them bankrupt in 1982. A lot of the banks were borrowing dollars and 
lending pesos, taking advantage of the stable exchange rate and the big difference 
between Mexican and US inflation. In order to avoid another crisis the central bank 
limited banks' foreign exchange liabilities to 10% of their total borrowings. Several of 
the banks had a large percentage of bad loans in their portfolios. Overdue loans in 1992, 
accounted for 4.7% of total loans while some banks had up to 14% of their loans not 
paying interest. About 9% of credit card loans were overdue. The problems escalated in 
1995, following the December 1994 peso devaluation. Several banks avoided bankruptcy 
thanks to government schemes which bailed them out. These schemes included the sale of 
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one tenth of all debts to the government, real interest rate cups and the lengthening of 
some debts' maturities. The government created an agency to restructure and sell many of 
the banks' assets which it held, trying to create a secondary market for bank loans. In 
1996, bad loans accounted for more than 30% of banks' total loans. Banks were not 
allowed to consolidate and foreign firms could not have more than 1.5% of the market in 
1992. By 1996, about 14% of Mexico's banking industry belonged to foreigners. 
The Mexican stock market is very volatile compared to other emerging stock markets. 
After the 1982 crisis, the Mexican Bolsa was one of the most profitable in the world. 
Between 1982 and 1987 the market rose 16-fold. In 1982 there were 66,000 accounts 
with stock brokers and in 1987 the figure was 312,000. The equity market was dominated 
by five big companies (Telemex, the communications monopoly, Televisa, the 
broadcasting giant, Cemex, the cement producer, ICA, the construction and engineering 
company and Vitro, the flat glass produce). Foreign participation in the Bolsa was 
relatively small (22% of market capitalisation in 1992) but accounted for 60% of the 
market's turnover. Between 1982 and 1997 the market had two major crashes, one in 
1987 before the peso devaluation and one in 1994 when the peso was devalued. However, 
for the rest of the period the index was still very volatile and the index experienced mini 
crashes (e. g. in September 1992 it lost one third of its value because of fears that Mexico 
would not join NAFTA and in April 1994, mainly because of political uncertainty). A lot 
of Mexican stock is traded in New York and in total, 41 stocks were traded in foreign 
markets in 1993. Because many Mexican blue chip are traded in the New York stock 
exchange which opens one hour earlier, prices in the Mexican Bolsa usually follow New 
York.. In 1993 legislation was approved to allow foreign stocks to trade in Mexico. 
2.3.4. South Korea 
The economic "miracle" of South Korea has for many years baffled the advocates of free 
market. From 1910 to 1945 Korea was under Japanese rule. When the war ended the 
country was split. Three quarters of South Korea's citizens were impoverished farmers. 
Since then the country has experienced spectacular economic growth. This growth was 
the result of the Korean model designed by Park Chung Hee who run the country from his 
coup in 1961, to 1979 when he was assassinated. Park directed investment towards the 
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development of heavy industry such as steel and shipbuilding. These industries were 
heavily subsidised. The focus then was on economic growth and nothing else. Wages 
were very low by international standards which made the South Korean products very 
competitive. The ingredients behind the spectacular South Korean economic growth were 
subsidised capital, imported technologies, low wages, promotion of exports and 
restriction of imports. 
The promotion of these industries resulted in the creation of huge conglomerates, the 
chaebol. Unlike India, where government intervention resulted in inefficient and loss 
making industries, the chaebol were very successful. POSCO, for example, the steel 
manufacturer, became in a few years a very efficient steel maker and successfully 
competes with Nippon Steel, the world's largest steel manufacturer. The economic 
success of South Korea during the late 1970s and early 80's was very high by 
international standards: between 1953 and 1988, national income in real terms had 
expanded by 1,200%. While in 1970 there were refrigerators in 2% of households and 
telephones in 4% of them, in 1988 three quarters of households had refrigerators and half 
of them had telephones. 
The government spent a lot of money on education: in 1960 27% of children were 
enrolled at school; in 1983 the same figure was 89%. There is also intense competition 
for university places since without a degree, a South Korean is expected to find a job only 
as a labourer. Another desirable effect of economic growth was the reduction in poverty: 
in 1965,40.9% of households were in absolute poverty; in 1980,9.8% of households 
were poor. The economic growth of the country had undesirable side-effects as well. The 
government did not concern itself with problems that could hamper the competitiveness 
of South Korean products by increasing their costs. So, the country was left with a big 
pollution problem, inadequate social welfare and no safety standards for workers. 
For all their success the chaebol had a big problem: to expand rapidly they borrowed vast 
amounts both domestically (low rate loans) and abroad. In 1986, South Korea's debt was 
$46 billion, the largest in Asia. The chaebol, assured of government protection, continued 
to borrow and expand their operations in every sector they could. Furthermore, the 
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chaebol distorted competition. A chaebol subsidiary could drive competition out of 
business because it enjoyed easy access to capital, political contacts, a ready-made 
customer base and the ability to sustain losses for a prolonged period since the parent 
company would always cover them. However, if business slowed down, the chaebol 
would be unable to service their huge debts. Because of their size, this would have a 
devastating effect on their associate companies and banking system and the whole 
economy could become unstable. 
The administration of Chun Doo Hwan, which succeeded Park, tried to break up the 
chaebol and reduce their importance in the economy. They also tried to reduce 
government intervention and introduce liberalisation policies8. The government 
introduced legislation to stop chaebol member firms guaranteeing loans for another 
member, restrict cross-shareholdings, reduce indebtedness by issuing shares and limit 
their operations to two or three industries. The first major incident of a chaebol in trouble 
was in 1985, when Kukje, the sixth biggest chaebol, collapsed resulting in the write off or 
roll over of 900 billion won of loans. In 1997, a full blown economic crisis hit South 
Korea resulting in thousands of bankruptcies. 
In. December 1987, South Korea saw democracy and an elected president after many 
years of colonial rule and dictatorships. Democracy brought pressure on the government 
to increase the low wages and trade unions gained significant power. Between 1987 and 
1992, average wages rose by more than 18% a year, while productivity rose by only 10% 
a year according to estimates of the Bank of Korea. 
The banking sector of South Korea had been used to develop the heavy industry. The 
country's four commercial banks were nationalised under Park and privatised during the 
1980s. Five more banks were allowed to open up. The government did not let the banks 
assess the riskiness of their borrowers because the development of the market was not 
based on market forces but the state's industrial plan. Although the country has several 
successful companies, several others failed leaving the banks full of bad debts, which in 
1987 accounted for 10% of total commercial bank lending. In the 1980s the government 
8 For a review of the 1980s reforms in South Korea, see: Amsden and Euh (1993). 
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decided to interfere less in companies' investment decisions but it still promoted favoured 
sectors of industry and the banks had to finance them. In 1990, these "policy loans" 
accounted for 54% of total bank lending.. In 1982, the government abolished preferential 
lending rates and set all bank lending rates at 10%. However, lending at preferential rates 
of interest continued after that. In December 1988, the government liberalised interest 
rates and in theory it would not interfere with banking operations any more, which did 
not happen. The Ministry of Finance suggested to banks both deposit and loan rates 
through "window guidance". This aimed to prevent interest rates from rising too high. 
This unsuccessful liberalisation attempt was followed by another on November 1st, 1993. 
Also, rules preventing competition among different types of financial institutions were 
relaxed. The liberalisation process continued in more recent years. On December 17th, 
1996, the government announced that regulators would force unsound banks out of 
business. All the reform policies aimed to strengthen the banks position. The reason 
banks came into such trouble is not only because they had to lend to projects suggested 
by the government. The banks were also "encouraged" by the Ministry of Finance to act 
as a shock absorber for the stock market. When the stock market was overheated, banks 
were instructed to sell shares and when the market was bearish banks were instructed to 
buy shares. This practise resulted in large losses for banks: in 1996, analysts in Seoul 
estimated that shares owned by South Korean banks were worth $5 billion less than the 
banks paid for them. Another source of losses for banks was the use of real estate as 
collateral from borrowing companies. When the real estate bubble burst in South Korea, 
banks faced large losses. Korea First Bank, a commercial bank, was in serious trouble 
and was bailed out by the government in September 1997, with an emergency loan of 
$1.1 billion. In October 1997, the government had to provide another $1.1 billion to 16 
merchant banks9 to avoid bankruptcy. Despite the problems, the government still urged 
banks to lend money to ailing firms. 
The development of the stock market in South Korea was also a part of the government's 
development plan. The government did not want to let interest rates rise and saw the 
9 Merchant banks in South Korea are not like the merchant banks operating in the rest of the world. Their 
function is to provide short time loans to companies too frail to borrow from commercial banks or issue 
bonds. 
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stock market as a useful instrument to mobilise domestic savings. Another function of the 
stock market was to diffuse the wealth of the chaebol to the general public. To achieve 
that, the government forced the chaebol to raise capital from the stock market with a 
series of measures. It restricted them from borrowing from abroad and enforced debt- 
equity ceilings. The stock market was closed to foreign investors until January 1992. 
Until then, foreigners could buy into Korean companies through country funds and 
convertible bonds. A real-time computerised trading system existed only for a handful of 
the most traded shares and rules and regulation were not properly formed. 
In May 1990, the government launched a four trillion won "stock market stabilisation 
fund". The money came from securities companies, financial institutions and listed 
companies. The role of the stabilisation fund was to respond to excessive changes in the 
stock market: when the market was bullish the fund sold shares and when it was bearish it 
bought shares. The Korean stock market experienced a boom in the late 1980s and the 
stock market became very popular with investors and companies. The number of listed 
companies increased from 352 in 1980 to 686 in 1991 and in the same period the stock 
market capitalisation grew tenfold. In 1992, the market opened to foreigners but not 
completely. Foreign ownership of a company could not exceed 10%, with some 
exceptions. Foreigners were initially slow to enter the South Korean market but towards 
the end of 1992 inflows picked up. In the first quarter of 1993, $1.2 billion entered the 
stock market from abroad and pushed prices up. By that time 27 foreign securities houses 
had representative offices in Seoul. In December 1994, the ceiling on foreign ownership 
rose to 12% and was later raised further with the intention to eventually abolish it. To 
further develop the financial market the government listed a stock-index futures contract 
in May 1996. 
2.3.5. Taiwan 
The economic success of Taiwan is similar to that of South Korea. The country became 
from an agricultural economy an industrial one within three decades. Between 1950 and 
1980 the number of factories in Taiwan increased from 5,623 to 62,474. Exports were 
promoted and imports were restricted with tariffs. The main difference between South 
Korea and Taiwan is that although both countries had restrictions on international trade 
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and capital, the Taiwanese government did not impose severe restrictions domestically. 
More specifically, prices were left on market forces and interest rates were not kept 
artificially low. The lack of cheap credit forced the companies to become equity-based 
and did not allow them to grow to the size of the South Korean chaebol. The market in its 
majority is composed by small and medium enterprises, of which there were about 
700,000 registered in 1983. Apart from the monetary policy, fiscal policy was also tight: 
since the late 1960s the budget was always on surplus except for a few rare occasions. 
Also, Taiwan did not rely on foreign debt too much. Its foreign debt-was always one of 
the lowest in East Asia and at the end of 1997 it was a negligible $100 million. The 
country's growth came exclusively from exports. The country has presented a trade 
surplus almost every year, for the last thirty years. This surplus resulted in the 
accumulation of huge foreign reserves; in 1997, these reserves amounted to $82 billion. 
The economic success of Taiwan has resulted in a dramatic increase of income for the 21 
million Taiwanese. Annual income per person is about $10,000 when forty years ago 
most Taiwanese lived in poverty. Unemployment has officially been around 1% for the 
last thirty years. Virtually all Taiwanese know how to write and read and some 45% of 
them get higher education. Life expectancy has increased by 15 years compared to 1950. 
All households have a television and there was one car for every ten people in 1990. 
There is no welfare system in the country. The old, the sick, student and unemployed are 
left in the care of their family. This is balanced by the very low income tax. Urbanisation 
has seen many young Taiwanese going to cities to get a job and an increased cost of 
living in the cities, mainly because of the soaring property prices. In 1997, the 
government was working on a national pension scheme. 
A big part of the Taiwanese economy is black economy. The size of the black economy is 
estimated to be about 40% of the official one. Actual foreign investment made by 
Taiwanese is a matter of guesswork. In 1988, the Ministry of Economic Affairs said that 
it approved $218 million of overseas investment, but Thailand alone said that for that 
year it accepted $2.1 billion of foreign investment from Taiwan. The most developed part 
of the black economy is the financial market. Taiwan has an underground futures market, 
and off-exchange stock market, a black-market foreign exchange network and an 
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underground banking system. All these are so developed that are considered as part of the 
official market. Especially the black market lending industry is so well-established that 
the central bank publishes monthly statistics of the prevailing interest rates in that market. 
The Taiwanese stock market was one of the most volatile in the world during the late 
1980s and 1990s. The share price index went from 1,000 in 1986 to 12,500 in 1990 and 
turnover for that period was one of the highest in the world. In 1990 it fell to 2,500. For 
the rest of the period it followed an upward trend but with large fluctuations. The 
Taiwanese became rich because of the country's economic success but did not have many 
investment outlets. They were not allowed to invest abroad and for those who did not 
want to do physical investment there were two main options: the stock market and the 
real estate market. During the late 1980s both markets overheated because of increasing 
demand and speculation and during the 1990s both markets collapsed. The Taiwanese 
stock market was rather small in size (only 130 companies listed) and closed to foreigners 
during the boom. The only way foreigners could buy into the stock market was through 
funds traded abroad: the Taiwan ROC, Formosa and Taipei funds listed in London and 
the Taiwan fund listed in New York. Because of the scarcity of Taiwanese stock these 
funds traded at prices much higher that their original price. However, the stock market 
did not probably represent the Taiwanese economy. The success of the economy was due 
to the thousand small and medium firms which are not listed on the stock market. 
Furthermore, 25% of the index's composition was made up by the banking sector which 
was government controlled and rarely traded. The Taiwanese stock market acquired the 
reputation of a casino. The government took some steps towards developing the stock 
market with a series of reforms in 1988: tighter regulation, introduction of a tax on capital 
tax gains to slow down the boom, the end of a 15-year old ban on new securities firms 
and the allowance of foreigners to invest in local broking firms. Due to these measures 
the number of brokerages went from 28 to 320 within four years. The boom ended in 
1990 when the central bank increased interest rates in an attempt to reduce money growth 
and restrain inflation. In 1991, foreign investors were allowed to buy Taiwanese shares 
but only limited; foreigners could but only 4.9% of the local market. Since then the limit 
on foreign money entering the stock market was raised gradually. 
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The banking sector in Taiwan is also not very well developed compared to other 
countries. All banks were state-run. Foreign banks in Taiwan were not very active 
because of the government's unwillingness to liberalise this sector. Most foreign banks 
operating in the country were limited to just one branch. Most of the lending to 
companies was done through the massive illegal market in financial services. This 
- comprised some 200 investment companies which were illegal deposit takers which 
offered high interest rates. In most years, Taiwan saved more than it invested. Until 1987 
it was a criminal offence to bounce a cheque. Collateral, almost double the face value of 
the loan, was almost always demanded in order to provide a loan. Foreign banks could 
not operate efficiently, too, because the government restrained them by regulating their 
lending, deposit-taking and reserves. The sector's supervision was inadequate and in 
1995, it was revised by the government. In the late 1980s, the government decided to 
slowly liberalise the banking sector. In 1988, it allowed all Taiwanese banks to set up 
branches overseas to locations of their preference. To create competition, the government 
allowed in 1989 private banks to enter the market. In 1990, it started selling its share of 
the three biggest commercial banks. At the same time, it relaxed the restrictions on 
foreign banks operations and allowed more foreign banks to enter the market. By 1992, 
there were 16 privately owned commercial banks and 15 more were authorised. In 
addition to that, there were 37 foreign banks in the country and another 22 had 
representative offices. The liberalisation process continued for the rest of the sample 
period. More state banks were privatised (partially), foreign banks gained more freedom 
to expand their operations and the sector became more strictly regulated. 
2.4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we provided a brief overview of foreign investment in several emerging 
economies as well as a profile of the five countries included in our first test. The 
overview at the beginning of the chapter also serves to indicate the importance of 
examining issues surrounding the development of emerging stock markets. 
Flows in these markets increased dramatically during the last 20 years. Market 
capitalisation in both regions increased by more than ten times since the late 1980s. This 
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trend suggests that stock markets in these economies are becoming more and more 
important, not only for these countries but as a part of the world market. 
The profiles of the five countries should help us understand better some of the issues 
involved in emerging financial markets and put the results presented later into 
perspective. All countries moved towards a more liberal economy but each country 
followed a specific path towards liberalisation and liberalised its economy to a different 
degree. Our sample should provide an interesting case study because we can link the 
economic policies adopted by each country to our results and evaluate the effectiveness of 
these economic policies. The selected countries offer a wide range of economic regimes, 
from the very liberal Chilean and Mexican economies to the rather restrictive Indian 
economy. Bearing in mind the characteristics of each economy, we now move to discuss 
the economic theories on stock market liberalisation. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1. Introduction 
Before moving on to consider the perspectives on financial liberalisation, it is useful to 
attempt a simple schematic outline of the approaches. This will of necessity be broad and 
sometimes imprecise but is intended to simply provide some context to the discussion. 
The arguments for and against the financial liberalisation thesis are provided by the neo- 
classical and the Keynesian schools of thought and reflect their somewhat different views 
of the economy. The neo-classical economists believe that the economy is supply-driven 
and demand simply follows. Neo-classical economists accept Say's law (that supply 
creates its own demand) so supply and demand always coincide. 
Central in the neo-classical theory is the assumption of price flexibility which is used to 
ensure equilibrium. Moreover, nominal wages are flexible downwards and they can move 
the economy from a position of involuntary unemployment to a position of full 
employment. Another feature of the neo-classical theory is that the interest rate is 
determined by savings and investment. Savings precede investment and are determined 
by the interest rate. Money supply is largely considered exogenous in the neo-classical 
theory. An important feature of this approach towards financial institutions, is that they 
are considered simply as intermediaries between savers and lenders. Banks are restrained 
in their lending by reserve requirements. Both the monetary system and the liquidity 
system (financial institutions), do not give any feedback in the economy when interest 
rates or prices change. In this sense, their role is a passive one. 
One of the most important features of the neo-classical theory is the significance of 
market forces. Neo-classical economists believe that the economy adjusts at the position 
of full employment on its own, if it is left to operate alone. The basic assumptions behind 
the market forces is that individuals maximise their utility and firms maximise their 
profits. 
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The simple neo-classical models were criticised by Keynes (1936) who argued that the 
economy does not have to reach the level of full employment. Instead there can be an 
equilibrium at a lower level. The economy according to Keynes is demand driven and 
current demand is based on expectations of future demand. Investment does not depend 
heavily on the interest rate since most investment is carried out by the companies' 
retained earnings. The latter are based on the mark up companies put on their products 
which is determined by the need for future investment and the availability of external 
finance. Keynes argued that the economy does not have a natural tendency to reach 
equilibrium because of rigidities in prices and wages. Because prices and wages do not 
move downwards in the Keynesian framework, Say's law cannot work'. 
The Keynesian criticisms led to the neo-classical synthesis [Hicks (1937), Samuelson 
(1948)] which borrowed elements from the two schools of thought. The neo-classical 
synthesis assumes that Say's law holds and ensures full employment in an economy. 
However, the natural tendency of an economy to return to the level of full employment 
may be hampered by the Keynesian assumptions which the synthesis accepts. Downward 
price and wage rigidity may keep the economy away from full employment in the short 
run. Other assumptions of the neo-classical synthesis are a liquidity trap and the 
inelasticity of investment with respect to the interest rate. 
Because of the assumptions of the synthesis, the economy may be below full employment 
for a considerable amount of time. It is therefore, necessary for the government to 
intervene in order to restore full employment. Economic policy in this framework 
depends on the estimation of multipliers which show the effect of changes of exogenous 
variables (taxes, government expenditure) on the economy. The problem with this 
method is that the multipliers are estimated to account for the effect of a particular policy 
on the economy. However, their estimation depends on historical data which refer to 
periods when this particular policy was not necessarily pursued. Therefore, the 
multipliers will give the wrong signals. Also, this approach does not accommodate the 
For a discussion on the differences between neo-classical and Keynesian models, see: Levacic and 
Rebmann (1982). 
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reaction of economic agents. The problems of this approach are discussed by Lucas 
(1976). 
The Keynesian criticism of the neo-classical model and the neo-classical synthesis, has 
lad a group of economists to form what is known as the post-Keynesian school of thought 
[Arestis (1988,1992), Arestis and Skouras (1985), Palley (1996)]. Post-Keynesian 
economics is an updated and extended version of Keynes' theory. So, as in Keynesian 
economics, post-Keynesian believe that output depends on demand and that the most 
important factor affecting output today is expectations for future demand. So, agents form 
their expectations for the future and invest accordingly2. Post-Keynesian investment 
theory differs from Keynes investment theory in that not only expected profitability 
matters but realised investment matters as well because it creates profits which can be 
3'a reinvested 
The level of demand depends on investment as well as on consumption spending, which 
is a function of employment. Post-Keynesians do not accept Say's law, not only because 
of price and wages being downward rigid, the liquidity trap and the interest inelasticity of 
investment but also because demand may simply not be enough to cover supply, because 
of pessimistic expectations for the future. 
Clearly there are two basic theoretical directions provided by the schools of thought 
outlined above: a laissez-faire and an interventionist one. The neo-classical theory and 
the neo-classical synthesis both favour a liberal economy where market forces are 
allowed to operate freely. The post-Keynesians argue that government intervention is 
essential because there is no mechanism which ensures full employment. Instead, the 
economy may possibly experience crises which can be avoided (or become milder) if the 
economic authorities intervene. Obviously, the differences in these directions have 
2 In the post-Keynesian theory as in the Keynesian theory, investment is determined by `animal spirits'. 
3 See: Kalecki, 1971. Retained profits explain why interest rates are of secondary importance to investment. 
Retained profits are internal funds which companies can use irrespective of the interest rate. The latter only 
matters when companies wish to raise additional finance. 
4 Another factor affecting investment is technological change, which contrary to neo-classical economics is 
endogenous. 
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implications for the theoretical developments on financial markets in emerging 
economies. 
3.2. The financial markets development in emerging economies 
Until recently, most developing countries had adopted protectionist policies. They 
believed that openness to foreign investment from the developed countries would result 
in exploitation of their natural resources and not in domestic development. So, several of 
these countries tried to completely insulate their economies from any external influence 
believing that they could achieve some degree of self efficiency. They also tried to 
manipulate their domestic economies by means of low interest rates, minimum wages, 
etc. This was the reason behind interventionist policies such as the import substitution 
policies implemented by India and Mexico5. After the debt crisis of the 1980's, several 
developing countries had to change their ways because they had failed to achieve the 
growth levels of developed countries and were still depending on them for finance. The 
theoretical justification for financial liberalisation was provided by Shaw (1973) and 
McKinnon (1973). Both these economists argued that the problem with developing 
countries was their governments' interference with the economy. Their approach is a neo- 
classical one, where financial markets can promote economic growth if they are 
deregulated. 
The next section gives a brief description of the main features of financial repression. 
Following that is the neo-classical propositions for financial liberalisation and a critique 
of these propositions from a post-Keynesian perspective. 
3.2.1. The financial repression paradigm 
The main feature of financial repression is low nominal interest rates [Fry (1997) p. 76]. 
These are believed to assist economic growth through increased investment. Capital, 
under these conditions, is cheap and there is always excess demand for investment. Real 
interest rates are sometimes zero or negative since they do not cover the rather high 
inflation rates usually found in developing countries. High inflation is created by a 
5 For a discussion on the reasons for and effectiveness of import substitution policies, see Bruton (1998). 
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growth in nominal money that exceeds growth in real money balances demanded 
[Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992)]. The result of low interest rates is low savings which 
are not enough to cover the demand for investment. Therefore, credit is rationed (which 
has implications for the efficiency of the resource allocation, as we shall discuss in the 
next section), and curb markets for credit are created, where interest rates are extremely 
high, for finance which is predominantly short term. Another part of financial repression 
is cheap foreign exchange. The price of foreign exchange is kept artificially low and 
imports are relatively cheap. This allows entrepreneurs to buy capital equipment from 
abroad cheaply. Consumption goods imports are usually restricted or the import quotas 
are so high that these products are too expensive for the people of the developing 
economy. 
Because capital is very cheap, the growing industry of the financially repressed economy 
is capital intensive[see: Shaw (1973) p. 13]. The result is high unemployment and only a 
small percentage of the population is qualified to work for the capital intensive industry. 
In order to fund its social security system and its development programme, the 
government can rely on few sources of finance. The largest part of that finance comes 
from the country's few exports and import quotas. Since revenues are usually not enough 
to cover expenditure, governments have to rely on inflation to finance their deficits [Fry 
(1997) p. 31]. To cover the high demand for capital, governments borrow from abroad, 
most times at high interest rates, and then ration the money themselves. 
These are some of the aspects of financial repression. Although these are its main 
features, policies vary from country to country. Financial repression aims to manipulate 
the economy. To this end, all prices in the economy are distorted to serve the 
government's plan. Another aim of this policy is to isolate the country and make it 
independent of foreigners. This is usually the result of popular sentiment after 
colonialism (e. g. India). Although financial repression was very popular among 
developing countries until the 1980s, there are not many success stories. The best known 
success story (until recently) was South Korea. After the debt crisis, it became obvious 
that financial repression had failed to contribute to the economic development of these 
countries. One alternative was provided by the financial liberalisation thesis. 
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3.2.2. The financial liberalisation thesis 
The financial liberalisation theory was first developed by McKinnon(1973) and Shaw 
(1973). Its basic argument is that interest rate liberalisation will increase savings and 
investment and result in faster economic growth and that increased real interest rates will 
only allow the most productive projects to go through, increasing thus the efficiency of 
investment. The whole process aims to develop the capital markets of the developing 
countries to achieve what Shaw (1973) calls financial deepening. This is based 
predominantly on neo-classical assumptions about interest rates, financial markets 
functioning and the economy in general (e. g. one of the basic assumptions of the thesis is 
that only real money are important and there is no money illusion). The advocates of this 
thesis6 argue that if interest rates are liberalised in developing countries, then they will 
rise and real interest rates will rise too. The higher interest rates will attract more savings 
because of the higher return. These savings will be channelled in the economy in the form 
of investment. The real growth of the financial institutions provides potential lenders with 
a bigger and more efficient market for credit. The assumptions made about the financial 
institutions is a typical neo-classical one: their role is to intermediate between borrowers 
and lenders. Furthermore, it is assumed that financial services become cheaper and more 
efficient as capital markets develop. Financial firms compete with each other driving the 
cost of intermediation down and, in trying to identify the best investment opportunities, 
they generate information and provide access to finance only to the `best' investments. 
Another effect of financial liberalisation is the reversal of capital flight. Since savers have 
access to interest rates as high as in other economies, they have no incentive to send their 
money abroad. This serves to further increase savings in the developing country and 
promote investment. The developing country will have no reason to prohibit capital flows 
and the foreign exchange rate will stabilise at a level reflecting the country's economic 
condition. At that point, access to foreign capital markets should become easier. This 
effect together with the increase of savings serves to fill the dual gap in developing 
countries: the gap between savings and investment and the gap between investment and 
foreign exchange (if most of the planned investment is based on capital imports). 
6McKinnon and Shaw were hugely influential and several academics and policy makers supported their 
theories; for example, see Drake (1980). 
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The financial liberalisation thesis claims that unemployment should fall following reform 
policies. Following the neo-classical assumptions about market forces, advocates of the 
thesis argue that unemployment in developing countries is high because of financial 
repression. The very low interest rates combined with high minimum wages, make 
investors choose capital intensive production, even though labour is the one thing 
developing countries have in abundance. If market forces are allowed to operate, capital 
intensive productions will become too expensive for the developing countries relative to 
labour intensive productions. The wage will fall and the demand for labour should 
increase (especially since the exchange rate will fall making domestic products 
competitive abroad and thus, increasing output). 
3.2.3. Post-Keynesian criticism of the financial liberalisation thesis 
Post-Keynesian economics agree with part of the above theory: that the development of 
financial intermediation in an economy can and should help economic growth. However, 
it is clear from the above that the financial liberalisation thesis is a supply-led theory; it 
assumes that the supply of finance will be used to stimulate investment. Post-Keynesian 
economists believe that the economy of any country is demand-led and the development 
of the financial sector will follow the increasing demand for financial instruments, as the 
economy grows. 
A problem of the liberalisation thesis may be that interest rates do not affect the level of 
savings but the way they are held [Dow and Earl (1982)]. As interest rates rise, savers 
will be induced to switch from holding cash to financial assets and may even be tempted 
to increase savings, but the main effect of such a policy will not increase savings 
dramatically7. According to the post-Keynesian theory, savings can only increase if 
income increases, so people will spend a smaller proportion of their income. However, 
income increases when investment increases, therefore, the only way to increase savings 
is to stimulate the demand side of the economy. 
7 In fact, under certain circumstances, higher interest rates may result in lower savings. For a discussion, 
see: Akyuz, 1992. 
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Even if savings increased, there is no guarantee that it would be used for investment 
purposes. Contrary to neo-classical theory, post-Keynesians argue that investment 
depends on the rate of return on capital and it does not have to reach an equilibrium with 
savings. In developing countries, real returns on capital are lower than in developed 
countries. Khatkhate (1980) argues that this is the reason behind the low incomes 
observed in these countries. In order to increase investment, interest rates would have to 
rise but not above the rate of return on capital. This would not be a problem, if the capital 
account of these countries was closed (and the authorities had the means of effectively 
policing capital flows). Because rates of return on capital are always higher in developed 
countries, capital would naturally flow to developed markets, leaving the developing ones 
with a financial capital shortage. Therefore, letting interest rates rise, will not be an 
effective way of increasing investment in these countries. In this respect, it is the 
openness proposed by the liberalisation thesis which, makes it difficult for developing 
countries to stimulate investment8. 
3.3. Issues examined 
Obviously, the liberalisation reforms followed by developing countries, created a large 
number of issues needed to be examined by economists. Especially since most countries 
followed a unique path to liberalising their economies and pushed the reforms to different 
degrees, there is clearly a need for a lot of research to be carried out in the area in order to 
identify not only the impact of financial liberalisation on these economies, but also to 
compare different reform paths and identify the strengths and weaknesses of each one9. 
Clearly, this is a huge task which will require a considerable amount of research. Since 
the theoretical arguments point to two different directions, the analysis of these issues 
will have to be an empirical one. In this thesis, we examine three issues concerning the 
development of stock markets in developing countries. These are the impact of the stock 
market development on economic development, the change in stock market volatility 
after foreign investors were allowed to enter these markets and the change in the degree 
8 At this point, it should be noted that the capital flow restrictions which are in place in several developing 
countries do not work anyway. Capitalists usually find a way of exporting capital illegally. 9 Horne (1995) provides a discussion on several issues surrounding the economies of transition. 
46 
of integration (or segmentation) of national emerging stock markets, following 
liberalisation. 
3.3.1. Stock market expansion and economic development in emerging economies 
The development of stock markets in emerging economies is a rather recent phenomenon. 
It started in the early 1980s mainly because of the third world debt crisis. The World 
Development Report for 1989 suggested that government-directed credit - which was 
often subsidised - to priority industries in these economies failed to assist economic 
growth, and as a result, the World Institute of Development Economics Research 
(WIDER) Study Group proposed the development of equity markets in these countries as 
a way to attract foreign capital. It also proposed the abandonment of the IMF article 
which allowed member countries to exercise controls in international capital movements 
and promoted the development of stock markets as an alternative to debt finance. It 
argued that the establishment of an equity market is of vital importance for, economic 
development in every country. 
The theoretical discussion on capital market development in developing countries begins 
with the work of Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973). Keynesian economists challenge 
the validity of the neo-classical propositions both at a theoretical and an empirical level 
[Akyuz (1991)]. The main points of their criticism are based on the relationship between 
savings and investment and the savings behaviour of individuals. They argue that the 
assumption that higher interest rates will lead into higher corporate investment through 
higher savings of the personal sector, will depend on the savings propensity of the parties 
involved [Akyuz (1992)]. Higher interest rates could reduce corporate profits so, if the 
savings propensity of individuals is lower than that of the corporations, total savings will 
fall (Akyuz's discussion of the Turkish financial liberalisation experience shows that 
higher interest rates can have a random impact on total savings). 
Furthermore, Hoffman and Stiglitz (1991) argue that even if credit markets were perfect, 
they could still not allocate credit efficiently because of asymmetric information. Interest 
rates function as a pricing mechanism as well as an instrument indicating the riskiness of 
the borrower. If there is excess demand for credit, financial institutions will ration credit 
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rather than increase interest rates, since the riskier rather than the most efficient 
borrowers will accept these higher interest rates. Stiglitz (1994) advocates government 
intervention since financial markets are prone to failures mainly because of information 
imperfections. Fry (1997), however, argues that information imperfections can be 
addressed within a liberalised financial environment. Moreover, financial repression does 
not guarantee improvement of capital allocation efficiency. The main problem with 
Stiglitz's propositions is that they rely on an exemplary government, which is rarely the 
case. An example of successful government intervention has been the Korean economic 
miracle10 but, as Fry argues, "there are extremely few other developing countries for 
which the same claim could be upheld"11 (p. 761). 
3.3.1.1. The role of the stock market in an economy 
Some economic researchers cast doubt on the usefulness of a stock exchange - even a 
well developed one - compared to a bank oriented system in enhancing economic growth. 
There is evidence which suggests that the stock market has not contributed in the 
financing of physical investment in the UK and the US during the last two decades. For 
example, Mayer (1988) finds that during the 1970s and 1980s, the stock market made a 
negative contribution to investment in the UK and US, and surprisingly, a small positive 
contribution in Germany and Japan where the role of the stock market is rather limited. 
In terms of economic growth and international competitiveness, Germany and Japan have 
been more successful than the US and the UK. It is argued that the Anglo-Saxon 
countries are at a disadvantage mainly because of short termism in investment 
opportunities [e. g. Financial Times, 24 April 1990; MIT (1989)]. This short term attitude 
towards investment is closely related with the active role of the stock market in these 
economies. 
10 For a discussion of the process which led to the economic success of South Korea in the 1980s see 
Amsden and Euh (1992). 
11 The best example is the financial liberalisation in Latin American economies which proved disastrous 
mainly because of inadequate or inappropriate government regulation. Especially with respect to the 
banking sector, government regulation resulted in the destabilisation of the banking system like the bank 
run in Argentina, when on 28 March 1980 the Banko de Intercambio Regional closed for liquidation. For 
a discussion of the liberalisation programmes implemented in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay during the late 
1970s and early 1980s, see Corbo and De Melo (1985), and Diaz-Alejandro (1985). 
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In Germany and Japan the financial system is bank based. Banks in these countries have a 
long term relationship with their clients and often there is cross ownership between 
financial institutions and industrial corporations. In this environment managers are not 
concerned with short term stock price fluctuations, but are focused on the long term 
instead. Because of the close relationship between banks and corporations, the latter 
often have a low cost of capital and can accept a low rate of return (in the case of Japan, 
government intervention, too, has contributed in the low cost of capital). The MIT 
Commission Report gives examples of markets where Japanese companies went in and 
accepted low rates of return, which has contributed in the development of the real 
economy and international competitiveness of Japan. Such investment opportunities 
cannot be accepted in the Anglo-Saxon economies since the stock market would punish a 
low rate of return. 
These observations which are often cited in the economic growth literature, echo Keynes 
thoughts "... the spectacle of modem investment markets has sometimes moved me 
towards the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and 
indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, might be a 
useful remedy for our contemporary evils. For this would force the investor to direct his 
mind to the long-term prospects and to those only" [Keynes (1936) p. 160]. 
With respect to corporate growth, the role of the stock market has been a controversial 
issue for many years. The neo-classical view until recently was dominated by the 
"irrelevance theorems" developed by Modigliani and Miller (1958). These theorems 
argue that the capital structure of the corporation is not related to its economic 
performance. The latter depends only on expectations about future earnings and that 
would be the only basis for the corporation's share valuation. However, this view was 
generally rejected because when the complexities of the real world are considered it does 
not hold. Such complexities involve taxation issues, asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders, moral hazard, agency costs and transaction costs [Edwards 
(1988); Mayer (1988)]. The Keynesian approach assumes imperfect capital markets in 
relation to transaction costs and the availability of relevant information to all participants. 
In the Keynesian view, the firm's capital structure, its dividend pay-out decisions and its 
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retained earnings are important variables in determining the firm's share price and its 
investment opportunities. 12 
3.3.1.2. Equity markets versus banks 
Theory supports that financial intermediation can enhance economic growth. The 
question arises as to what kind of financial intermediation is appropriate for developing 
countries; i. e. equity markets or a banking oriented system. Most developing economies 
have traditionally been bank oriented. So, why should they encourage the development of 
stock markets? 
The stock market can enhance economic growth in three ways: growth of savings, 
efficient allocation of resources and better utilisation of the existing resources. These, 
however, are broadly the same functions performed by the banking sector when interest 
rates are free to reach their equilibrium level, as proposed by Shaw and McKinnon 
[however, as shown by Clarke (1996), an equilibrium interest rate may not exist since the 
interest rate required to balance financial markets differs from that required to equilibrate 
savings and investment]. The stock market can perform the above tasks by acting as a 
pricing instrument and with the takeover mechanism13. The latter and the fact that stock 
market provides investors with liquidity14 are the main features which make a' stock 
market desirable compared to a banking system. As for the role of the stock market in 
increasing efficiency in resource allocation by acting as a pricing mechanism, Singh 
(1992) argues that share prices in these countries are too volatile to be used as 
information about firms' prospects. 
The establishment of an active stock market may also be desirable because of the 
weaknesses of the banking system. Banking finance has always been problematic because 
long term illiquid investments rely on short term deposits. In the case of developing 
12 For a brief discussion on the development of corporate finance theory and suggested literature see: 
Demirguc-Kunt, 1992. 
13 For a discussion on the takeover mechanism, problems associated with it and a summary of the existing 
literature on the subject, see: Hughes and Singh, (1987). 
14 For a discussion on the importance of liquidity of investments, see: Hicks (1969) and Keynes (1936). 
Also, Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) present a model showing how liquidity can affect savings and 
income and Bhide (1993) provides a good discussion on the problems that stock market liquidity generates 
for corporations. 
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countries where the economic environment is very volatile, this problem is even bigger 
and banks could be forced to liquidate some of their investments (recall their loans) or 
ration credit if faced with liquidity problems. Financial shocks - which are common in 
developing countries - can change the availability and the cost of finance. In the case of 
an increase in interest rates, the cost is passed on to companies with variable rate loans. 
This was especially the case in Latin American countries after the 1982 debt crisis. 
Furthermore, banks may have very few or no incentives to exercise control over the firms 
to which they lend capital [Stiglitz, (1985)]. If the entire loan is covered by collateral and 
the bank is not otherwise related to the firm (e. g. own equity of the firm), then it could be 
costly to the bank to exercise any control. 
3.3.1.3. Indirect foreign investment 
The establishment and fast expansion of stock markets in developing countries has in 
many cases aimed at attracting capital from abroad. Researchers have argued that in many 
cases this has proved to be a "fatal attraction" because of the financial booms and busts 
which these countries experienced due to capital flight. Opening up the economy to 
foreign investors can seriously damage economic development through several channels. 
Free movement of capital links two unstable markets: stock and currency markets. In the 
event of a shock the two markets may interact and produce even greater instability for the 
economy [Akyuz (1992)]. Furthermore, financial insulation allows the country to delink 
its interest rates from the international markets. This can allow the government to use its 
financial policies without any destabilising effects from abroad [Akyuz and Kotte 
(1991)]. If the economic system becomes unstable due to capital flight, aggregate 
investment is likely to decrease because of depressing business expectations. These 
factors can damage the real economy and reduce long term economic growth. Therefore, 
it could be beneficial if governments separated trade related financial transactions from 
ts capital transactions and insulated to a degree their economies from the latter. 
's As Cho and Khatkhate (1989) discuss, one reason liberalisation in several countries has had disastrous 
results is because the countries which implemented it were not mature enough to open up to the 
international markets. In their report, they argue that unless a country achieve macroeconomic stability and 
adequate financial depth, full liberalisation may not be the best policy. 
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3.3.1.4. Financial deepening and the stock market 
Part of the criticism on the neo-classical propositions on "financial deepening", is that 
they do not address the role of the stock market. For example, Shaw (1973) merely 
points out that the development of the stock market in developing economies could 
follow financial deepening as part of a well functioning financial market. However, the 
establishment of a stock market concerns long term investment and it could prove very 
expensive during the first stages of financial liberalisation. If anything, Shaw seems to be 
against the creation of a stock market in developing countries, at least until the economy 
has been allowed to operate freely without government intervention ["Creating new Wall 
Streets comes later, if at all. ", Shaw, (1973), p. 147]. 
An attempt to integrate the stock market in the neo-classical framework was made by Cho 
(1986), who argued that "substantial development of an equity market is a necessary 
condition for complete financial liberalisation" (p. 192). Cho's argument is based on the 
fact that equity finance is free from adverse selection effects and will enhance the 
allocative efficiency of -capital since debt finance is problematic because of asymmetric 
information. Cho also suggests that in the absence of an active equity market, government 
intervention could be appropriate. As Singh (1992) points out, Cho's propositions have a 
serious flaw. They assume that potential shareholders have the same information as 
banks. However, in the real world information is scarce and costly. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that a small shareholder will try to acquire such information. If the agency 
problem in management controlled corporations is added, then it is likely that the 
existence of a stock market can lead to even greater inefficiencies in the allocation of 
capital. 
Another argument for the establishment of stock markets in developing economies is 
provided by Subrahmanyam (1975). Subrahmanyam provided a theoretical framework in 
which he examined the benefits of integration to individual investors under three forms of 
utility functions. His framework suggests that in each case, when two economies' capital 
markets merge, the individual investors' welfare always improves except for the case 
when the two capital markets are positively and perfectly correlated where there is no 
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change in investors welfare. However, this framework ignores several of the real world 
stock market features concerning integration, such as: capital flight, speculation and 
vulnerability of an economy to international instability [Cosh et al, (1989)]. When these 
factors are added to this framework, the results may change dramatically. 
3.3.1.5. The stock market in endogenous growth models 
During the last decade a booming literature of endogenous growth model has emerged. 
These models aim to overcome some of the problems inherent in neo-classical growth 
models. Specifically, the neo-classical model assumes that the economy will stop 
growing at some point unless it is stimulated by some exogenous technological progress 
[McCallum (1996)]. The endogenous growth models, use neo-classical assumptions to 
show that an economy can experience everlasting growth. There are several endogenous 
growth models, each modelling some internal mechanism which is the source of growth. 
In the present analysis, we are concerned with the family of endogenous growth models 
in which financial intermediation is modelled explicitly. 
In these models financial intermediation enhances economic growth mainly in three 
ways: first, financial institutions pool funds and by predicting withdrawal demand they 
economise on liquid reserve holdings and direct these funds towards production. This 
effect is mainly attributed to the banking sector and it has been modelled by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). With respect to the role of the stock market, it provides liquidity to 
entrepreneurs when they need it, so they do not have to liquidate their investment. Similar 
models are presented by Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1995,1996). Their models focus 
on the effect of improved liquidity as transaction costs fall, to the savings rate of return 
and the growth rate of the economy, and show that under certain conditions, greater 
liquidity may result in lower growth rate. Levine (1991) develops a model where through 
the development of the stock market, agents avoid both liquidity and productivity risk. 
The latter refer to the ability to diversify. 
Second, financial institutions acquire information which enables them to allocate capital 
efficiently. Probably the best known endogenous growth model in this area is the one 
presented by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). In their model, financial activity 
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develops as the economy develops. The most important role of intermediation is to 
collect and analyse information, thus facilitating the allocation of funds in projects with 
the highest return. Greenwood and Smith (1997) present two models where again, 
financial markets develop together with the economy. The first model can accommodate 
either banks or an equity market. It is shown that equity markets increase the economic 
growth rate if and gnly if, agents are sufficiently risk averse. In this case, if the economy 
was bank based, agents would be reluctant to invest their funds in physical capital. Their 
model may have implications for developing economies because it assumes that financial 
development requires some initial real development. This is because of the costs 
involved in establishing a financial market. According to this model, financial 
intermediation may not be appropriate if it is imposed by the government to promote 
growth. Instead, the economy should develop to such a degree that would result in an 
increase in market activity. The second model shows how intermediation can support 
specialisation which is important in economic activity. This model shows how resource 
allocation is done more efficiently through financial intermediaries. 
Finally, investors can diversify through intermediaries, obtaining a higher and safer 
return. This results in increased investment and growth. Saint-Paul (1992) presents a 
model where the main feature driving economic growth is the possibility of 
diversification. Saint-Paul shows that in the absence of financial intermediation investors 
will choose "flexible" and poorly productive technologies. If the financial market is well 
developed, then they can diversify. In this case they will prefer specialised technologies 
which will boost productivity growth. Devereux and Smith (1994) and Obstfeld (1994) 
present two models which assume world market integration. Obstfeld shows that welfare 
increases through international diversification because, the world portfolio shifts from 
safe, low-yield capital into riskier, high-yield capital. However, Devereux and Smith 
show that reduced uncertainty may reduce people's propensity to save. In their model, 
there is a trade-off between reduced risk and lower savings. The latter can result in lower 
growth. In an earlier study, Devereux and Smith (1991), examine the effect of integration 
on different generations. They show that initially, global integration leads to higher 
welfare because the risk-sharing effect is larger than the growth effect. However, future 
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generations experience much lower economic growth rates than those that would occur 
under autarky. 
Boyd and Smith (1996) construct a model in which borrowers can choose between debt 
and equity. Their decision depends on the amount of information that an investor needs 
in order to monitor the investment. More specifically, Boyd and Smith distinguish 
between three technologies which borrowers can utilise: a publicly available production 
technology which yields a return r, a production technology with which investors can 
monitor their investment without any cost (observable), which yields a return y and a 
production technology with which investors have to incur some costs in order to monitor 
their investment (unobservable) and which yields a return w. The cost that investors have 
to incur is denoted by it and is similar to the auditing cost that shareholders will have to 
incur if they want to monitor their investment. Borrowers can use any combination of the 
above three technologies and it is assumed that r<y<w. If borrowers choose only the 
unobservable returns technology, then they will finance their investment with debt. 
However, as technology becomes more complicated, monitoring costs rise and borrowers 
will switch to the observable technology, in which case it is optimum to issue some 
equity as well16. This allows for the development of the stock markets as the economy 
grows and becomes more complicated. Boyd and Smith show that to choose between the 
two technologies, borrowers have to maximise the expression: 
0 
4Pc+i {O S+ (1 - O) w-r-i, +, G[z (es; it+l)]} 
where q is the maximum amount an investor can invest, pt is the rental rate for capital at 
time t, Ot is the proportion of total investment done in observable technology by a 
representative borrower and G[z (6t; it+l)] is the probability of the occurrence of 
monitoring costs. As the economy grows, the relative price of capital declines and the 
monitoring costs increase. Therefore, borrowers change the composition of their 
investment towards the observable technology. This results in less monitoring and the 
16 This result is based on the asumption that an observable return technology exists. In reality, as technology 
becomes more complicated and monitoring costs rise, investors are more likely to turn to debt instruments 
[Fry (1997)]. 
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decline of the per unit costs of intermediation. The result is an increase in the proportion 
of funds invested in the equity markets (e/cJ. Although the ratio of debt to equity will 
fall, debt and equity are complementary sources for the financing of capital investment. 
The role of the equity market in the economy according to this model, is to provide 
entrepreneurs with cheaper finance and thus, promote economic growth. 
3.3.2. Stock market volatility and economic development 
The development of the stock market may also have an indirect effect on economic 
development through increased volatility. If the stock market becomes more volatile as it 
develops, it could undermine the whole economic system. Unstable prices can deter 
investment and give rise to speculation opportunities. Speculators will divert money from 
the production process and make the stock market even more volatile. However, stock 
market development does not have to increase volatility in the stock market. Instead it 
could reduce volatility by making the market more efficient and driving speculators out. 
Whether volatility will increase or not as the stock market expands is really an empirical 
question. The two main theories (neo-classical and post-Keynesian) are not very helpful 
at explaining how stock market volatility is affected by stock market development. The 
two following sections provide a discussion of the implications the two theories present 
with respect to the volatility of the stock market. 
3.3.2.1. The neo-classical argument 
The neo-classical theory on financial deepening suggests that financial 'deepening 
associated with financial liberalisation could reduce stock market volatility by increasing 
the number of shares and traders in the market. The neo-classicals argue that government 
intervention leads to distortions of financial prices. These distortions are the result of 
restrictions on market competition (e. g. interest rate ceilings, credit rationing, barriers to 
entry or exit markets). Deregulation and liberalisation can affect financial markets by 
allowing interest rates to raise to their competitive levels and therefore act as an efficient 
price mechanism [see Shaw (1973) and McKinnon (1973)]. This process should 
encourage investment and increase output growth which in turn should lead to increased 
investment and savings [Fry (1997)]. The role of the stock market in this scenario is to 
act as an efficient equity pricing mechanism which will act as a guide for resource 
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allocation. According to neo-classicals, this development process should enhance the 
role of the stock market through increased research and production and dissemination of 
information in the market place, which could result in the reduction of volatility of equity 
prices. This should encourage increased participation of both firms and investors in the 
stock market, which will eventually lead to reduced volatility of equity prices. Tauchen 
and Pitts (1983) present a model which shows that volatility is inversely related to the 
number of traders in a market. In their model, volatility consists of two components: a 
variance component common to all traders and a variance component relative to each 
individual trader. The more traders in the market, the more the trader specific variance 
reduces. However, as Kwan and Reyes (1997) argue, the variance components in this 
model may change after liberalisation due to different levels of uncertainty, so, whether 
volatility will increase or decrease is an empirical question. 
However, even if volatility increases after liberalisation, this is not necessarily damaging 
to the efficiency of the market. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990a) show that, for 20 
actively traded stocks from the S&P index, volatility is positively related to the 
information flow arriving in the market. Therefore, increased volatility could reflect 
increased information flow which can promote efficiency in a market. This hypothesis is 
also consistent with the neo-classical theory which suggests that financial deepening 
should encourage increased production and dissemination of information because of the 
profit opportunities which will follow financial liberalisation. Also, note that the capital 
asset pricing model suggests that if the markets are efficient, increased volatility should 
not affect macroeconomic performance [Chou, Engle and Kane (1992)]. 
3.3.2.2. The Keynesian argument 
The post-Keynesian view assumes -imperfect markets, particularly in relation to the 
availability of information to all participants. It assumes that investment is determined by 
"animal spirits". Therefore, deregulation could attract speculators and investors with 
short term strategies who can introduce financial crises and economic instability. 
Furthermore, volatility can induce even more volatility. Since individual investors are 
mainly "ignorant" of the future, according to the post-Keynesian view, a change in their 
expectations which is not really relevant to the prospective yield, can bring violent 
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changes in the valuation of stocks, "since there will be no strong roots of conviction to 
hold it steady" [Keynes (1936)]. In this sense, financial liberalisation will increase 
volatility through increased liquidity. Keynes, (1936) regards liquidity as having a 
destabilising effect on the market because of the assumption of market imperfection. 
Therefore, an increased number of trading shares and investors can destabilise the market. 
Increased volatility can result to misallocation of savings and investment because of 
increased uncertainty. Advocates of the post-Keynesian view [e. g. Stiglitz (1994)] argue 
that government intervention can have a positive effect on the market because financial 
markets are subject to market failures that can produce externalities. Singh (1997) 
discusses the role of a stock market in a developing economy and concludes that the 
expansion of a stock market which results from financial liberalisation is more likely to 
damage than enhance economic growth. Most developing economies lack the necessary 
legal and regulatory infrastructure to ensure that their stock markets functions properly 
[Bekaert (1995), Cashin and McDermott (1995)]. Furthermore, equity prices in these 
markets are much more volatile than in developed markets. Singh argues that increased 
volatility can undermine the role of the stock market as a whole, since prices are no 
longer useful in resource allocation decisions and risk-averse firms could stop raising 
capital or even listing in the stock market. 
3.3.3. Integration of the ESMs with the world market 
The third issue we examine considers the integration of the emerging stock markets with 
developed stock markets and with each other. Integration has several implications for the 
emerging economies and their ability to attract foreign investment. From a neo-classical 
perspective, as long as there are no barriers to investment between two countries, the rate 
of return offered by these countries should gradually become equal. This is the result of 
competition which is a central assumption in the neo-classical theory. The equalised rate 
of return is referred to as the normal rate of profit [Konz (1997)]. If capital can move 
freely between countries, the neo-classical theory assumes that convergence between the 
rates of return offered by these countries is inevitable. The same principle extends to the 
stock market. The only factor which should cause rates of return to differ across stock 
markets should be their individual risk. Integrated national stock markets should offer a 
common reward for the same risk [Bekaert (1995)]. If national stock markets are well 
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diversified and perfectly integrated then, similar assets should offer similar rewards and 
we should expect the market indexes to offer the same return over time. 
Financial liberalisation can enhance integration which can assist stock market and 
economic development. Increased participation due to foreign inward investment, can 
enhance the liquidity of a market and prices will become less sensitive to the sale of 
equity [Pagano (1989)]. This in turn should decrease volatility which can affect 
negatively economic development. The increased activity in the stock market should 
induce more companies to seek a listing and the stock market will be able to provide the 
diversification, liquidity and informational benefits which promote economic growth 
[Hargis (1997)]. The increased investment will increase stock prices resulting in lower 
required rates of return for companies. Faced with the lower rates of return, companies 
can raise additional capital through the financial markets and increase aggregate 
investment in the economy. 
The above scenario can materialise in a neo-classical world. In such a world, competition 
will ensure that rates of return will become equal. The emerging stock markets have 
attracted huge amounts of capital (see chapter 5). This implies that when they opened up 
to foreign investors, prices there were repressed and the capital inflows raised them until 
they corresponded to their individual risk level as it was priced in the world market. 
However, it has been often argued in the economic literature that this is not the case. 
Instead, the reason foreign investors entered the ESMs, was a misplaced euphoria and a 
herd instinct [Singh (1997)]. In other words, the fundamentals of the recipient countries 
could not justify the capital inflows. The money invested in these countries were simply 
chasing short term high returns or they were responding to the trend of investing in 
ESMs. 
This view is supported by Krugman (1995) among others. Krugman states that `It seems 
fairly clear that some of the enthusiasm for investing in developing countries in the first 
half of the 1990s was a classic speculative bubble. '[p. 35]. An example they use to 
support their proposition is the Mexican crisis in 1994 [e. g. Aitken (1996), Krugman 
(1995)]. It is argued that the Mexican crisis was caused by institutional investors who 
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entered the Mexican market for a quick profit. When the economy hit trouble, they 
liquidated their investment and send the money out of Mexico. If the speculative bubble 
theory is correct, then it is expected that the returns of the ESMs will not converge. 
The speculative bubble scenario is only one reason why the rates of return offered by 
ESMs may not be converging. Another reason may be interference from the governments 
of the developing countries. If the liberalisation policies have not gone far enough to 
remove all barriers on investment flows, then the developing stock markets will have a 
different risk premium from the rest of the world for the same risk class [Hietala (1989), 
Korajczyk (1995)]. If residents are not allowed to invest abroad, they cannot diversify the 
country specific risk and they should demand a higher return on domestic securities than 
foreigners. Errunza et. al. '(1992) developed a model which accounts not only for 
integration and segmentation, but also for mild segmentation. Their model is a modified 
International Asset Pricing Model. 
Another reason why segmentation may persist, is because of the problems often presented 
in ESMs. Cashin and McDermott (1995) report that inadequate regulation and 
supervision of financial markets and poor quality of information are common features in 
emerging stock markets. The neo-classical theory assumes that capital will move in 
because of the higher rate of return offered by the markets. However, foreign investors 
should only move in if they have enough information to evaluate their investment. If the 
investment environment is not developed enough to allow an investor to evaluate and 
follow his preferred investment strategy, then it is possible that investors in these markets 
would demand a premium to invest there. Furthermore, the investment horizon would be 
shorter because of the uncertainty associated with the problems inherent in undeveloped 
stock markets. One would expect that such markets are segmented because of a lack of 
foreign capital involvement. 
Integration of the ESMs with the world stock markets implies that the ESMs can 
contribute positively to economic growth. On the other hand, segmentation would imply 
that either these markets have been used by foreign investors for speculation, or the 
liberalisation reforms have not gone far enough to eliminate any barriers in capital flows. 
60 
Alternatively, it could be that the ESMs in some countries are not sophisticated enough to 
provide foreign investors the services that developed stock markets provide. In any case, 
if the markets are segmented they could be caught in a low equilibrium trap [Hargis 
(1997)], i. e. in a situation where few money is invested in the stock market making it 
illiquid and risky. It is then expected that such a stock market cannot enhance economic 
growth, but rather hinder economic growth through volatile prices, illiquid investment 
and speculation. 
3.4. Our research questions 
The financial liberalisation thesis has been the cornerstone of the financial liberalisation 
reform policies which have been implemented in several developing countries during the 
last twenty years. The liberalisation thesis which advocates the abolition of 
interventionist policies is largely based on the neo-classical model. One of the reasons 
these policies where implemented in several countries was because they needed foreign 
aid and the IMF imposed conditions on the loans or made suggestions which would make 
the country which followed the suggestions a better candidate for aid. However, a lot of 
these policies are controversial and not strictly based on some theoretical model. In 
effect, the McKinnon - Shaw propositions were used in order to suggest wide scale 
liberalisation of the emerging economies17. There is now controversy surrounding the 
way the liberalisation policies were suggested to these countries and implemented, 
especially with respect to the stock market. What is interesting is that the controversy 
comes not only from economists against liberalisation but also from advocates of the 
liberalisation process. '8 
Clearly whether the reform policies work or not is an empirical issue. There are dozens of 
issues involved and in this thesis we aim to examine three of them: the effect of stock 
markets development on the economic development of selected emerging economies, the 
17 For example, the stock market development which started in the early 1980's is justified in the academic 
literature by Cho's article which was published in 1986. Prior to this, there was no theoretical argument for 
the creation of a stock market in the developing countries. 
18 For example, Fry (1997) supports the financial liberalisation theory but not the development of stock 
markets in the emerging economies. 
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change in the nature of stock market volatility following liberalisation and the change in 
the degree of integration (or segmentation) of national ESMs after liberalisation. 
First we test if stock market development had an effect on economic growth. To test this 
we utilise the Boyd and Smith model described earlier. According to the model, 
economic growth (EG) is a positive function of stock market development (SD) and the 
banking sector development (BD): 
EG=f(SD, BD) 
Furthermore, as the economy grows, economic development should result in stock market 
and banking sector development; therefore, the above equation is bi-directional. The 
banking sector and the stock market are complimentary sources of finance in this model. 
However, at the early stages of development a substitution effect takes place because debt 
is exchanged for equity. This implies that for most countries in the sample we could find 
a substitution effect. If the model holds we should be able to find evidence to support the 
above relationships and provide some justification for the rapid expansion of the stock 
markets in several developing countries. 
Second we examine if volatility increased after foreign investors were allowed to invest 
in these markets. Our tests will look at the change in the nature of volatility rather than 
volatility per se. This should give us more information about how the opening up of 
certain markets to foreign investors, affected the volatility of stock returns. The tests 
should provide evidence as to whether the effect of liberalisation on stock market 
volatility is positive or negative. 
Finally, we test for integration across emerging stock markets. We shall test for regional 
integration first, i. e. integration across the Latin American stock markets in our sample 
and integration across the Asian stock markets in our sample. Then we shall test for 
integration of these markets with two developed ones. The results should provide 
evidence on whether these stock markets developed enough after liberalisation so they 
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could enhance economic growth, as well as on a number of relating issues such as the 
potential for diversification and efficiency. 
3.5. Summary and Conclusions 
From the above discussion, we can see that the financial liberalisation propositions have 
their foundation in the neo-classical theory of free markets. The liberalisation reforms 
have been implemented in several countries, at the suggestion of the IMF and the World 
Bank. These reforms and the way they were implemented have attracted fierce criticism 
from several economist, even from advocates of the free market. 
A major subject of controversy is the usefulness of the development of a stock market in 
an a developing economy. A lot of advantages and disadvantages have been cited in the 
literature. One of the problems surrounding stock market development is that it was 
ignored by the early literature which proposed financial deepening. Although an early 
analysis on the benefits of the creation of a stock market in developing economies was 
missing, several of these countries either promoted the development of, or created a stock 
market. In this sense, any theoretical developments in the area followed the creation of 
the stock markets. Whether these stock markets assisted or hindered economic growth in 
the developing countries is an empirical matter which will be examined in the following 
chapters. 
The effect of the stock market development on economic growth can be direct or indirect. 
We first perform a general cointegration test to examine this effect. We utilise the Boyd 
and Smith model and we examine not only the interaction between the stock market and 
the economy, but the role of the banking sector as well. 
The stock market can also have an indirect effect on the economy through the volatility of 
stock prices. Increased volatility could undermine the whole economic system by 
undermining investment through increased risk. In this thesis we examine if the nature of 
the volatility of stock prices changed after foreign investors were allowed in these 
markets. 
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Finally, a national stock market should integrate with the world capital markets in order 
to assist economic growth more effectively. Integration can help the stock market grow 
and develop the characteristics which make it a useful instrument for economic growth. 
Therefore, we test for integration across the emerging stock markets before and after the 
liberalisation policies were implemented. Before we discuss the methodologies we 
employ to test the above hypotheses, we critically review the empirical reseach on the 
issues we examine. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON EMER GING STOCK 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review presented here concentrates on the three issues which we will 
examine empirically: emerging financial markets development, emerging stock market 
volatility and integration among national ESMs. The latter issue has implications for the 
diversification benefits offered by these markets and the efficiency of these markets. 
Efficiency is of interest for our entire analysis because if a stock market is to act as a 
pricing instrument it should be efficient up to some degree. Efficiency is implicated in the 
analysis of volatility because efficient stock markets are not usually volatile. We begin 
the discussion with an overview of the development of the emerging stock markets and 
some definitional issues. 
4.2. The development of emerging stock markets 
Up to the early 1980s, commercial banks have traditionally provided investible funds in 
many developing economies, while the local equity markets have been relatively inactive. 
This was mainly the result of macroeconomic and regulatory policies which did not 
encourage the private sector to play an active role in the economy. High fiscal debts, high 
inflation, low or negative real interest rates, the dominant role of the public sector and 
quantitative restrictions on the availability of credit were the main reasons for the 
inability of the private sector to contribute to national economic growth. In 'addition, high 
taxes on dividends and capital gains, inadequate regulation and supervision of financial 
markets, the poor quality of dissemination of information and barriers to inflows of 
foreign capital all contributed to a low demand for equity finance [Cashin and 
McDermott (1995)]. 
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Emerging stock markets (ESMs) have received increasing attention by investors and 
academics since the early 1980s. There is no universally accepted definition of what is an 
ESM. The term ESM is not a parallel to emerging economies, according to Errunza 
(1983) although there is an obvious -relationship (a stock market is considered as an 
indication of development for emerging economies). The most widely accepted definition 
of an ESM is the one given by the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IFC 
classifies countries according to their per capita GNP, which is also the classification 
used by the World Bank. So, according to the IFC, ESMs are stock markets in countries 
with low-to-middle per capita income, which in 1992 meant a per capita GNP of less than 
US$8,356. However, as Barry and Lockwood (1995) report, investors focus on those 
developing countries in which capital markets are advancing in size, activity or 
sophistication. The definition usually used by investors and academics is that an ESM is 
an active stock market not big or accessible enough to be considered as a developed 
market. So, for example, Greece [with a per capita GDP of US$5,500 in 1990 and the 
World Bank limit being at US $2,200 as Bekaert and Harvey (1995) note] is included in 
the IFC indices and is characterised as an ESM in various studies. Other definitions of 
what an ESM is can be found in the literature [e. g. Divecha et. al. (1992), Errunza (1983), 
Taliente and Fraser (1995)]. However, it is very difficult to find an exact definition of an 
ESM, since the markets which are described as emerging today vary widely in their 
structure, performance, prospects and principal features [Barry and Lockwood (1995)]. 
Investment flows to ESMs have increased dramatically during the last decade. By 1992, 
these flows were over $35 billion from four major industrial countries (Canada, Germany, 
Japan and US), compared to US$8.2 billion in 1988 [Chuhan (1994)]. According to 
Forbes magazine, investment flows in ESMs in 1993 were US$92 billion [Taliente and 
Fraser (1995)]. Five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the Republic of Korea and 
Turkey) account for two thirds of the portfolio flows to developing countries between 
1989 and 1993 [Gooptu (1994)]. One of the largest recipient of foreign capital was 
Mexico. In 1992, nearly 60 percent of US residents' portfolio flows to developing 
countries were to Mexico. In 1994, investment flows in ESMs declined. As Gooptu 
(1993) reports, it is difficult to measure the composition of foreign portfolio investment 
66 
in developing countries due to the existence of several estimates of these flows by 
reporting agencies, with none of the data sets being compatible. 
The effect of these flows was an increase in the number of companies listed in ESMs 
from 12,904 in 1990 to 15,370 in 1993. The market capitalisation of these companies 
increased from US$429 billion in 1990 to US$2.2 trillion in 1993, which corresponded to 
a 16% share of the total world equity markets' capitalisation [Taliente and Fraser (1995)]. 
Barings Securities estimate that this percentage will rise to 44% by the year 2010. 
The equity market growth and internationalisation of finance can help developing 
countries in several ways: first, they can attract capital to finance productive investment 
activities. This came at a time when there were increasing pressures on industrial 
countries for aid budgets'. The process of capital market growth has also facilitated price 
signalling in developing countries, which had been disrupted by quantity rationing of 
capital. Furthermore, a well-functioning price mechanism enhances the scope for efficient 
mergers and acquisitions and can contribute to a more efficient allocation of capital. 
Through stock markets, investors can diversify reducing this way the risk they bear. This 
results in lower risk premiums demanded and therefore lower cost of capital [Claessens 
(1995), Kim and Singal (1993)]. 
In the case of developing economies an interesting question is how useful the stock 
market has been to firms for raising capital. Singh and Hamid (1991) examine corporate 
capital structures in nine developing countries. They find that firms in developing 
countries rely to a much greater extent on the stock market for capital than firms in 
developed countries. Demirguc-Kunt (1992) examines the corporate capital structure in 
the same nine countries and confirms the above results. Demirguc-Kunt also examines 
whether debt and equity in these countries are substitutes or complements. His results 
suggest that debt and equity are complementary, so, the development of the stock market 
has increased the borrowing capacity of firms with the availability of equity financing. 
Demirguc-Kunt also suggests that the development of the stock market may be 
A brief discussion of the background of the economic relationship between industrial and developing 
countries is given by El-Erian and Kumar (1994). 
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beneficiary for industry because it provides banks with good quality information about 
firms, so banks may be able to assess creditworthiness more accurately, increasing their 
lending. 
These results are confirmed by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996), who examine 
the financial structure of firms in thirty countries from 1980 to 1991 and find that the 
financing choices of firms differ between firms in developed and developing countries. In 
developing countries, large firms increase their leverage as the stock market develops. A 
possible explanation is that large firms usually publicise more and better information at 
the early stages of stock market development. They also improve monitoring and 
corporate control in order to attract investors. This provides an incentive for creditors to 
lend more. In this sense, banks may actually benefit from the development of the stock 
market as they can assess creditworthiness easier and expand their lending. In developed 
countries, as stock market develops more, the process is inverted: large firms shift from 
debt to equity. In their sample, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic find no effect of stock 
market development on small firms. Singh (1992) argues that debt and equity are in fact 
substitutes since there is no evidence that aggregate savings in developing countries 
increased [see also: Cho and Khatkhate, (1989)]. In some countries, aggregate savings 
actually fell during the 1980s. As for the role of the stock market in increasing efficiency 
in resource allocation, Singh argues that share prices in these countries are too volatile to 
be used as information about firms' prospects. However, the main role of these stock 
markets was to attract foreign investment at a time when the prospects of raising 
additional debt where rather slim. 
4.3. Foreign investment in ESMs 
Since the early 1980s, ESMs have received increasing attention by investors. Investment 
in ESMs was facilitated by the IFC, which provided information about these markets. 
Towards the end of the 1980s ESMs were recognised as an investment category by 
investors. Two funds were set up (Templeton ESMs Investment Trust and Genesis ESMs 
Fund) which exclusively invested in ESM, thus providing investors access to these 
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markets and saving them the hazards of investing in foreign countries where little 
information is available [Dunham (1989)]. 
There are several factors which attracted foreign investors to ESMs which can be 
classified as "pull" and "push" factors [Gooptu (1993)]. "Pull" factors refer to country- 
specific factors and "push" factors refer to global factors which made investment in 
ESMs favourable. 
4.3.1. "Pull" factors 
Two are the major "pull" factors: high returns and diversification benefits. The 
outstanding return performance of ESMs has been documented in several papers [e. g. 
Gooptu (1993), Mullin (1993)]. Historically, ESMs have had much higher returns than 
developed markets. Gooptu (1993), distinguishes between two classes of investors who 
aim at higher returns by investing in ESMs. Individual foreign investors and domestic 
residents of developing countries with overseas holdings, managed funds, foreign banks 
and brokerage firms, and finally purely speculative traders, all belong in the class of 
investors who move funds from country to country chasing high returns in the short term. 
Institutional investors and non-resident nationals of developing countries are in the class 
of investors with long term investing horizons. High returns in emerging economies 
derive from the high growth rate which some of these countries experience [Fischer and 
Reisen (1994)]. 
The diversification benefits from the inclusion of ESMs' equity in the world portfolio 
have also been well documented in the literature [e. g. Divecha et. al. (1992), Harvey 
(1995), Wilcox (1992)]. Several studies report low correlations between developed and 
ESMs. Also, Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988), report that although currency risk is an 
inhibiting factor in investment in ESMs, the benefits for the global investor are still 
sizeable. Because there are several issues surrounding global diversification, it is 
discussed separately (section 4.7). 
Another "pull" factor is the reforms that ESMs have undertaken in order to develop the 
role of their stock exchange [Claessens (1995), El-Erian and Kumar (1994), Gooptu 
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(1993)]. Such reforms include deregulation and liberalisation of the stock market, 
improved supervision of stock market activity, increased information flow and 
improvement of the legal infrastructure which aims to protect investors. Pardy (1992) 
provides a framework of the institutional reforms which are necessary to ensure the 
smooth development of the financial market in developing countries. Another "pull" 
factor reported by Chuhan et. al. (1993), is the credit rating of available investments in 
ESMs. In their study they find that Asian countries are much more sensitive in credit 
rating than Latin American countries. Several developing countries adopted credit 
enhancement techniques, like collateralisation, which provided a means of reducing credit 
and transfer risks [El-Erian and Kumar (1994)]. 
4.3.2. "Push" factors 
There have also been "push" factors in equity flows to ESMs, which are weak domestic 
asset markets and declining interest rates in developed countries [Calvo et. al. (1993), 
Chuhan (1994)]. In the early 1990s interest rates and industrial production declined 
world-wide (e. g.. the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate fell from 5.9% in 1988 to 3.3% in 
1992). This forced investors to look outside their national borders for high return 
investments and restructure their portfolios by including risky assets such as ESMs' 
equities [Solinger (1994)]. Placing private securities in the US market was also facilitated 
by the introduction of Rule 144a, in April, 1990, which liberalised the private placements 
market by providing a safe harbour from registration requirements for the resale of 
securities to institutional investors. Rule 144a freed investors from having to hold the 
securities for two years before they can sell them. 
4.3.3. ESMs weight in foreign portfolios 
Although the flow of capital to ESMs increased, these flows represented a small 
percentage of the total assets of the major world investors (US, UK, Germany and 
Canada). Less than 5 percent of their foreign equity holdings were invested in ESMs in 
1992 [Chuhan (1994)]. However, because of the small market capitalisation of these 
countries, even a marginal increase in investment from the major players in the world 
market has a significant effect in these economies. Because of this effect, developed 
countries' institutional investors have gained power in controlling emerging countries' 
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government policies. As Taliente and Fraser (1995) report, in March 1994, after the 
assassination of the Mexican presidential candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio, US fund 
managers became worried about the sliding peso. They contacted the Mexican central 
bank, suggesting measures which should stabilise the currency. The choice for the central 
bank was either to follow the suggestions so that fund managers not only would not sell 
their Mexican holdings but they would make additional investment, or not follow the 
suggestions and lose the capital inflows. The latter meant that relationships between 
Mexico and US investors would deteriorate and as it was estimated by one of the fund 
managers, this could cost Mexico US$30 billion off its GDP. 
4.3.4. Foreign investors and speculation 
Since investment in emerging markets attracted attention, foreign investors' behaviour 
has been characterised as irrational and herd-like by several financial publications. 
Examples cited in the literature of such behaviour have been the "tequila effect" in 
December 1994 and the dramatic collapse of the South East Asian stock markets in 1997 
[e. g. Aitken (1996), Krugman (1995)]. 
A variance ratio test for the composite IFC index, the IFC Latin American index and the 
IFC Asian index, shows that the variance ratio is higher for the indexes than it is for their 
respective individual countries [Aitken (1996)]. This implies that fund managers view 
ESMs as a different asset class since the autocorrelation of the indexes is higher than the 
autocorrelation of the individual markets. This finding is consistent with Buckberg's 
(1996) results, and can perhaps help to explain bubbles in ESMs (if they exist). Fund 
managers who lack the knowledge needed to assess the future performance of ESMs, 
decide what proportion of their funds to place in these economies and then spread these 
funds over a portfolio of stocks so as to receive the risk/return benefits of international 
diversification. When ESMs performance falls below expected levels, instead of shifting 
from one ESM to another, fund managers shift out of ESMs altogether since they 
perceive them as an asset class. An example of such behaviour used by'advocates of the 
existence of bubbles in these markets, is the December 1994 "Tequila effect". The peso 
devaluation reflected fundamentals about the Mexican economy only. Although Mexico 
represented less than two per cent of global stock market capitalisation, other developing 
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countries' stock markets experienced a dramatic decline because of the Mexican financial 
crisis. 
Buckberg (1996) tests the application of the CAPM on 13 ESMs versus a two-factor 
model including the world portfolio return and the returns on a IFC index. Buckberg finds 
that the two-factor model is more powerful in explaining returns in most of the countries 
used in the test, compared to the CAPM. This result also indicates that ESMs are treated 
by investors as a separate asset class. 
Gooptu (1994) finds that the flows going to a region are correlated ("contagion effect"). 
His findings suggest that investors do not choose specific countries to invest but regions. 
Such investing behaviour is rather surprising considering Harvey's (1995) results of very 
low return correlation among ESMs of the same region (e. g. Argentina and Brazil, 3%, 
Colombia and Chile, 0%). Gooptu, also finds evidence which suggests that ESMs have to 
compete with each other to attract funds. The hypothesis examined is whether financial 
flows to ESMs come from an increasing pool of investible resources of whether it is the 
same funds (e. g. "hot money") chasing higher returns from country to country. Gooptu 
concludes it is the same funds which go around countries which means that investors are 
generally not committed in long term investments in these markets. However, Claessens, 
Dooley and Warner (1995) find no evidence of "hot money" going around countries, 
chasing high returns. 
4.4. ESM development and economic growth 
Whether or not ESMs are only used for speculation, as Singh (1992) states, they are: 
"... today a part of the new economic landscape and, notwithstanding their dubious merits 
in relation to economic development, they are here to stay" [p. 44]. The question 
therefore, is if they have contributed to the economic growth of their respective countries 
or not. On an empirical level, most studies examining the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in developing economies focus only on different 
measures of money as a proxy of financial intermediation [e. g. De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995), Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Demetriades and Luintel (1997), Ghani (1992), 
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King and Levine (1993), Odedokun (1996)]. The most common measure of money in 
these studies is the ratio of M2 or M3 to GDP. These studies employ a wide range of 
methodologies to examine the hypothesis and the result seems to be always the same: 
financial development is positively related to economic growth. 
The only exception seems to be Ram (1999) who finds that the relationship between 
financial development and growth is negative and for most countries insignificant. Ram 
estimates the coefficient of correlation between financial depth (as represented 'by the 
ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP) and growth of real GDP and finds that from the 95 
countries in the sample, correlations were negative for 56 and positive for 39. From those 
39, only in nine countries were the positive correlations statistically significant. Ram goes 
on to estimate the correlation coefficient between the same variables but using a cross 
section technique and finds a positive and significant correlation. He concludes that the 
positive relationship in cross country studies is an artefact which does not reflect the 
relationship between financial development and growth. Ram also uses Odedokun's 
(1996) specification where he replaces the financial development variable with his 
financial depth variable and finds that the positive relationship between financial depth 
and growth reported by Odedokun disappears. 
However, most researchers find that financial development causes economic growth. 
Also, Demetriades and Hussein's findings suggest that the relationship is bi-directional. 
While these results are evidence against government intervention in the economy this is 
not to say that a free economy can always lead to higher levels of growth. De Gregorio 
and Guidotti find that increased financial intermediation can lead to a lower level of 
growth if an inadequate regulatory framework exists (like, for example, in Latin America 
during the 1970s and 1980s). As Demetriades and Hussein report "There can, therefore, 
be no "wholesale" acceptance of the view that finance leads growth as there can be no 
"wholesale" acceptance of the view that finance follows growth". This view is reinforced 
by Arestis and Demetriades (1997) findings in their examination of the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth in South Korea. Their findings 
suggest that financial repression affected financial development and economic growth 
positively. However, Arestis and Demetriades recognise that the South Korean case is 
73 
unique and financial repression has not actually worked for other economies. Therefore, 
it is widely supported that policy reforms that foster financial development have a 
significant positive effect on GDP growth [Ghani (1992)]. Further evidence against 
financial repression are provided by Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992) and Fry (1997) 
who find that financial repression affects growth negatively in a large sample of 
countries. 
With respect to the stock market, few studies have examined its role in economic 
development in emerging economies. Chatrath et al. (1997) and Mookerjee (1988) 
examine the relationship between real economic activity and stock returns in India. This 
relationship is particularly important if we accept that stock prices affect investment2. If 
this is the case, then the value of the stock market would lie with its ability to predict real 
economic activity. If, instead, the stock market is informationally inefficient with respect 
to real economic activity, it will convey the wrong signal to investors and affect 
investment negatively. Both studies find that the Indian stock market is inefficient. Stock 
returns are positively correlated with real activity, but they lag real activity up to six 
months. 
In a recent article, Levine and Zervos (1998) examine whether measures of stock market 
development are robusly correlated with current and future rates of economic growth in 
47 countries using cross country regressions. In doing so, Levine and Zervos include a 
measure of banking sector development in their regreesions (as measured by bank loans 
to private enterprises divided by GDP) in order to account for the separate effect of the 
banking sector in the economy. Their analysis is innovative in this area, for two reasons. 
First, they use different measures of stock market development to provide evidence on a 
variety of theoretical models. They proxy stock market development by using measures 
of stock market liquidity, size, volatility and integration with world capital markets. This 
way they can provide evidence on the features of a stock market that affects an economy. 
Second, in running their regressions they use different proxies for economic growth. 
More specifically, growth is proxied with four separate indicators: output growth, capital 
2 There is evidence that stock prices affect investment in developed countries in which the stock market 
plays an important role in the economy [e. g. Mullins and Wadhwani (1989)]. 
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stock growth, productivity growth and savings growth. These four variables (together 
with economic and social indicators wich are conditioning variables) enter the regressions 
as dependent variables. This way, Levine and Zervos examine not only if stock market 
development affects economic growth but through which channels it affect growth. 
Their findings suggest that stock marjet liquidity and banking sector development are 
positively and robustly correlated with rates of economic growth, capital accumulation 
and productivity growth. Furthermore, they fail to find any evidence that savings or long 
run growth are negatively affected by stock market liquidity, volatility or integration with 
international capital markets. Their results support the models which show that stock 
market development is an integral part of the growth process and they call for theories 
which incorporate both stock markets' and banks' development as part of the growth 
process. This is particularly important because their results show that the two financial 
sectors provide different services in the economy (since they are both significant in the 
regressions). 
Atje and Jovanovich (1993) examine the effect of stock market development on the level 
and the growth rate of economic activity in several developing and developed countries, 
for the period 1980-1985. Stock market development is proxied by the ratio of the annual 
value of all stock market trades to GDP. Their results suggest that there is a substantial 
positive effect of stock market development both on the level and the growth rate of 
economic activity. Atje and Jovanovich, also examine the effect of bank credit on 
economic activity and find that it is insignificant. 
Similar evidence is presented by Levine and Zervos (1996). They examine the effect of 
stock market development in forty one countries from 1976 to 1993. Their study differs 
from that of Atje and Jovanovich in that Levine and Zervos use an index of several 
variables to measure stock market development (these variables measure size, liquidity 
and integration with world markets), and that they control for other variables which may 
have affected economic growth during that period (these variables include education, 
initial income, political instability, government consumption, inflation and the black 
market exchange rate). Their results suggest that the stock market is strongly linked to 
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long run economic growth. However, the above studies use pooled cross-country data and 
their methodology has several limitations, as Levine and Zervos acknowledge. 
Aggregation across countries cannot account for policy changes and differences across 
these countries. Furthermore, cross country regressions cannot resolve issues of causality 
(although, because of the methodology followed by Levine and Zervos, the statistical 
significance of the stock market measurement in explaining economic growth implies that 
stock market development does not simply follow economic development). Any 
significance of a variable in explaining economic growth should be viewed only as a 
partial correlation to be investigated further. Levine and Zervos (1993) discuss the 
problems of interpreting results from cross-country regressions and provide a guide for 
examining the validity of any results obtained with this methodology. However, they 
conclude that there is indeed a positive relationship between financial development and 
economic growth. 
The problem with the existing empirical literature on the interaction between the stock 
market and the banking sector and their effect on economic growth is quite clear. There is 
a gap in this area especially with respect to the developing economies. Most studies in the 
literature examine the effect of either the stock market or banks on the real economy, but 
do not include both in a model [except Levine and Zervos (1998)]. Also, there is a lack of 
studies using time series analysis which can overcome the problems of cross country 
analysis. Our analysis, aims to contribute towards filling this gap by examining the 
interactions between the two financial sectors (stock markets and banks) and their effect 
on the real economy. The methodology we employ is different to the cross country 
regression employed elsewhere in the literature because of the problems associated with 
this particular methodology. We feel that exploring this area is of particular interest due 
to the increasing development of stock markets in a number of developing countries. 
4.5. Volatility in ESMs 
One issue directly related to the merit of ESMs in relation to economic development, is 
their volatility. It has been argued in the literature that volatility could increase following 
76 
liberalisation. If this is the case, it will be more difficult for the ESM to assist the 
economic development of their countries. 
Several researchers have taken the view that investment in ESMs is a classic speculative 
bubble [e. g. Krugman (1995)]. According to this view, foreign investors 'rushed 
"lemming-like" to buy equities in ESMs and this "herd-like" behaviour has resulted in 
boom and busts like the "tequila effect" in 1994 [Aitken (1996)]. If the result of financial 
liberalisation is indeed increased volatility, it could have deleterious effects on the 
macroeconomy via increased financial fragility. 
Grabel (1995), examines the above arguments by constructing volatility indexes for the 
two different theories. Neo-classicals believe that assets yield some "normal" return over 
time which is based on fundamentals. Deviations from this return are the asset's return 
volatility. Keynesians suggest that asset return volatility is given by the fluctuations in 
the asset's returns (e. g. in the form of standard deviation). Grabel examines both 
propositions for six ESMs for the periods around liberalisation in each country. The 
results for all volatility indexes are consistent with the view that volatility in ESMs did 
increase after liberalisation. This view is also confirmed by Aitken (1996), whose tests 
support the view that foreign institutional investors have had a destabilising effect on 
ESMs. Aitken's results, based on the variance ratio, suggest that financial liberalisation 
has resulted in a price behaviour which is consistent with speculative bubbles. It should 
be noted, however, that even if volatility has increased in ESMs after liberalisation, this 
could be a result of more and quicker information flow. Therefore, if a market develops, 
in the short run higher volatility should be expected [El-Erian and Kumar (1994)]. 
However, there are several researchers who argue that volatility in ESMs has fallen since 
they opened up to foreign investors. Richards (1996) conducts tests for volatility on 
weekly and monthly data from 16 ESMs and 16 developed markets. He concludes that 
volatility has actually fallen in ESMs during the last years. Even after the Mexican crisis, 
volatility still did not increase considerably. Richards suggests that these markets were 
always more volatile than developed markets but, it is only lately that investors deal with 
them. Therefore, although the volatility was always there, it is only now that it has drawn 
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attention. Also, Levine and Zervos (1998) fail to find any negative impact of stock market 
volatility on any of their economic growth indicators, using cross country regression on a 
sample of 47 countries. 
Kim and Singal (1993), also report lower volatility in 16 countries after liberalisation. 
Furthermore, evidence from the Korean market given by Jun (1993) indicate that there is 
only a marginal impact of capital flows on monthly volatility. The above results are 
confirmed by Bekaert (1995) who finds that openness of the markets he examines is not 
related to volatility and Tesar and Werner (1995) who conclude that although US 
investment in ESMs is more volatile than in other foreign equities it has not increased 
volatility in these markets. Actually, Bekaert finds that volatility is negatively - although 
not significantly - correlated with the measures of market integration he uses. 
Claessens, Dooley and Warner (1995) examine inflows in five ESMs and conclude that 
there is no distinction between short and long term capital. The time series statistics are 
the same and there is a substitution effect: when an amount of short term capital leaves 
the country, a same amount enters the country as a different type of short term capital. 
Therefore, the only meaningful indicator is the amount of overall capital account and 
there is no volatility due to "hot money". The implications of this study for policymakers 
is that any policy which aims to control short term capital may be misguided. Policies 
which aim to control the overall capital account may be more appropriate [Claessens 
(1995)]. 
Furthermore, Kim and Singal (1993) examine capital flow volatility before and after 
liberalisation for 14 countries and find that there is no increase in fund flow volatility 
after liberalisation. The above results indicate that market openings are good for market 
volatility. However, Velasco (1993), commenting on the article by Kim and Singal (op. 
cit. ), argues that this may not be the case. Although volatility may have not increased 
after liberalisation, the level of funds entering and leaving the country may be so high as 
a share of GDP, that could seriously damage macroeconomic stability. Velasco (op. cit. ), 
also questions the validity of tests which aim to examine the situation before and after 
liberalisation, since it is impossible to determine the correct cut-off date. This problem is 
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addressed by Grabel (1995), who omits one third of the observations of her sample, in 
order to eliminate the transition period. 
Bekaert and Harvey (1997) also consider the problem of timing, and divide their sample 
into four subperiods: before (more than 30 months before liberalisation), pre- (30 to 6 
months prior to liberalisation), mid- (6 months prior to 3 months after liberalisation) and 
post- (four months after liberalisation to the end of the sample period). The results 
suggest that volatility has decreased after liberalisation. The advantage of this study, is 
that it also accounts for other events that may have affected volatility but have little to do 
with liberalisation. Such events include asset concentration, development and integration 
of the markets, microstructure and macroeconomic stability. They find that development 
and integration as measured by the size of the trading sector as well as macroeconomic 
stability as measured by foreign exchange rates are significant in explaining volatility. 
Mullin (1993) also examines the causes of volatility in developing markets from 1976 to 
1991, irrespective of foreign investment. He finds a significant relationship between 
return volatility and the volatility of inflation, real exchange rate changes, export growth 
and dividend-per-share growth in US dollars. In this case, macroeconomic stabilisation 
policies could reduce stock market volatility in these markets. 
Another concern expressed by Velasco (1993), is the long term effect of financial 
liberalisation on volatility. More specifically, the worrying effect of market openings 
may be long swings in prices followed by crashes later on. Richards (1996), finds some 
evidence of returns reversals in ESMs, but not full mean-reversals. When compared to 
mature markets, ESMs demonstrate larger reversals which appear more quickly (maybe 
because of illiquidity, prices cannot remain far from fundamentals for long periods). 
However, there is not much difference in returns reversals between ESMs and smaller 
mature markets. 
Most of the above models, examine volatility in ESMs using static models. These results 
are not informative of the nature of the volatility in these markets and its effect on stock 
returns. Furthermore, since there is evidence that returns' distributions depart from 
normality [Harvey (1995a), Bekaert and Harvey (1997)], alternative models are needed to 
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examine volatility in these markets. Our analysis overcomes this problem by utilising a 
GARCH process. The ARCH family of processes is a family of models which has been 
known to successfully capture stock returns volatility. Furthermore, the process is 
dynamic and is able to explain changes in volatility over time and to capture 
leptokurtosis, skewness and volatility clustering. 
Choudhry (1996), examines volatility in six ESMs using a GARCH-M model (an 
extension of the GARCH model) for the period 1976-94. In the GARCH-M model the 
conditional mean is a function of the conditional variance. Choudhry, examines whether 
the nature of volatility changed in these markets after the October 1987 crash. The only 
results which apply to all markets are: there is an inverse but insignificant effect of 
volatility on stock returns and there is no evidence of time-varying risk premia. There is 
evidence of changes in volatility persistence before and after the crash, but results vary 
between individual countries. A modified GARCH-M model is also used by Fraser and 
Power (1997) to examine the impact of information arrival on volatility in five Pacific 
Rim countries and two developed countries from 1988 to 1994. The factors acting as 
information in this study are unanticipated news and past performance. Fraser and Power 
find that volatility can be predicted in three markets based on past market performance. 
Also, volatility in the Australian market is related to current and lagged news arrival. 
Fraser and Power also report volatility clustering for the Malaysian and Singapore equity 
markets, indicating that these markets are integrated. However, they fail to find any other 
correlation among the markets in the Pacific Rim. Bekaert and Harvey (1997) also find 
varying results in their examination of the forces that determine volatility in 20 ESMs. 
They find that individual markets' volatility is differently affected by world factors and 
there is also a difference in the time variation of this effect. Clare et. al. (1997) examine 
the seasonal patterns of the conditional volatility in five Asia-Pacific markets and find 
that conditional volatility is higher on Mondays. 
Most researchers' attention is drawn to the opening up of the ESMs and the effect it had 
on the volatility of these markets. However, Bekaert and Harvey (1997), perform a cross 
sectional analysis of volatility for 20 countries and their results cannot establish a 
relationship between macroeconomic stability and stock market volatility. 
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A study by Kalotay and Alvarez, (1994) suggests regional co-operation as a way of 
protection of small stock markets from excessive volatility due to foreign capital flows. 
Instead of setting up individual stock exchanges, ESMs with relatively small size and 
capitalisation could set up regional stock exchanges. One of the benefits of this scheme 
could be the strengthening of the developing country's ability to cope with volatility 
"contagion" effects from international markets. 
4.6. Integration of emerging and developed markets 
Even if the ESM do not set up regional stock markets, eventually their stock market 
should integrate. In other words, stock markets which open up to foreign competition 
should follow a common trend with other open national stock markets in the long run, as 
a result of increasing integration [Kasa (1992)]. There are several ways to test for 
integration versus segmentation of stock markets, the most popular of which are reported 
in Claessens (1995). 
One way is to explicitly model the barriers to investment and test whether the model 
applies to individual markets. The problem with this approach is the risk of 
misspecification. First, there are too many barriers to be considered. It is likely that in any 
model there will be missing barriers. Second, it is difficult to quantify these barriers. 
Therefore, rejections could be attributed to either lack of integration or the model itself. A 
theoretical framework which incorporates the hypotheses of integration, mild 
segmentation and complete integration was developed by Errunza and Losq (1985). 
Errunza, Losq and Padmanabhan (1992), use this framework to test the degree of 
integration in 8 ESMs. The barrier considered in this framework is restrictions to capital 
flows. They conclude that five of the markets are mildly segmented, two are either 
mildly or completely segmented and one (India) rejects all hypotheses. The results for 
India suggest that a more appropriate test for market integration has yet to be defined. 
Furthermore, their results may be problematic because the proxy used for the world 
portfolio is the US market which at the time represented only two fifths of the world 
capitalisation [Buckberg (1995)]. 
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Another way is to assume that a particular model holds; rejection of the model would 
imply segmentation. Again there is the risk of misspesification since there is not a 
universally accepted international asset-pricing model. Another problem with this 
approach is that it encompasses only the two polar cases, i. e. complete integration versus 
complete segmentation. Buckberg's (1995) tests for market integration suggest that 
`... once foreign investors "discover" an ESM, it quickly becomes part of the global 
market' (p. 63). From the 20 markets examined, 18 do not reject a conditional ICAPM 
model for the period 1985-91 but, reject it for the earlier period 1977-84. However, in a 
later paper (1996), Buckberg finds that an asset pricing model with two factors (world 
portfolio returns and IFC index) for the period 1989-1995, dominates the CAPM, 
especially for the period 1992-95. An ICAPM model is also used from Jun (1993), for the 
Korean market. The results depend on the variable used as a world portfolio. When the 
IFC index return is used, the estimated beta increases after liberalisation; when the MSCI 
index return is used, the estimated beta is insignificant. 
Harvey's (1995) results for a single factor model indicate that ESMs are not integrated 
with the world markets for the period 1976 to 1992. Harvey uses constant betas and 
expected returns in a model where the benchmark is the MSCI world market portfolio. 
His estimation of five-year rolling correlation measures of the local market returns and 
the MSCI returns show that the fit of his model could improve with time varying betas. 
Harvey questions the power of the test used by Buckberg although her test accounts for 
time-varying expected returns (but not betas). Buckberg's test assumes that local market 
excess returns are proportional to the world market excess returns. A more general test 
from Harvey (1994) which assumes linearity and allows for time varying betas and 
expected returns, rejects the single factor ICAPM and the hypothesis that the intercept is 
equal to zero. The factor used by Harvey (1995) is the world market portfolio represented 
by the MSCI world market portfolio return in excess of the 1 month Eurodollar deposit 
rate. The problem with the MSCI world market portfolio as a benchmark portfolio is that 
it lacks investment in ESMs (less than 2 percent). Therefore, this measure is more 
appropriate as an industrial world market portfolio while a better benchmark portfolio for 
this analysis could be the Financial Times Actuaries World Index as proposed by 
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Buckberg (1996). Harvey also uses an alternative test proposed by Scholes and Williams 
(1977) which takes into account nonsynchronous trading, but the results do not improve 
significantly. 
Many researchers use multifactor models which include betas for various risk factors 
[e. g. Claessens, Dasgupta and Glen (1995)]. The problem with using a multifactor CAPM 
is the assumption that common factors affect different markets, even though this could be 
incorrect even for integrated markets. Bekaert (1995) examines the degree of integration 
of 19 ESMs with the US market for the period 1976-1992. Bekaert regresses excess 
returns on five instrumental variables (two local and three US variables). The predictive 
power of the US variables as well as the lack of predictive power of the local factors are 
interpreted as evidence towards market integration. The results do not yield much 
information about market segmentation although they do indicate a higher degree of 
integration before 1986 for five countries. 
Bekaert also estimates the expected return correlation among developed and ESMs. His 
results suggest the existence of global factors affecting both developed and ESMs. 
However, his methodology is based on some strong assumptions which are not likely to 
hold, thus overestimating the true degree of expected-return correlation. Harvey' (1995) 
adds four more factors in his single factor model - exchange rates, commodity (oil) 
prices, business cycles and inflation - and although his results get better (but not 
statistically significant), the model is still unable to explain much of the variation of 
returns in the countries examined. However, the results from a multifactor model 
presented in Harvey (1993), suggest that returns in many ESMs are predictable. 
Claessens, Dasgupta and Glen (1995) examine the cross section of stock returns for 
nineteen ESMs and find some of the factors examined to be significant. However, in 
many cases their sign was opposite to the sign found in developed countries. 
A model-free way to test for integration is by testing the law of one price [De Santis 
(1993)], which is a general model underlying all traditional asset pricing models. 
Differences in the price of the same asset in different countries would reflect lack of 
integration and could be interpreted as the price of the barriers for each market. De 
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Santis' findings suggest that it is difficult to derive an asset pricing model for both 
industrial and ESMs, because factors which are significant for one set of markets are not 
for the other. However, this result does not imply complete segmentation because there 
are still some factors which apply to both sets. Integration can also be tested by looking at 
investment patterns. Most investors prefer domestic assets which shows a lack of 
integration if investment should be based on the risk and return characteristics of an asset 
[Tesar and Werner (1995)]. 
One of the problems of most of the above models is specification with respect to time. 
Expected returns and betas may vary through time and this issue has been addressed by 
some researchers [e. g.. Bekaert (1995), Buckberg (1995), Harvey (1995)]. Furthermore, 
the level of integration of ESMs may vary over time. This hypothesis has been tested by 
Bekaert and Harvey (1995). They find evidence which suggests that integration is indeed 
time-varying for some countries. However, their results are preliminary in this area since, 
they use only a single factor asset pricing model. 
Tests using additional factors could offer further insights into the issue of markets 
integration. Their results suggest that contrary to the general perception that markets are 
becoming increasingly integrated, some markets are actually becoming more segmented. 
Korajczyk (1995) examines the degree of integration among emerging and developed 
stock markets using the law of one price to test if ESMs stocks are mispriced. An 
advantage of his approach is that the variation of the degree of market integration can be 
measured through time. From the model he develops, it is suggested that most markets 
experience relatively large misprices at one time or another, due to several factors. These 
include political instability, foreign investors' intervention, economic reforms 
(privatisations, liberalisation, etc. ), frauds and legal barriers to capital flows. Mispricing 
often decreases when markets are moving towards greater levels of integration. Related 
studies, [Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995)] find that adjusted mispricing is positively 
correlated with market volatility and concentration and negatively correlated with market 
capitalisation and trading volume. 
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The above results seem to indicate that ESMs are neither integrated nor segmented. The 
most often cited result support the mild segmentation hypothesis. Furthermore, ESMs are 
becoming more integrated as they attract more foreign investors. Although the degree of 
integration has increased, the diversification benefits are still there according to several 
studies [e. g.. Speidell and Sappenfield (1992), Wilcox (1992)]. According to Bekaert 
(1995), the diversification benefits are not related to market integration or market 
openness. He argues that policymakers are concerned about the loss of the diversification 
benefits because of increasing integration, which could result in less investment directed 
towards ESMs. However, his tests show no correlation between the risk-return trade-off 
in ESMs and market integration. 
Some comments should be made about the above studies. First, the results cited above are 
based on models which could be misspecified. For example Korajczyk suggests that the 
differences between his results and Bekaert and Harvey's results may exist because their 
methods highlight different aspects of the expected returns generating mechanism. In this 
case, a more well specified model is needed, which will reveal the true level of 
integration. Also, Errunza and Losq's results indicate that more appropriate tests for mild 
segmentation should be developed, which will incorporate barriers other than restrictions 
on capital flows. Finally, tests on indexes could be giving misleading results about the 
degree of integration of individual markets. Jun (1993), examines the response of 
individual stocks to liberalisation. Jun finds that the 20 largest Korean stocks' behaviour 
listed in the IFC index indicates increasing integration with the world market (proxied by 
the MSCI index returns). The hypothesis examined by Jun, and seems to be accepted by 
the findings, is that after liberalisation, only the largest stocks which are included in the 
IFC index will become integrated with the world portfolio. The Korean market as a whole 
may not become more integrated than before. Actually, since more foreign investors will 
buy shares in the largest stocks and domestic investors' share will drop, their covariance 
with the Korean market will fall. Therefore, when examining integration with respect to a 
whole market and not individual stocks, the results may be misleading and hide the true 
effects of liberalisation. 
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Our methodology aims to overcome some - though not all - of the above problems. We 
examine integration by testing for cointegration among national stock markets. This way 
we do not run of risk of misspecification like some of the above researchers. By adopting 
a general approach like cointegration, we can examine integration among national stock 
markets as well as the nature of the relationship they share. Tests for endogeneity, for 
example, will tell us which markets react to changes in other market prices and which do 
not. We also employ a methodology where we examine integration not with respect to 
stock prices but with respect to risk. This methodology examines the evolution of the 
riskiness of every country in our sample, during the last decade. Since we estimate the 
riskiness of each country for each year of the sample period, the test allows us to see how 
the risk of each country evolved during liberalisation rather than simply accept or reject 
integration. 
Integration among national stock markets has implications for their efficiency and the 
diversification benefits which drive international investors in these countries. Since we 
examine integration, we feel that we should also discuss the potential for diversification 
offered by ESMs and evidence concerning their efficiency. 
4.7. Portfolio diversification 
The diversification benefits from investing in ESMs depend on the degree of integration 
between these markets and developed markets for two reasons: first, low integration 
implies low covariance with common world factors, which results in low correlated 
expected returns [Bekaert and Harvey (1995)]; and second, segmentation due to barriers 
to investment may make potential diversification benefits unattainable for foreign 
investors [Bekaert (1995)]. 
There are at least two reasons for fund managers to invest in ESMs: high returns and the 
diversification benefits - higher returns with lower variance. ESMs are considered from 
most investors an appropriate vehicle for diversification since most emerging countries' 
returns are very little or not correlated with developed countries' returns. The issue of 
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diversification is strongly related to the issue of integration of these markets with the rest 
of the world's markets. 
Harvey (1995) reports very low correlations among ESMs and industrial markets. These 
results imply that significant diversification benefits are possible if ESMs' equity is 
included in a world portfolio. The same result can been found elsewhere in the literature 
[De Santis (1993), Divecha et. al. (1992), Errunza (1983), Errunza and Padmanabhan 
(1988), Speidell and Sappenfield (1992), Taliente and Fraser (1995), Wilcox (1992)]. 
These low correlations could be real or could be attributed to certain ESMs' 
characteristics. Restrictions on equity portfolio flows and poor liquidity can make it 
difficult for investors to react quickly to changes in the economic environment. 
Nonsynchronous trading is another potential reason. Also, ESMs' stocks do not 
necessarily trade every day. Therefore, even when tests are based on low frequency 
observations, e. g. monthly observations, the prices obtained could be other than the end 
of month prices or returns could be correlated but with a lag. Mullin (1993) finds that 
annual correlations are higher than monthly correlations between returns from seven 
ESMs and developed stock markets. This difference could be attributed to the above 
factors. Harvey, however, challenges Mullin's results. He argues that the annual 
correlations, although higher, are not statistically significant. Harvey finds 26 correlation 
coefficients for ESM returns statistically different from zero with monthly data, but only 
5 with annual data. Therefore, he concludes that: "the low correlations are real rather 
than an artefact of infrequent trading" (p. 25). 
Although most tests in the literature find that the correlation between ESMs and 
developed markets is low, Aitken (1996) argues this does not necessarily mean that 
diversification benefits are feasible. Aitken argues that most researchers behaviour is 
backward, because they believed that ESMs could be used as a vehicle for diversification, 
looking on past performance. Their conclusion is based on historical returns and 
covariances. As Mullin (1993) demonstrates, the mean/variance frontier obtained from 
the inclusion of ESM equities in an industrial market portfolio, can vary dramatically 
depending on the period selected for the analysis. Speidell and Sappenfield (1992) 
demonstrate this by estimating the risk/return locus for different mixes of S&P's and 
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EAFE's and different beginning and ending periods. The results differ for each period but 
the diversification benefits persist in each period. 
However, the argument seen in several papers that a 20% holdings of ESMs could 
increase the efficiency of a portfolio is relying on past performance only and therefore 
could be misleading [see also Harvey (1993)]. Furthermore, it is not universally accepted 
whether a 20% holding in ESMs is the optimum investment strategy. Speidell and 
Sappenfield (1992) take a more conservative position and suggest an optimal ESM 
weighting of 10 to 15 percent. In Harvey's (1993) analysis, it is not clear whether a 20 
percent restriction is useful or not since a higher proportion results in lower returns but 
with lower volatility. Divecha et. al. (1992) propose a 20 percent investment in ESMs 
based on a five year holding period. 
There are several issues which one should address in the context of global portfolio 
diversification. How should the currency effect be dealt with in an investment in ESMs? 
Should diversification strategies be based on countries or industries across countries? Are 
the diversification benefits attainable or restrictions make them unattainable? Can an 
investor formulate an ex ante strategy or diversification is possible only with perfect 
foresight? 
4.7.1 Currency effect on diversification 
Currency effect is the effect of currency fluctuation on the diversification benefits from 
investing in different countries. Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988) find no currency 
fluctuation effect for ten countries for the period 1976-1980. They examine return 
correlations of the ten countries with US returns and find no difference in the results 
obtained when the returns are measured in US dollars or local currency. To determine if 
there is a currency effect in international investment, several studies have examined the 
performance of different portfolios with and without currency hedging [e. g. Eaker and 
Grant (1989), Hauser and Levy (1991)]. These studies conclude that hedging can increase 
the diversification benefits in developed countries. Similar studies in ESMs are scarce. 
88 
Hauser et. al. (1994) find that hedging may be appropriate for ESMs under some 
conditions. Hedging is appropriate for low-risk investors who dedicate only a small 
percentage of their portfolio in ESMs (small percentage in this study means a 25% 
holding in ESMs -a much higher proportion than what is usually held by international 
investors). If the risk tolerance increases (at about 32% volatility), at 71% expected 
return, the optimal portfolio should consist of 100% unhedged investment in ESMs. 
Hedging may not be optimum for ESMs, because the volatility of an investment for a 
foreign investor depends on the variance of the stock and currency returns and their 
covariance. The latter is usually negative because many ESMs experience high inflation 
and high rates of depreciation of their currency. This results in a reduction in volatility, 
which will be lost if the investor hedges against the foreign currency. Similar results are 
presented by Johnson et. al. (1993), who find that the covariance between currency 
returns and local returns is generally considerably greater than and opposite in sign to the 
currency variance. So, as long as currency volatility contributes to the low correlation of 
returns between developed and ESMs, hedging for currency risk can actually increase the 
correlation of returns and reduce the benefits from diversification. 
4.7.2 Industry effect on diversification 
This refers to the effect of selecting specific companies or industries in different countries 
or concentrating on selecting countries only. Divecha et. al. (1992) find a strong country 
effect in 23 ESMs but no industry effect which means that an investor should focus on 
selecting countries and not specific stock in these countries because stock returns in each 
emerging market in the sample are fairly homogenous. Similar results are presented by 
Errunza and Padmanabhan (1988) who also examine the importance of the country and 
industry factors in explaining stock returns in 10 countries [see also Errunza (1983) and 
Grinold et. al. (1989)]. Most countries examined by Divecha et. al. (1992) are fairly well 
diversified (except for the smaller countries like Jordan and Nigeria). Therefore, high 
concentration in industries cannot account for the country effect. Hargis and Maloney 
(1997) however, report very high concentrations in most of the six countries they 
examine (e. g. about of 88% of Taiwan's market capitalisation is concentrated in 
manufacturing and financial/insurance/real estate services). Therefore, if the return of a 
country's stock market depends heavily on the performance of one sector, then this high 
89 
concentration could explain the country effect. Another explanation for the country effect 
could be the high asset concentration (in most markets the 10 biggest companies are a 
large proportion of the whole market capitalisation). Also factors which drive these 
markets as a whole (e. g. political events) could cause the country effect. 
4.7.3 Diversification benefits using ex ante versus ex post data 
Most studies mentioned so far use ex post data to demonstrate the diversification benefits 
from investment in ESMs. However, to capitalise on these gains, one would have to have 
perfect foresight of future correlations. In the long term, it is suggested by De Fusco et. 
al. (1996) that returns correlation between the US market and three sets of ESMs are not a 
function of time. De Fusco et. al. use cointegration tests to examine long term 
correlations among the markets. None of the markets in the three sets are cointegrated so, 
long term diversification benefits are feasible. 
Harvey (1993) examines different ex ante investment strategies and concludes that the 
inclusion of ESMs in a world portfolio improves performance dramatically. Harvey 
compares two sets of strategies: one unconditional and one conditional. In each set, there 
are three types of investment: only developed markets, developed and ESMs with a cap 
of 20 percent on ESMs proportion and developed and ESMs with no restriction on the 
proportion. The conditional models which include ESMs equities outperform the 
alternative strategies. 
A different approach to examine the feasibility of ex ante diversification benefits is 
through the intertemporal stability of the correlation matrix between market returns. Few 
studies have examined this issue. Cheung and Ho (1991) examined the stability for seven 
Asian-Pacific ESMs and four developed markets using four different methods. They find 
that for the period 1977-1988 the return correlation is not stable and it has become more 
unstable in the most recent years. However, in a later paper, Cheung (1993) uses a non- 
parametric technique and cannot reject the stability of the correlation matrix. The 
technique used is the Sen and Puri nonparametric test. It should be noted that this test 
does not examine the actual covariance between any two markets over time but, the 
ranking of the covariances. So, although the ranking is stable, the actual covariances may 
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be unstable. Sinclair et. al. (1994) find that for nine ESMs the correlation matrix is not 
stable for the period 1977-1992. However, by employing a simple technique they can 
produce good predictions of the correlation matrix. Their results show no significant 
differences between ex ante and ex post results. 
4.7.4 Attainability of returns 
Although the sizeable diversification benefits from the inclusion of ESMs' equity in a 
portfolio of developed markets are well documented, Bekaert and Urias (1996) note that 
most researchers base their analysis on ESMs indexes. Such investment strategy may 
actually be unattainable due to illiquidity, investment constraints or high transaction 
costs. Quantifying these problems and assigning a price to them is not feasible. In an 
attempt to address this problem, Bekaert and Urias examine the diversification benefits 
from investing in ESMs' closed-end country funds trading in developed markets. There 
are two problems with this approach: first, the observed returns do not always reflect the 
performance of the ESM from which the stocks originate, but the composition of the fund 
(which depends on the ability of the manager to select stocks); and second, closed-end 
fund shares usually do not trade at their portfolio value (known as net asset value) but at a 
premium or discount. Therefore, the returns observed deviate from the actual returns in 
the market from which the fund originates. Bekaert and Urias find that if funds traded in 
their net asset value, there would be significant diversification benefits if they were 
included in a US or UK portfolio (the benchmarks used are equally weighted index 
returns from US and UK country funds). However, because of the differences in portfolio 
holdings, only UK ESM funds provide statistically significant diversification benefits. 
There is another problem associated with country funds: they tend to be correlated with 
the market in which they trade. Johnson et. al. (1993) examine the behaviour of seven 
ESM country funds trading in the US market and find that apart from Thailand all other 
markets are sensitive to the local stock index. The same problem has been addressed by 
other authors [e. g. Bailey and Lim (1992), Bekaert and Urias (1996)]. 
The above factors make it more difficult for the investor to benefit from the low 
correlations reported between developed and ESMs. Direct investment may prove costly 
91 
enough to offset any diversification gains (this could be the case in the smallest and less 
liberalised markets). The problems mentioned above could reduce significantly any 
diversification gains from country funds. The message to the investor is clear: although 
diversification benefits may exist, it is not so easy to capitalise on them. 
4.7.5. Barriers to entry 
One of reasons why investors cannot reap the diversification benefits offered by ESM is 
because of barriers to invest in these countries. There are two kinds of barriers: the 
demand side barriers; i. e. those barriers imposed by the emerging economies, and the 
supply side barriers; i. e. the barriers which refer to regulations and legislation of the 
developed markets which prohibits investors to buy into less developed economies. 
4.7.5.1 Demand side barriers 
More and more ESMs open up to foreign investors. However, there are still many 
markets which are either totally or partially closed to foreign investment. There are 
several ways to restrict investment in a market. Bekaert (1995), distinguishes three 
groups of barriers: two direct and one indirect. In the first group are legal restrictions 
applying to foreigners, like, ownership restrictions and taxes. The second group includes 
barriers about the regulatory and accounting environment like, financial information 
disclosure from companies and adequacy of settlement systems. The third group refers to 
country specific risks like, economic policy and political risk. Bekaert identifies as 
effective barriers, those in the second and third group. 
The effect of taxation on dividends and capital gains in ESMs is examined more detailed 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1992,1993). They find that taxation has a significant 
impact on required returns by non-residents. Specifically, taxation is a barrier when 
imposed on real or inflationary capital gains, but not on dividends. Furthermore, 
transaction costs are a barrier which declines as a market becomes more developed. The 
latter result implies that policies should make it easier for foreign investors to enter a 
market. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga also find that it is optimal to take action as early as 
possible, because the marginal benefits of further development decline as a market 
becomes more integrated with the world market. In this context, low taxation on foreign 
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investors could also help market development. However, Newlon (1993) challenges this 
result in his comments on Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga's findings. Taxation in the host 
country is creditable in the home country of the investor, for any dividend gains. But a 
well diversified investor can also make capital gains creditable in his or her home 
country. Therefore, as long as taxation is lower in the host country than in the home 
country -which generally is - than taxes should not matter. Even in the case of tax 
exempted investors such as pension funds, the results are still suspicious because taxes on 
dividend gains should be a significant barrier and they are not. 
There is a number of additional barriers which made most institutional investors to 
approach ESMs cautiously. ESMs are very risky and relatively illiquid compared to 
developed markets. Most debt issues are not graded by a recognised institution so, 
investors could not evaluate them properly. The few debt issues which are graded, are 
usually below investment grade and therefore do not meet investment criteria [Chuhan 
(1994)]. A problem which is common in ESMs is small size of the market and high 
concentration, factors which result in excessive volatility [Cashin and McDermott (1995), 
Fischer and Reisen (1994), Taliente and Fraser (1995)]. Other barriers to investment in 
ESMs are insider trading, the cost of obtaining information and inadequate regulation 
[Cashin & McDermott (1995), Taliente and Fraser (1995)]. 
4.7.5.2 Supply side barriers 
There are several other factors which prohibit investment in developing countries. The 
biggest investors in developed countries are pensions funds and insurance companies. 
Although capital movement is not restricted in industrial countries, institutional investors 
face restrictions on their foreign investments. Under UK legislation, life insurers have to 
match the currency composition of their assets to the currency composition of their 
liabilities. For liabilities in any currency that account for more than 5 percent of the total, 
there has to be a matching of assets of at least 80 percent in the same currency. Since 
most of life insurers' liabilities are in sterling, there is limited scope for foreign 
investment. In the US, legislation is different from state to state. Under New York State 
legislation, which is the most influential state on investment issues, only recently the 
ceiling on foreign investments of life insurance companies was raised from 3 percent to 6 
93 
percent. In addition, there is regulation with respect to the quality of investments 
[Chuhan (1994)]. The above restrictions do not apply to pension funds which can select 
their investments with more freedom. The requirements for pension funds in most 
countries are prudence and diversification in order to minimise risk. In Australia, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Spain and the UK, there are no legal limits to foreign investment for 
pension funds [Fischer and Reisen (1994)]. In 1979, when capital controls were 
dismantled, the foreign asset share of UK pension funds was 7 percent. The same figure 
for 1985 was 15 percent and for 1994,30 percent. 
4.8. Efficiency in ESMs 
The other issue associated with stock market integration is efficiency. If prices in two 
stock markets are cointegrated then these stock markets are inefficient in the long run 
[Chan et. al. (1997)]. Another reason why a discussion of stock market efficiency is 
necessary is because it is implicated in the relationship between the stock market and 
economic growth. Efficient stock markets price assets listed on then correctly and allow 
investors to discriminate between projects in different risk classes. If a stock market is 
efficient, it has the potential to assist economic growth by diverting funds towards the 
most productive projects. Efficiency then, has implications for our first question of 
whether ESMs have assisted the economic development of their countries. The efficient 
market hypothesis also has implications in the examination of volatility. Efficient stock 
markets have the ability to price assets correctly and quickly. It is therefore expected that 
the more efficient the market the lower its volatility since prices will adjust more quickly 
to news. Also, there is no economic reason why asset prices should fluctuate wildly in the 
short run. If the stock market can price assets correctly, we should expect these prices to 
be fairly stable. Efficiency then, has implications in every one of our research question 
and a discussion on ESM efficiency is required. 
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Stock market efficiency is one of the most extensively covered areas in the financial 
literature. Although there are numerous studies about developed markets, few studies 
have examined informational efficiency in developing countries' markets. Studying the 
informational efficiency of stock prices is useful because theory suggests that these prices 
contain information about market expectations of future economic growth and interest 
rates. Furthermore, movements in equity prices can have direct effects on consumption 
and investment expenditures via wealth and liquidity effects. 
El-Erian and Kumar (1994), argue that although developed equity markets may be 
efficient, ESMs could be inefficient for a number of reasons: companies divulge far less 
information to investors compared to that available to investors in industrial countries, the 
companies are subject to less investment research, small markets are less elaborately 
organised, markets have difficulty in detecting and discriminating among investment 
opportunities, capital markets are fragmented, dichotomy exists in the financial activities 
between organised and unorganised money markets and investors have shorter horizons 
because of greater political and economic uncertainties. Apart from these reasons, Sharma 
and Kennedy (1977) further report that in ESMs composition of outputs may respond 
sluggishly to changes in relative prices and investment preference is given to physical 
assets rather than financial assets. Additionally, a market experiencing bubbles is 
inefficient, i. e. prices will not always fully reflect relevant information. It is generally 
accepted that ESMs are prone to bubbles (there have been several swings in prices which 
are not justified by fundamentals). Some authors [e. g. Aitken (1996)] support the view 
that these bubbles indicate the inefficiency of the ESMs. 
Given all the above factors, one would expect to find a high degree of inefficiency in 
ESMs. Few studies have attempted to examine efficiency in the stock markets with 
respect to macroeconomic variables. Hargis and Maloney (1997) examine prices 
rationality in six ESMs (three Asian and three Latin American) for the period 1975 to 
1993. The study explores whether the indexes in these countries incorporate domestic and 
global shocks to future expected cash flows as represented by leads of industrial 
production. The findings suggest that future expected movements in industrial production 
are incorporated in prices, and the RZ obtained from these regressions are high. When the 
95 
level of US and Japanese industrial production is added in the regression as explanatory 
variables, the R2 increases even more for the Asian markets examined but not for the 
Latin American markets (a possible explanation could be the manufacturing export 
orientation of the Asian economies). These results indicate efficiency with respect to the 
forward looking behaviour of the countries examined. A study from Mookerjee (1988) 
indicates that the Indian stock market is informationally inefficient for the period 1949- 
1981. Mookerjee conducts Granger causality tests between stock prices and consumption, 
investment, and real activity as measured by GDP, industrial production and agricultural 
production. These tests suggest a causal relationship among stock prices and some of the 
above variables. Similar results are presented by Cornelius (1991) who examines 
informational efficiency in six ESMs with respect to monetary policy, and Cashin and 
McDermott (1995), who examine informational efficiency in three ESMs with respect to 
the equity market price implied by estimated consumption and investment decisions. 
There are also a few studies examining efficiency in ESMs in terms of predictability. 
Before discussing the results a note should be made. In the early literature (pre-Fama, 
1970), serial correlation or predictability of returns (either by macroeconomic variables or 
by anomalies in the returns) would imply inefficiency. However, Fama (1991) argues that 
all the above could exist in an efficient market. Serial correlation could exist because of 
nonsychronous trading, especially for small firms. Also, some markets exhibit positive 
serial correlation in the short term and negative serial correlation in the long term [see 
Summers (1986)], but is usually economically insignificant (a further problem is the low 
power of such tests even for large samples). Such behaviour is consistent with models of 
irrational pricing as well as time varying expected returns generated by rational pricing 
[Fama and French (1988)]. Predictability of returns conditional on 'macroeconomic 
variables could also imply time varying expected returns. For example, an increase in the 
dividend yield (which has been used to forecast future returns) could indicate good 
prospects for a company. In this case, predictability from this variable does not imply 
inefficiency but forward looking behaviour. On the other hand, if an increase in the 
dividend yield is not based on forecasts about the future, then it could result in irrational 
stock price increases which will be temporary. Furthermore, anomalies in returns can be 
sensitive to the sample examined (as shown by Fama) so, inference should be cautious. 
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The thing to remember when examining efficiency is that we do not yet fully comprehend 
how expected returns are affected by their cross section properties and by the real 
economy. Therefore, extreme caution is needed when making inferences about the 
efficiency of a stock market. A further problem investors usually face is how to exploit 
inefficiencies in ESMs. The evidence from the studies for predictability indicate that this 
is not generally achievable [e. g. Cooper (1982)]. Keane (1993) provides a good 
discussion on the problems of exploiting inefficiency in ESMs. 
The simplest way to test for returns independence is with tests for serial correlation. Such 
test have been implemented by several authors [e. g. Bekaert (1995), Claessens (1995), 
Cooper (1982), El Erian and Kumar (1994), Errunza and Losq (1985), Harvey (1993), 
Richards (1996)]. The results are unanimous: returns in ESMs are more correlated than 
returns in developed markets, with return autocorrelations statistically different than zero. 
In some cases the first order autocorrelation reported is higher than 0.2. It is difficult to 
determine the causes of this predictability. While it could mean inefficiency, it could also 
be caused by time-varying risk premia [e. g. Claessens et. al. (1995a)]. There are fewer 
tests on the predictability of long horizons. As Richards (1996) reports, a large sample is 
needed to ensure that the test for long term predictability does not have low power, which 
is a problem for ESMs because of data unavailability. Richards uses the approach of 
Fama and French (1988) to examine autocorrelation up to three years, in a sample of 16 
countries. The null of no autocorrelation is. rejected in nine cases, in six of which the 
autocorrelation is negative, indicating price reversals. 
Another way to test for returns independence is with a non-parametric test, that is the runs 
analysis [e. g.. Cooper (1982), El Erian and Kumar (1994), Errunza and Losq (1985), 
Sharma and Kennedy (1977)]. The runs analysis has a few, advantages over the serial 
correlation test. No assumptions about the distribution of the price changes are needed, it 
is not affected by unusual price changes which may distort the pattern of price changes 
and it can detect small periods in the sample where serial correlation is present. Although 
the runs analysis is superior to the serial correlation test because of the above factors, the 
results from the two tests have been similar in most cases, again indicating predictability 
of returns. 
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A more sophisticated and less frequently seen method to test for randomness, is the 
spectral analysis [e. g.. Cooper (1982), Sharma and Kennedy (1977)]. The spectral 
analysis examines the autospectrum of the price changes, which should be completely flat 
if the series is random. If it is not flat, then there are cycles in stock prices. Cooper finds 
some evidence of nonrandomness based on this test, which generally agree with the 
results from the previous tests. Sharma and Kennedy fail to find any cyclical behaviour in 
the Bombay stock exchange. 
A robust and simple test of random walk is the variance ratio test [e. g. Aitken (1996), 
Claessens et. al. (1995)]. This test operates under the hypothesis that if returns follow a 
random walk, then their variance should increase proportionately with time. The 
advantage of this approach is that the test focuses on the behaviour of the asset's price 
and not on the level, which depends on the asset's fundamentals, thus avoiding 
specification errors. Claessens's results are again similar to the results from their previous 
tests. Aitken finds that six of 16 ESMs reject the random walk hypothesis for the period 
1992-95. 
Few studies have examined predictability in ESMs with respect to anomalies 
(seasonality, day-of-the-week effect). Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989), Claessens et. al., 
(1995a), and Garrett and Spyrou, (1998), examine seasonality and day-of-the-week 
effects in four, twenty and ten ESMs respectively for various periods. The results for 
seasonality vary: Aggarwal and Rivoli find a January effect in three out of the four 
countries they examine; Claessens et. al. find some evidence of seasonality in their 
sample, but not a specific turn-of-the-tax-year effect; while Garrett and Spyrou find no 
evidence of January or other seasonal effect in their sample. The last result is also 
confirmed by Buckberg (1993) who tested for a January effect in a sample of 20 countries 
from 1985-1991 and found a significant January effect only for Turkey. Lee (1992), also 
examines seasonality in five Asian markets (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Singapore) for the period 1970 (and 1975) to 1989, and finds a January effect in all of 
them except Korea. In Hong Kong there is also a December effect. Huang (1997), also 
finds that returns are higher in January in the Taiwan stock market. The rational behind 
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seasonality is provided by the "tax-loss-selling" hypothesis which says that investors sell 
stock which declined in price in order to reduce their taxes. This selling pushes prices 
down, and once the tax year is over, the stock is bought again and prices return to their 
equilibrium level, resulting in high returns in January. However, there is no rational 
explanation for the seasonality in many of these markets, since there are no capital gains 
taxes. 
With respect to the day-of-the-week effect, the results are similar: Aggarwal and Rivoli 
(1989), Garrett and Spyrou (1998) and Lee et. al. (1990), find lower returns for Monday 
and higher returns for Friday (Lee et. al. find that the highest returns in his sample are 
generated first on Wednesdays and then Fridays). These results are similar to findings for 
industrial countries [e. g. French (1980), Keim and Stambaugh (1984)]. Furthermore, 
Aggarwal and Rivoli find that the Monday effect is extended on Tuesdays as well. Also, 
Garrett and Spyrou report a substantial day-of-the-week effect in the Latin American 
countries of their sample, in general. 
Tests on the predictability of returns in ESMs have also been done using lagged 
information variables [Bekaert (1995), Buckberg (1993), Claessens et. al. (1995), Hargis 
and Maloney (1997), Harvey (1993)]. These studies have used either local or local and 
global variables to predict future returns. Claessens et. al. (1995) use local variables to 
examine the cross section of returns in 19 countries. In eleven countries the "size" 
variable is significant and positive. This finding contrasts findings in developed markets, 
where small firms produce higher returns. Turnover is also significant in nine countries 
with a positive sign. This result indicates that liquidity carries with it a premium which is 
rather surprising considering that illiquid assets are considered more risky. Both of the 
above results indicate that investors are attracted to the biggest and more liquid assets in 
every market, thus increasing the expected return. Other variables with explanatory power 
in individual countries are price-to-book value and dividend yield but, their sign was not 
stable so, it is difficult to make inference on the way they affect each market. The 
R2 reported vary from 86% for Colombia to -0.02 for Venezuela. In another paper, 
Claessens et. al. (1995), find no significant size effect in a sample of 20 countries. 
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Other studies have examined predictability in ESMs using both local and global variables 
[e. g.. Bekaert (1995), Buckberg (1993), Hargis and Maloney (1997), Harvey (1995)]. The 
variables used in these studies are lagged local and global returns, dividend yields and 
interest rates, with some exceptions. Two issues are examined: first, the predictability of 
returns in these markets, and second, which set of variables drive the markets: local or 
global. The results obtained from these studies vary. Buckberg's sample consists of 20 
countries and the period examined is from 1985 to 1991. The fit of the instruments in the 
regressions ranges from 0.338 for Colombia to negative values. Buckberg finds that 
compared to developed markets, ESMs are more predictable. Another finding is that 
predictability in several countries is driven by the lagged local return. 
This finding contradicts Bekaert's results for 19 countries for the period 1985-1992, who 
finds that it is the local lagged dividend yield and not the local return which drives 
predictability in a number of countries [see also Hargis and Maloney (1997)]. His 
findings are consistent with results from developed countries as well [e. g.. Bekaert and 
Hodrick (1992)]. Bekaert finds that predictability in ESMs is generally driven by the 
local variables and is not significant for the period examined. However, for an earlier 
period (1976-1985) predictability in the same markets is much stronger and it derives 
mainly from global instruments. 
Harvey examines predictability in 20 ESMs from 1976 to 1992. He finds that 
predictability has actually increased recently and that predictability in returns is driven by 
local factors. His results are confirmed by Hargis and Maloney (1997) who examine 6 
ESMs for the period 1975 to 1993. Harvey takes the analysis one step further and 
examines how these predictions can help ex ante in the formation of a portfolio where 
predictions given by his model are used as expected returns. The results indicate that the 
portfolios based on conditioning information can lead to consistent higher returns 
compared to the unconditional strategy. The results from the above studies seem to agree 
that ESMs are more predictable than developed markets and this predictability is 
economically significant for investment decision. 
4.9. Summary and Conclusions 
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In this chapter, we have tried to give an account of the status, role and characteristics of 
ESMs in the global market and to review the empirical evidence concerning our research 
questions. The ESMs were given increased attention both by investors and academics the 
last two decades when governments used them in an attempt to attract foreign capital in 
their countries. This coincided with a decrease in the rate of return offered by developed 
stock markets in the early 1990s because of an economic slowdown. Although ESMs are 
a great deal riskier than developed ones, investors noticed that these markets exhibit some 
desirable characteristics. One is high returns. If an investor could foresee when to enter 
and exit a market, he could realise returns a lot higher that any developed stock market 
usually offered. Second, ESMs offer valuable diversification benefits for the global 
investor. Most developing economies tend to move together overtime but emerging 
economies do not follow that trend. Therefore, a global investor can minimise her risk by 
investing a portion of her funds in ESMs. Because of these reasons, foreign investors 
have invested heavily in ESMs during the last twenty years. However, it is frequently 
said in the literature that the investors behaviour is erratic and "herd-like". This behaviour 
is claimed to have caused crashes, like the Mexican crash in 1994. What is worse, is that 
there is evidence suggesting that once a national stock market crashes, the whole 
geographic area surrounding this country is affected. So, after the Mexican crash, several 
South American stock markets fell for no apparent reason. This fall could not be justified 
based on fundamentals and was blamed on the erratic behaviour of the investors. 
Apart from the desirable characteristics found in ESMs, foreign investors also found 
several undesirable ones. In many ESMs there are restrictions on capital flows or 
available investments to foreigners. Foreign investors also complain about other problems 
such as insider trading and inadequate regulation of these markets. In terms of assessing a 
market, there are difficulties as well. Studies have found that most ESMs are not efficient 
in pricing stocks. Prices most often than not are not based on fundamentals. Furthermore, 
most of these market are a lot more volatile than developed markets. While this last 
characteristic presents opportunities for short term profits, it makes most investors 
nervous about their investment, resulting in capital flight when trouble arises. 
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From the above, it seems that most emerging stock markets are inefficient and ridden 
with problems. Such characteristics have serious implications on the questions we have 
posed. The following chapters examine empirically whether the development of the stock 
market contributed to economic growth, if stock price volatility increased following 
liberalisation and if the ESMs became integrated following liberalisation. The 
characteristics of the stock markets in these regions and the nature of foreign investment 
there, should be considered when we discuss the results from our tests. It seems 
implausible to expect to find a positive effect between stock market development and 
growth in countries where the stock market resembles a casino and extreme volatility in 
prices is the norm. Also, if foreign investors used these markets purely for speculation, 
we should expect a large increase in the volatility of these markets and segmentation after 
foreign investors were allowed to invest there. 
It should be noted however, that not all countries present the above characteristics. Some 
of the countries in our sample have shown economic stability and a soundness of 
macroeconomic policies which are considered good even by developed countries 
standards. Our results will have to be considered vis-ä-vis the special characteristics of 
each emerging economy, which were presented in chapter 2 where we provided an 
overview of the economic development of some of the countries examined, during the 
last two decades. We shall now discuss the methodologies that we employ to test our 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5: DA TA AND TESTING METHODOLOGIES 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we reviewed the empirical research on the issues we examined. 
We found that there are certain gaps in the literature which we shall attempt to fill. One of 
the problems with the existing literature involves the methodologies followed by several 
researchers. We believe that our methodologies overcome several of the problems 
discussed in the previous chapter. In this chapter we present the methodologies we shall 
follow, explain why we use them and discuss the data used in the analyses. 
5.2. Methodology and data for the first research question 
5.2.1. Testing methodology 
The first research question is how the stock market and banking sector interact in the 
developing economies and if they assisted their economic development. Our concern is 
the time series analysis of the variables of interest (i. e. the proxies for the stock market 
development and volatility, the banking sector development and the real economy). We 
wish to examine the long run relationship among the four variables and how they interact 
in a system. Although we do not examine the short run dynamics, we need to utilise a 
methodology which accounts for these dynamics and provides results concerning the long 
run only. We feel that the most appropriate methodology is to test for cointegration 
among the variables. This methodology will give us an insight into the relationship of 
each of the variables with the others and how they behave as a system. In the present 
analysis this methodology is particularly relevant because we wish to establish not only 
how these variables relate, but also which of the variables are endogenous. Endogeneity 
of the relevant variables is a basic assumption of the Boyd and Smith (1996) model 
because the financial sector development causes economic growth and vice versa. In the 
present analysis, we use the Johansen cointegration methodology which involves several 
steps described below. 
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5.2.1.1 Stationarity 
The first step in the analysis is to test for stationarity. A process is said to be stationary if 
its mean and variance are independent of time. In this case, a time series (x) mean E(xt) 
and variance E[xt - E(xý]2 will be stable for any subperiod of the sample period. Instead, 
if a series (x) is non-stationary then, its mean and variance will change over time. This 
has both economic and statistical implications. If a series is non-stationary the effect of 
any shock in the series is permanent. Establishing stationarity is important in 
econometrics because unless the variables involved in a model are all of the same order of 
integration, then the result could be a spurious regression. 
If non-stationary series are differenced one or more times they usually become stationary. 
Depending on how many times we have to difference a series we refer to the series order 
of integration. If we have to difference a series once to make it stationary then this series 
is said to be of first order. Notationally we use the symbol I(d), where d is the order of 
integration. Thus, the notation for a first order series is I(1). Most economic series are 
I(1). To determine the order of a series the most common test is the Dickey-Fuller tests 
(DF) proposed by D. Dickey and W. Fuller (1979,1981). The simplest form of the DF 
tests amounts to estimating: 
xt= pXti +Ui, (1) 
and testing whether p equals to 1. Alternatively we test whether p* =p-1=0 against p* 
< 0. This alternative test simplifies matters if a more complicated autoregressive process 
is considered [Harris (1995)]. Equation (1) assumes that the data generating process is a 
simple first order autoregressive process with no trend component, zero mean and that the 
first observation is also zero. Since these assumptions hardly satisfy any empirical series; 
the test most commonly used is: 
dz, =a +ißt +p* x, -, 
+u (2) 
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where t is the time trend. Equation (2) assumes that the series follows a first order 
autoregressive process. If this is not true, the residuals u, will be autocorrelated and the 
DF test will be invalidated because the DF distributions are based on the assumption that 
the residual is white noise. For this reason the test should have sufficient lags to ensure 
that the residuals are not correlated. This results in the augmented DF test. In the presence 
of unit roots, the estimates of the autoregressive parameters have a non-standard 
distribution and the critical values for the usual tests (t, F) cannot be used. Instead, we use 
the distributions tabulated by Dickey and Fuller. The critical values for their distributions 
have been computed using Monte Carlo techniques and are much larger than those in the 
F table. The null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root which implies nonstationarity. 
If the null is rejected (i. e. if the F test is larger than the critical value) then there is no unit 
root and the process is stationary. 
5.2.1.2 Cointegration 
The notion of cointegration refers to the case where two or more variables move together 
over time and the difference between them is stable over time. Consider two variables xt 
and yt, where xt is I(1) and yt is 1(0). Then any linear combination of these variables will 
be I(1). Regressions where variables of different orders of integration are involved can 
often lead to spurious results. Consider now two variables xt and yt where they are both 
I(1). Generally, linear combinations of these two variables will be also I(1). However, 
there are cases where linear combinations of two or more variables of the same order of 
integration are of a lower order of integration. For example, if xt and yt are both I(1) and 
zt = yt - a- ßxt is 1(0), then xt and yt are said to be cointegrated of order CI(1,1) [Engle 
and Granger (1987). 
One of the most important implications of cointegration is the Granger representation 
theorem (Granger 1983, Engle and Granger, 1987). The theorem states that if two or 
more variables are cointegrated of order 1, then the data can be represented by error 
correction models. These models for two variables xt and yt are: 
Ax, = a1 +, B l+ lags ('ix, y) + uut, (3) 
Ayr = a2 + ßß2 + lags(dyt, xd+ uyt, (4) 
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where (u,, t, uy) is bivariate white noise and at least one of ß1 and ß2 is non-zero. If xt and 
yt are cointegrated then zt is 1(0) and each one of the two equations is 1(0). If this is the 
case, then the two variables move closely together over time. There are two 
methodologies to test for cointegration: the Engle and Granger (1987) methodology and 
the Johansen (1988) methodology. The latter has several advantages over the Engle and 
Granger methodology, of which the main is that it can estimate the number of 
cointegrating vectors in the system. Therefore, for the present analysis we utilise the 
Johansen methodology. 
5.2.1.3 The Johansen methodology 
The Johansen (1988) methodology is rather complicated and by now well known in the 
academic literature so, here we give only a brief overview of it. It begins with the 
construction of a multivariate autoregressive model of the form: 
zt = A1z1-1 + A2zr-z + ... + Akzr-k + ur, ur - IN (O, E) (5) 
where zt is a (n x 1) matrix of n potentially endogenous variables and each of the A; is a 
(n x n) matrix of parameters. Equation (3) can be reformulated into a vector error- 
correction form: 
AZl = r, AdZ1-, + ... + rk-, ter-k-, + ý1-k + u1, u, (O Y) (6) 
where T; =-(I-AI -... -A), (i= 1, ... , k- 1) and P=- (I - A, -... -Ak), with Ibeing the 
identity matrix. The vector error correction form gives us information about the short and 
the long run via the estimates of ri and II respectively. It can be shown that Il = ap', 
where a is the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium and ß is a vector of long run 
coefficients. Johansen proposes to regress Ozt and zt_k on a constant and the zt lagged 
differences to obtain the residual vectors Rat and Rkt respectively. These residual vectors 
are then used to form residual matrices: 
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S>> = T' 1] R11R' i, J=0, k (7) 
r=i 
The eigenvectors which correspond to the r largest eigenvalues from solving the equation 
(8) "Skk - `Sk0`S00 `SO/ 
I 
=0 
are the maximum likelihood estimate of P. This procedure gives n eigenvalues 
Al >'%2 >... >, Land the corresponding eigenvectors V= (vý, ..., 
v) . The r elements 
in 
V are the cointegrating vectors. Furthermore, Johansen shows that ä= Sokß from which 
we obtain estimates of a. Once we have estimates of a and ß and test for restrictions, we 
then estimate equation (4) by OLS to obtain the full model. 
5.2.1.4 Constructing the long run equations 
To choose the appropriate lag length, cointegration rank and the model for deterministic 
components we use Microfit 4.0. First, we run the VAR model for several different lag 
lengths and choose the appropriate lag length according to the log-likelihood ratio 
statistic. We run specification tests on the model with the chosen lag length. If the model 
suffers from any problems, we use a higher order model. We then run tests for 
cointegration using different specifications with regards to deterministic components. If 
we find cointegration under different specifications, we determine rank and model 
specification simultaneously using the Pantula principle [Harris (1995)]. We estimate 
three models: one with restricted intercepts and no trends (Model 1), one with 
unrestricted intercepts and no trends (Model 2) and one with unrestricted intercepts and 
restricted trends (Model 3). We then compare the trace and max-eigenvalue statistics with 
their critical values starting from Model 1 through to Model 3 for each different rank. We 
stop the first time the null hypothesis is not rejected and we choose the Model for which 
the null hypothesis was not rejected and the appropriate rank (the results are presented 
and explained more clearly in appendix 3). When the two tests (trace and max- 
eigenvalue) do not choose the same model, we choose the one proposed by the trace 
statistic because it is more robust to both skewness and kurtosis in the residuals than the 
max-eigenvalue statistic [Harris (1995)]. 
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In order to construct the long run equations, once we determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors in our models we run restrictions to obtain the most parsimonious 
specification not rejected by the data [see: Arestis and Demetriades (1997)]. We begin by 
testing for weak exogeneity of each variable to the system. These test are distributed as 
x2(1) (except from Chile where we find two cointegrating vectors and the tests are 
distributed as x2(2)). Once we establish which variables are exogenous to the system, we 
impose the restriction in further estimation. The next step is to find which variables in the 
cointegrating vector(s) are significant. These tests are carried out sequentially and when 
the tests do not reject the null, the variable is dropped from the estimation. Finally, in 
order to establish which of the variables is endogenous to which vector, we run the error 
correction regressions and examine the significance of each of the error correction model 
in each regression using the t-ratio. For the countries where only one cointegration vector 
was found, the error correction regressions are run to verify the endogeneity tests for the 
reduced cointegration vector. Once we establish the endogeneity of a variable to a vector, 
the vector is then normalised on this variable and presented in equation form. 
5.2.2. Data 
To examine the relationship between economic development and the financial sector in 
emerging economies, we utilise data from five countries: Chile, India, Mexico, South 
Korea and Taiwan. We chose these particular countries because they followed different 
paths to economic liberalisation and their stock markets exhibit different characteristics. 
Therefore, the results should also provide evidence for and against liberalisation policies 
adopted by emerging countries. Ideally, we should include more countries in our analysis, 
but data unavailability is a major constraint. 
During the past two decades, Chile opened up its stock market to foreign investors and 
adopted a monetarist approach for its economic policy. Although, foreigners were 
allowed to invest in the country, capital repatriation was restricted. This policy gained 
much praise from economists during the 1997 crash because it insulated the country from 
sudden massive capital outflows which other countries experienced. One effect of this 
policy was a more stable stock market compared to other developing countries. India's 
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economy has been centrally controlled since it gained independence in 1947. This has put 
a strain on the country's economic growth, which economists call `the Hindu rate of 
growth'. The interest in this case is to examine the effect of the stock market on a mainly 
state controlled economy. Mexico followed the US economic model and liberalised its 
economy rapidly during the `1980s. The Mexican stock market grew at a very fast rate 
mainly because of foreign investors. This rapid growth came to a halt in 1994 when the 
stock market crashed. Since then, it made an impressive recovery in a relatively short 
period of time. South Korea was until recently considered a `miracle' economy by 
economists world-wide. Its successful heavy industry was part of a government 
development plan. The development of the stock market was also part of a government 
plan. The role of the stock market in South Korea was to mobilise savings outside banks 
(because of rising interest rates) and to diffuse the country wealth from the few chaebol 
bosses to shareholders. The government took a series of measures (e. g. restrictions on 
foreign borrowing, debt-equity ceilings) to force the chaebol to raise money from the 
stock market. Another interesting feature of the South Korean stock market is that the 
government launched a stock market stabilisation fund: a fund which the government 
used to buy shares when prices fell and sell shares when prices rose `excessively'. Under 
these conditions, the stock market was not allowed to be excessively volatile - so, the 
Keynesian argument against the development of stock markets cannot apply in this case - 
but it could not perform its primary function as a pricing mechanism. It is therefore 
interesting to examine what effect a government controlled stock market had on the South 
Korean economy. Finally, the Taiwanese stock market has been one of the most volatile 
during the late 1980s and 1990s. The government had imposed restrictions on capital 
inflows and outflows so, the only investment outlets for the Taiwanese were the stock 
market and the real estate sector. The Taiwanese people became rather wealthy during the 
last two decades due to the country's vast exports. A lot of their money found their way 
into the stock market pushing prices up. This gave the Taiwanese stock market the 
reputation of a casino. 
The different liberalisation paths followed by these countries and the different role given 
to the stock market in their respective economies make an interesting case study. Here, 
not only do we examine the relationship between stock market and banks and their effect 
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on the real economy, but we also attempt to find evidence on the usefulness of a stock 
market under different economic regimes. 
The data we use in the present analysis serve as proxies for the three variables under 
investigation, namely: stock market development, banking sector and economic growth. 
To proxy economic growth, most studies on developing economies use the GDP 
indicator. However, for most developing countries, this variable is available only 
annually and in some cases the series are discontinued. Considering that we examine a 
period of about twenty years, annual data would give us too few observations for 
cointegration analysis. Therefore, we use the industrial production index as a proxy for 
economic growth, as in Chatrath et. al. (1997). The industrial production index should be 
a good proxy for real economic activity because it includes manufacturing, mining, 
construction and public goods production, which compose the major part of an economy, 
especially for Asian countries which are manufacturing oriented. For the banking sector, 
we use the amount of credit given by both public and private banks to the private sector, 
because in these countries the state usually provided loans to businesses. For Taiwan, we 
use the M2 measure of money supply. One of the characteristics of the Taiwanese 
economy is the huge black economy. Therefore, we feel that the official credit given to 
enterprises will not be an accurate measure of the total credit given to them. A measure of 
the amount of money circulating in the economy would be more appropriate as a proxy of 
the size of the official and unofficial credit market. For the stock market development 
proxy, we use the stock market capitalisation. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1995) 
examine various measures of stock market development. In their paper they construct 
indices of stock market developement using variou indicators. Then, they compare the 
individual measures of stock market development to the indices and find that both the 
indices and stock market capitalisation divided by GDP give similar results with respect 
to which markets are developed or underdeveloped. Therefore, we feel that stock market 
capitalisation is a good measure for stock market development even when used on each 
own'. This measure is directly related to size which is positively correlated with the 
ability to mobilise capital and diversify risk. ' 
1 Having said that, we recognise that different measures of stock market development could give a better 
understanding on the effect of stock market developement on the economy. Using different measures is 
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Additionally we use a measure of stock market volatility similar to the one used by 
Arestis and Demetriades (1997). This volatility variable is the 12 month rolling standard 
deviation of the stock market indexes' logarithmic returns2. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1995), refer to "less volatility" as a measure of stock market development, although they 
recognise that this is not necessarily the case [see: Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990a)]. In 
the present study, we are more interested in the status of the volatility measure in the 
models. If the volatility measure is endogenous, this provides evidence for the Boyd and 
Smith model, while if it is exogenous and negatively related to economic growth, it 
provides evidence for the Keynesian economists. 
The banking sector measures and the' stock market capitalisation are deflated by the 
consumer prices index3. The industrial production. index is deflated by construction. All 
data are monthly and can be obtained from the on-line information system Datastream 
International, except for the Taiwanese market capitalisation which is obtained from the 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of China. All variables are expressed in logarithms. The 
sample period for each country differs according to data availability. The start of the 
sample period is January 1977 for India, Mexico and Taiwan; January 1976- for South 
Korea and January 1982 for Chile because this is the earliest periods that we could find 
data for these countries. The end of the sample period is November 1997 for all countries 
because we want to exclude the period after the South East Asia crisis. Inclusion of this 
period would probably distort are esimators and introduce structural breaks in our 
regressions. Because of severe serial correlation in the datas, we seasonally adjust them 
using the ratio to moving average technique (appendix 1). The only series which did not 
exhibit any seasonal trends were market capitalisation for Chile and South Korea and the 
industrial production index for South Korea. These series were left unadjusted. 
particularly useful when one examines the channels through which stock market development affects the 
economy [see Levine and Zervos (1998)]. 
2 For a discussion on the limitations of volatility measures, see: Pagan (1986). 
3 We prefer the CPI to the WPI because the former includes goods and services and is therefore more 
appropriate as a deflator. Other `more appropriate' deflators are not available for these countries. 
4 See, IMF International Financial Statistics. 
S When we ran the VAR models to determine the lag length for each country, serial correlation was present 
even after we added 18 lags. 
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5.3. Methodology and data for the second research question 
5.3.1 Testing methodology 
The second research question is if stock market volatility increased following the opening 
of the ESMs to foreign investors and we examine changes in volatility using two 
procedures. The first methodology we employ in our analysis is the examination of 
volatility with a GARCH process. The second procedure utilises an EGARCH process 
and estimates the news impact curves for each country and subperiod. The reason we use 
two different tests to examine volatility is because they can both give useful information 
about changes in the nature of volatility. Bollerlev et. al. (1992) states that most stock 
return data follow a GARCH process of low order. However, the GARCH process cannot 
account for asymmetries in volatility, which have been found to be present in stock return 
data [e. g. Christie (1982)]. For this reason we also use an EGARCH process and examine 
the asymmetry graphically using a procedure proposed by Engle and Ng (1993). 
As a first step in the analysis, we test for ARCH effects in the data. The autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) model developed by Engle (1982) can account for 
the difference between the unconditional and the conditional variance of a stochastic 
process. ARCH modelling in finance has proven to be a very useful means of empirically 
examining the momentum in conditional variance. While conventional econometric 
models operate under the assumption of constant variance, the ARCH process allows the 
conditional variance to vary over time, leaving the unconditional variance constant. In the 
ARCH(q) model the conditional variance is a function of past squared innovations (us) in 
the mean of some other stochastic process, thus allowing it to change over time. 
Equations (9)-(11) describe an ARCH(q) process: 
yr = 6'xt + ut (9) 
utI 92 r-i-. N(0, hr) " (10) 
i=1 
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where xr is a vector including the information set 92 r-i, ue is a random error, and h, is the 
conditional volatility of the stochastic process yr. 
The main critique against ARCH modelling is that it lacks theoretical justification. 
Several interpretations of the ARCH effect can be found in the literature, none however 
has been fully satisfactory. Diebold and Nerlove (1989) argue that the ARCH effect is 
attributed to a serially correlated news arrival process. A similar explanation is given by 
Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990a), who argue that volatility clustering can be explained 
by trading volume. If the news arrival process is serially correlated, then trading volume 
and volatility should be contemporaneous related [Tauchen and Pitts (1983)]. Some 
support to the serially correlated news arrival process has been given by Engle, Ito and 
Lin (1990). Further support to this argument is given by Bodurtha and Mark (1990) and 
Attanasio (1991), who find evidence of an ARCH(3) process in their analysis of 
portfolios of monthly NYSE stock returns and monthly excess returns on the S&P500 
index, respectively. It is likely that the ARCH effect is present on a quarterly basis simply 
because of the way firms announce dividends and earnings. Other researchers attribute 
the ARCH effect to macroeconomic variables. Such variables include the nominal interest 
rates [Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1991)], the dividend yield [Attanasio (1991)] 
and the M1 money supply [Engel and Rodrigues (1989)]. Other possible explanations for 
the ARCH effect are the business cycle [Schwert (1989)] and the changes in the margin 
requirements [Hardouvelis (1990)]. 
From an econometric perspective, a problem with the ARCH specification is that it 
requires a relatively long lag structure in the conditional variance equation to take 
account of the long memory typically found in empirical work. However, a long lag often 
results in violation of the non-negativity constraints imposed on the ARCH parameters to 
ensure a positive variance. A more general process with a longer memory is the 
Generalised ARCH (GARCH) process developed by Bollerslev (1986). The GARCH 
models are capable of capturing leptocurtosis, skewness and volatility clustering, which 
are the three features most often observed in empirical analysis. Evidence of non- 
normality in market returns have been documented by several researchers [e. g. Harvey 
113 
(1995), Bekaert and Harvey (1997)] and will be examined in the current analysis as well. 
Volatility clustering implies that large (small) price changes follow large (small) price 
changes of either sign. While volatility clustering has also been documented in high 
frequency data, it is not clear what causes this clustering although some interpretation has 
been given in the literature [Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990a)]. In the GARCH(q, p) 
model, the conditional volatility is specified as in (11) with the addition of its past 
squared values, as in equation (12): 
4P 
hl=w+ aiu+ cih 
i=1 t=1 
(12) 
For a well defined GARCH(q, p) the following restrictions must be imposed to ensure that 
the conditional variance does not take negative values: w>0, at z0 and ci z 0. One of 
the appealing features of the GARCH model, is that it can be interpreted as an ARMA 
model. Assuming q; -, p 
(without loss of generality) and rearranging the terms of equation 
(12) we get: 
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u= co + (ai+ ci)u j-t ci (u t-r'h i2-1)+(U2 t- h2 
) (13) 
i=1 i=1 
Equation (13) is an ARMA process with serially uncorrelated innovations (u 't -h t' ). 
Although the innovations of the process is not correlated, it is heteroscedastic, so that 
estimation using standard Box-Jenkins procedure is inefficient. However, the formulas 
for forecasting ARMA processes still apply and the familiar ARMA processes theory can 
be applied to address questions on unit roots for long term forecasting [Engle and 
Bollerslev (1986)]. Interpreting the GARCH model as an ARMA process can also be 
used to identify the order of q and p [Bollerslev (1988)]. 
GARCH models are well known in the literature. By now, several studies have applied 
GARCH modelling on financial data to test several hypotheses; e. g. Choudhry (1996) 
examines volatility before and after the October 1987 crash in six emerging markets, 
Engle and Ng (1993), use and compare several GARCH models to examine the impact of 
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news on volatility, Fraser and Power (1997), examine the relationship between 
conditional volatility and market performance and news arrival in seven markets. 
Bollerslev et al (1992) review the empirical evidence on the ARCH modelling in finance 
and report developments in the family of GARCH modelling. In their review they find 
that most financial series follow a GARCH(1,1) process. In the present analysis, we will 
test for higher order GARCH processes as well. Selection of the appropriate order will be 
made by means of the log likelihood function of each equation. The models with the 
highest values for each period will be selected. 




»-1 + Lit (14) 
where yt is the return at time t, and ur is the error term. To capture the time varying 
volatility, equation (12) is used. The coefficient of the squared error term (a) measures 
the extent to which past news cause volatility today. In other words the size and 
significance of a implies the existence of volatility clustering in the data. The sum (a+c) 
measures volatility persistence. As the sum a+c approaches unity, the persistence of 
shocks to volatility becomes greater. If a+c=1 then any shock to volatility is permanent 
and the unconditional variance is infinite. In this case, the process is called an I-GARCH 
process [integrated in variance process, Engle and Bollerslev (1986)]. The I-GARCH 
process implies that volatility persistence is permanent and therefore past volatility is 
significant in predicting future volatility over all finite horizons. If the sum a+c is greater 
than unity, then volatility is explosive; i. e. a shock to volatility this period will result in 
even greater volatility during the next period [Chou (1988)]. 
In estimating the GARCH parameters pre- and post-liberalisation we have to make an 
assumption about the distribution of returns. Because of the non-normality of the 
unpredictable returns, assuming a normal distribution for the GARCH models could be 
inappropriate and result in inaccurate estimates [although in most cases results obtained 
under both assumptions are similar, e. g. Choudhry (1996)]. Therefore, all models are 
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estimated assuming a normal distribution and alternatively at distribution. Selection 
between the two models is based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC). 
Before estimating the GARCH models for the two subperiods, it is be useful to test for 
structural shifts in the variance of the data examined. In small samples, the absence of 
structural shifts could account for low GARCH values [Diebold (1986)]. Structural shifts 
mean that the constant in the variance equation of the GARCH model is not stable over 
time; i. e. the unconditional variance is non-stationary. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990b) 
examine structural shifts in the variance of daily returns from 30 companies and discuss 
the implications such shifts have for the results given by the standard GARCH model. 
Over long sample periods, it is likely that structural shifts will occur. These result in 
overestimation of the GARCH parameters, which could suggest an I-GARCH process. 
Volatility persistence has serious implications for issues such as option pricing and risk 
premia analysis, thus, unbiased estimates of the GARCH parameters are essential. 
Lastrapes (1989), confirms the appearance of this problem in big samples. Lastrapes 
examines exchange rate volatility and finds that, when US monetary policy regime 
changes are accounted for by dummy variables in the GARCH model used, volatility 
persistence is significantly reduced. Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990b) findings suggest 
that discrete, infrequent shifts in unconditional variance are a type of persistence in 
variance. This type of variance contains no information about, future variance contrary to 
a GARCH process which contains information about the future. Although the problem 
that structural shifts impose has been empirically confirmed, it has not been addressed in 
economic contexts. Another problem of accounting for structural shifts is that there is no 
methodology identifying the timing of such discrete shifts. In the present analysis only 
one subperiod can be identified a priory, the October 1997 crash. In October 1997, South 
Asian stock markets suffered a crash from which some countries still have not recovered. 
The turbulence in these markets can be seen in Figures 7.7-7.14, presented at the end of 
chapter 7. Towards the end of the period, adjusted returns for some of the Asian countries 
seem more volatile than the rest of the period. Therefore, we test for a structural shift 
from the beginning of September 1997 (to allow for the possibility of increased volatility 
prior to the crash due to anticipation of what actually happened), until the end of the 
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sample period. Although the crash affected Asian stock markets, tests are conducted for 
the same period for the Latin American countries as well because there is the possibility 
of volatility spillovers. 
To test for structural shifts in the unconditional variance, we include dummy variables in 
the variance equation of the standard GARCH model, as in (15): 
hý = co +dD, +au1_2 2 1 +cht_1 (15) 
where D1 is a dummy variable which corresponds to the period September 1997 to 
February 1998, i. e. takes the value of 1 for this period and 0 otherwise. We also test for 
structural shifts in the mean equation, by running the mean equation (14) with the 
addition of a dummy variable. If the dummy variable in any of the equations is 
significant, then the constant in the variance or the mean equation is not stable and the 
period for which it is unstable should be dropped from the analysis. The period used is 
the post-liberalisation period for every country. Then we proceed with the analysis as 
described above. 
The second methodology we use, is the examination of the changes of the impact of news 
on volatility using an exponential GARCH (EGARCH) process. To compare volatility 
before and after liberalisation, we use the news impact curves suggested by the EGARCH 
process proposed by Nelson (1991). The variance equation of the EGARCH model is: 
1og(hr) = a) +/1log(hr-, ) +y et -1 +a [IiI _ 
F2 
(16) 
h, - ý hý-ý ýc 
where, st_1 are the residuals from the mean equation. The news impact curves which is 
proposed by Engle and Ng (1993) relate s, _, 
to ht, so past return shocks are related to 
current volatility. We use the EGARCH model because it can capture asymmetries in the 
volatility of stock returns. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) have found that volatility 
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increases with `bad news' and falls with `good news'6. Other models (e. g. GARCH) are 
not able to capture this effect since they do not discriminate between positive and 
negative unexpected returns. The other desirable feature of the EGARCH model, is that 
the parameters of the model do not need to be restricted to ensure that the process remains 
positive. 
The news impact curves measure how volatility is generated from unexpected returns. 
For the EGARCH model, the curve is centred at s, _1 =0 and 
is increasing exponentially 
but with different parameters for positive and negative values of the residuals. The news 
impact curve is given by7: 
h1=Aexp 
(, v +a)Et-1 
, for Et_, >0, and (17) 
h1= A exp 
(T a) 
a-i, for st. ' < 0, (18) Q 
where A= dQ exp[ty -a 12 -/is ] and a is the unconditional return standard deviation 
implied by the conditional variance equation. 
The unconditional return variance is given by8: 
2 
co -a 1 (y2 +a2) 
az = exp 1- ß+2 1- ß2 x 
fl[Fm(Q, y, a) + Fm(ß, y, a)] , (19) 
M-0 
a s= 
where Fm(, ß, y, a) =N [/J (a+ y)] exp[gm y a], and N(a) = 
()feTdz 
For high values of m, the terms of the product in the right hand side of equation (19) 
converge to 1. Here, we assume that the product has converged when: F,,, (ßß, y, a) + 
Fm(ß, -y, a) < 1.000019. 
6 Both Black and Christie attribute this to the leverage effect, which however cannot adequately explain the 
extent of the asymmetric response of volatility to positive and negative returns. 
7 See Engle and Ng (1993). 
8 For a proof, see: Heynen, Angelien and Vorst, 1994. 
9 We calculated equation (19) for even higher values of m, but the results did not change. 
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5.3.2 Data 
To examine the change in the nature of stock market volatility before and after 
liberalisation, stock market data from eight developing countries were collected, namely 
Argentina, Chile, India, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan. In the 
current analysis we include three more countries because appropriate data for the current 
analysis for these countries are available. As a proxy for the stock market we use daily 
observations from their respective national stock exchange indexes (where available), as 
given by Datastream: Chile General Price Index, Bombay S. E. National Price Index, 
Korea S. E. Composite Price Index, Mexico I. P. C. Price Index, Karachi S. E. 100 Price 
Index, Philippines S. E. Composite Price Index and Taiwan S. E. Weighted Price Index. 
For Argentina, the only available index is the one constructed by Datastream for the 
whole Argentinean market. All indexes are expressed in local currency. The sample 
period begins at 5/1/88 for all markets except for India and Pakistan where the sample 
period begins at 3/7/89 because of data unavailability and ends at 27/2/98. The reason 
daily observations are used instead of weekly or monthly, is because the GARCH models 
that we will utilise are estimated using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) approach10, and 
ML estimators are asymptotic; i. e. they are valid only in large samples. The sample 
period starts at the beginning of 1988, in order to exclude the October 1987 crash, which 
could affect the pre-liberalisation volatility results. 
The sample period for each country is split into two subperiods, at the date when an 
important policy which opened the market to foreign investors was introduced. Table 5.1 
presents the relevant dates and policies for each country. It should be noted that these 
policies are not the only policies implemented in these markets, nor are they of the same 
nature. In Chile for example, although foreign investors are free to purchase equities, 
they cannot repatriate proceeds from the sale of these equities immediately, making the 
market relatively "closed" compared to other markets. Also, in South Korea, although 
the government announced it would liberalise the market in December 1988 and 
investment preapproval rules softened in January 1990, it was only in January 1992 when 
foreign investors gained significant access to the market and even after that, some rules 
10 All models are estimated using Microfit 4.0. 
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still limited foreign entry to the market. The dates and policies in Table 5.1 serve as 
indicators of significant changes and do not aim to fully account for the liberalisation 
process. However, note that it is during the period 1988-1992 that most of the sample 
countries took very significant steps towards liberalising their markets. 
For the two periods (pre- and post- liberalisation) the returns are obtained as the 
logarithmic changes of the price levels. Since only the conditional variance is of interest 
in the present analysis, the unpredictable part of the stock returns will be used, instead of 
the actual stock returns. This can be obtained through a procedure similar to the one used 
by Pagan and Schwert (1990): first, the logarithmic returns are regressed on a constant 
and four dummy variables, one for each day from Tuesday through Friday, to remove any 
day-of-the-week effect. The residuals from this regression are then regressed on their 
lagged values up to fifth order, to remove any predictable component of the return series. 
The residuals from the above process, are then used in the GARCH and EGARCH 
processes to examine volatility prior to and after liberalisation. 
Table 5.1 
Liberalisation of selected emerging markets 
Country Date Policy 
Argentina December 1989 All limits on foreign capital abolished 
Chile April 1990 Free foreign exchange transactions 
India November 1992 All shares made investable 
Mexico May 1989 All shares made investable 
Pakistan February 1991 All shares made investable 
Philippines November 1991 All shares made investable 
South Korea January 1992 Foreign ownership levels increased 
Taiwan January 1991 Foreign ownership levels increased 
Source: Bekaert, U. (1995) Market Integration and Investment Barriers in Emerging 
Equity Markets, World Bank Economic Review, 9, no. 1, pp. 75-107. 
120 
A visual inspection of the returns of the sample countries for the sample period (Figures 
7.7-7.14, presented at the end of chapter 7) suggests that, in several cases the market is 
more volatile than usually prior to liberalisation. In these cases it' can be argued that 
liberalisation was expected and the market adjusted before the policy was introduced. 
Volatility can also persist for some time after the policy is introduced, until the market 
adjust to the new regime. This adjustment process can affect the results of the models 
used and show increased volatility during the sub-periods examined. In order to avoid 
this bias, 200 observations before and 200 observations after the liberalisation policy was 
introduced, are dropped from the sample. 
5.4. Methodology and data for the third research question 
5.4.1. Testing methodologies 
The third research question is if the ESMs in our sample became more integrated after 
liberalisation or not. To examine integration among countries we use two approaches. We 
examine integration with respect to the returns offered by these markets and integration 
with respect to their riskiness. As markets open up to foreign investors and technology 
progresses, national stock markets should become more integrated [Garrett and Spyrou 
(1999)]. Therefore, although there may be short term differences in their returns, over the 
long term they should share some common trend. Our first test is concerned with 
identifying any common trends among stock market from the same regions. The riskiness 
of these markets should also converge (i. e. decline). Integration means that similar assets 
offer similar returns [Bekaert (1995)]. This can only happen if they belong to the same 
risk group. Liberalisation exposes national assets to international competition so, if 
national markets are well diversified, then every national market should have the same 
risk. In any case, liberalisation should increase prices in these markets and risk should fall 
as a result of participation externalities [Pagano (1989)] which increase liquidity and help 
the stock markets develop. The second test we perform examines the riskiness of these 
markets and if it reduces after the liberalisation policies were implemented. 
5.4.1.1. Integration with respect to stock market prices 
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In order to test for integration with respect to stock prices among the countries in our 
sample, we follow the methodology proposed by Garrett and Spyrou (1999). We utilise 
the cointegration analysis discussed earlier, proposed by Johansen (1988). If the emerging 
stock markets are integrated, their indexes should have a common trend [Kasa (1992)]. In 
the framework of the cointegration analysis, this means that we should find a 
cointegrating vector. This however, is not enough evidence for integration among all the 
markets used in the estimation. If we establish cointegration, we test which of the stock 
market indexes are significant in the vector(s) and which are endogenous in the system. 
In other words, in equation (6), reproduced here: 
dZI = Tjdzt-i + ... + Tk-rar-k-4 + Thr-k + u1, ur - IN (O, E) (6) 
we test all the elements of II where II = aß', and ß is the vector of the coefficients of the 
cointegrating indexes and a is the vector of the speed of adjustment of the vectors 
towards equilibrium. If any ßs are insignificant, their respective indexes are not integrated 
with the other markets in the model. Furthermore, if any as are insignificant, they are 
exogenous which means that they do not respond to changes in other stock markets 
trends. 
The first step in the analysis is to test for integration among the Asian and then among the 
Latin American countries. We also test for integration of each one of these groups with 
one developed stock market. The reason we test for regional cointegration is because if 
stock markets are indeed integrated, they would be integrated on a regional level rather 
than on a global level. This is supported empirically by the crises in 1994 and 1997 which 
affected whole regions. Furthermore, the existence of region-specific developing country 
funds suggests that stock markets of the same region could be perceived as one asset class 
[Buckberg (1996)]. 
For the first estimation, we use all the available data. We then test for the smaller period 
January 1990 - November 1997. Since most countries liberalised their stock markets in 
the early 191990s, if liberalisation resulted in a common trend among the stock markets 
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in any region, we should be able to detect it. Rejection of cointegration for the whole 
period and acceptance for the smaller period would suggest that liberalisation did indeed 
integrated these markets, either regionally of globally, depending on our results. 
The advantage of this methodology over the application of International Asset Pricing 
Models used in the literature is that it is assumption free. Solnik (1977) suggests that the 
best way to test for segmentation is to specify the type of imperfection which might cause 
it and test it. However, it is very difficult to account for every barrier in every country. 
Furthermore, the IAPMs assume the existence of a world portfolio. The portfolio usually 
used in this type of studies is the Morgan Stanley Global index. This however, includes a 
very small proportion of emerging market equity and although it is considered to be one 
of the most diversified portfolios offered, there is no reason to assume that it is indeed the 
world portfolio. Our methodology overcomes these problems by not assuming the 
existence of a global portfolio and allows to test not only for global integration but for 
regional integration as well. Additionally, the tests for exogeneity provide us with an 
insight on the interaction among the emerging stock markets. 
5.4.1.2. Integration with respect to risk 
To examine integration with respect to risk, we utilise a methodology from the country 
risk literature. This methodology takes into account the combined effect of changes in the 
market value, foreign debt levels and economic stability on the rate of return of our 
sample of emerging economies. We calculate the financial risk premium for each country 
for each year of the sample period, and examine if it declines. Given that our 
methodology is rather unusual, we should first explain how it works and then justify its 
use in the present analysis. 
This methodology is borrowed from the country risk literature" and is developed by 
Clark (1991)12. Clark uses the option pricing formula for European call options to 
estimate the financial risk premium implied by a country's economy. An assumption 
" For a discussion on the literature on country risk see: Eaton et. al. (1986). 
12 See also: Clark, Levasseur and Rousseau (1993) pp. 190-203, Clark (1991a) and (199 lb). 
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implicit in this technique is that foreign investors can appropriate a country's assets if a 
default occurs. In this sense, a country's debt is priced in the same way as corporate debt. 
If a country defaults on its loan repayments, it is rather unrealistic to assume that the 
lenders can confiscate the country's assets 13. However, from a theoretical point of view 
this may not be as unrealistic as it seems. Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986), argue that 
although a country's assets cannot be used as collateral when the borrower is the 
government of the country, the amount that a government can (or is willing to) 
appropriate can be used as a constraint on the amount borrowed. If the government can 
impose lump-sum taxation at no cost, then national wealth and maximal government 
revenue coincide. In other words, a government committed to repay its debt, can impose 
taxation to appropriate some or all of the country's assets and hand them over to its 
creditors, if it is unable to repay the loan. Taxes are costly to raise, therefore, treating 
national debt as corporate debt will overestimate the value of the assets available to 
lenders in case of default. Also, it is unlikely that a government would appropriate part or 
all of the country's wealth and hand it to its creditors in case of default. However, at least 
from a theoretical point of view, this methodology can provide us with a good estimate of 
a country's creditworthiness. This is further supported by Shapiro's (1985) argument that 
"... a nation's ability - and willingness - to repay foreign loans is its wealth" 
4. 
In this framework, a country's openness to foreign investors becomes a factor in the 
analysis because, if legislation prevents foreigners from ownership of the country's 
assets, then even if the government is willing to appropriate some of the country's wealth 
to give it to its creditors, it would not be allowed to do so (how this enters the 
calculations, will become clearer later). In this sense, the amount of wealth available to 
foreign investors depends on the maximum possible percentage of ownership allowed by 
the law. In completely open economies, foreigners can have a 100% claim on the 
country's assets in case of default. In the options pricing framework, this would increase 
13 This can only happen if the entire foreign debt is private debt. However, a large proportion of most 
developing countries' foreign debt is public or publicly guaranteed debt. 
14 Shapiro goes on to argue that a nation's wealth is directly linked to its terms of trade; in other words, its 
ability to generate foreign currency. This fits well with our framework, in which variables are expressed in 
dollars because they represent the countries' ability to generate foreign currency. 
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the value of the underlying asset and result in a lower price for the debt. On the other 
hand, the closer the economy, the less assets are available to foreign creditors in case of 
default and the higher the risk premium should be. 
5.4.1.2.1 Calculation of the financial risk premium 
The Black - Scholes (1973) formula for European call options is given as: 
Co = V0N(dý -Ee'`N(d2) (20) 
where Co is the present value of a call option, VO is the present value of the underlying 
security, E is the exercise price and N(d) is the value of the standardised normal 









Equations (20) - (22) express the exact pricing formula for a European call option. The 
derivation of the formula is based on the creation of a perfectly hedged portfolio by 
buying the underlying security and selling the number of calls so that the value of the 
portfolio will be unchanged as the value of the underlying security changes. The portfolio 
should yield the risk free rate of return. 
In the present analysis, we assume that when a country borrows money from abroad, the 
foreign lenders have a claim on the country's assets. Every time the country borrows 
money from abroad, it is the same as selling its assets to foreigners but holding an option 
to buy the assets back. If the country does not pay back its debt, then the foreign lenders 
keep the country's assets. In the present context, Co is the value of the country's residents 
equity, Vo i. e. the market value of the country's economy, as calculated above, E is the 
125 
total debt, t is the maturity of the debt, 6 is the standard deviation of the country's returns 
and r is the continuous compounded discount rate. 
The market value of the country's debt is the difference between the market value of the 
economy and the value of the residents equity. The next step is to calculate the risk- 
adjusted rate of interest on the national debt. This is equal to: 
Risk-adjusted cost of debt = 
ln(E - market value of debt) (23) 
t 
The financial risk premium for the country is the difference between the risk-adjusted 
cost of debt and the risk free (US) rate. 
To estimate the value of the residents' equity we first need to estimate the following 
variables: the country's market value, the economy's expected return, the standard 
deviation of the expected return, the total and discounted debt of the country and the 
maturity of the debt. 
5.4.1.2.2 Calculating the market value of the economy 
To estimate an economy's market value, Clark starts from the equation: 
Vt = (bt -at)+ (bt+l - at+, ) R71 + ... + (bn - an) R 
(n-t) (24) 
which simply states that an economy's market value is the economy's future discounted 
income. Vt is the country's market value at the beginning of period t, the "b's" are sales 
both internal and external, the "a's" are the cost of production of all consumption and 
investment goods and R is the discount factor where R=1+ r15. The "b's" are the value 
of exports plus the value of domestically produced goods for consumption, which is equal 
to exports plus consumption* minus imports of consumption goods. The "a's" are the 
value of imports plus the value of internal expenditure for domestically produced final 
goods and services, which is equal to imports plus consumption minus imports of 
15 r is the appropriate discount rate. 
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consumption goods. Thus, the term bt - at is simply exports minus imports. Both "b's" 
and "a's" are expressed in foreign exchange values because we are interested in 
evaluating an economy based on its ability to generate foreign exchange. If we rearrange 
equation (24), and ignore interest on net imports we get the identity 16: 
r(V) = Xt - M, + (Vl - V) (25) 
where X is exports and M is imports. Equation (6) states that profits before interest and 
dividends paid abroad are equal to the current account balance before financial services 
plus net investment. 
To estimate the market value for each year, we begin by calculating the accumulated net 
fixed capital formation (NFCF) of that year and previous years. For example, if our 
starting year is 1967, then the market value for 1970 would be the sum of the NFCF from 
1967 to 1970. This of course assumes that the market value in 1966 was zero. In order to 
estimate the market value for the year before the first year of our sample, we run a 
regression on equation (26): 
Xt - Mt + (V, +t - V) =c+ r(V) - (26) 
In equation (26), c is a constant representing profits generated with the capital 
outstanding at the end of the period preceding the first year of the sample period and r 
represents the return for the sample period. For the regression we use 18 years in order to 
capture about two trading cyclesl7. If we capitalise the constant from equation (26), i. e. c 
/ r, we obtain the market value of the country for the year before the first year of our 
sample period. We then add to this value the NFCF for the first year of our sample period 
to obtain the market value of the economy for that year. To obtain the market value for 
the next year we add to the market value of the first year the NFCF for the next year, and 
16 It should be noted that Vt is market value at the beginning of period t, Vi is market value at the 
beginning of period t+l (or at the end of period t), while Xt and Mt refer to exports and imports during 
period t. 
See: Hicks (1978). 
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so on. All calculations are carried out using local currency values. Once the market values 
are estimated, they are converted in dollars using the end of period exchange rate. 
5.4.1.2.3 Calculating the economy's expected return and the standard deviation of 
the return 
To calculate the economy's expected return, we first calculate the economy's actual 
return for each year. The profits for an economy are calculated using equation (25). They 
are the sum of net exports and the change in market value for that year. To find the return 
for that year, we simply divide the year's profits by last year's market value. Once we 
calculate the return for each year of our sample period, we then find the expected return. 
This is the average return of the last 18 years. For example, the expected return for 1984 
is the average return from 1967 to 1984. Note that the year 1984 is included as well 
because the analysis uses ex post data. 
The standard deviation of the expected return is calculated as the standard deviation of 
the last 18 years' returns. Again, the return for the year for which we calculate the 
standard deviation is included. For example, the standard deviation of the expected return 
for 1984 is the standard deviation of the returns from 1967 to 1984. For our analysis we 
use the 18 year rolling standard deviation. 
5.4.1.2.4 Calculating the economy's total and discounted debt 
Every economy's total debt is the sum of the principal repayments and the interest that 
the country will have to pay in order to pay off all of its debt. Projections of the principal 
and interest payments for our sample countries are available from publications18. Once 
we have the total amount to be paid by each country we discount it in order to find the 
present value of the debt. The discount rate used for the short term debt, is the average 
Eurodollar rate on 6 month deposits in London. For the long term debt, the discount rate 
used is the continuous compounded annual average rate on US government ten year 
constant maturity 19. 
'a The published projections cover payments for the next ten years after the year they refer to. The total 
amount repaid has to be estimated. The estimation procedure is explained in appendix 4. 19 Ideally, we should discount every payment using the risk free rate corresponding to its maturity. This 
however is unavailable. The interest rate that we use is proposed by Clark (1991) p. 92. 
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5.4.1.2.5 Calculating the maturity of the debt 
The maturity of the debt is calculated using the following formula: 
n 
E CFr 1rT (27) 
T=1 
where E is the total value of the debt, t is its maturity, r is the discount rate and CFT is the 
discounted payments. Since we have already calculated the discounted cash payments, we 






In equation (24), r is a continuously compounded rate. 
5.4.1.2.6 The subordination principle 
In the above analysis, we assume that borrowers `sell' their assets to their creditors, while 
owning a call option on these assets. In reality however, this may not be possible in the 
case of national debt. Most developing countries legislation, prevents foreigners from 
owning all or part of their market. In most cases, foreigners are banned from ownership in 
sectors which are considered of national importance (e. g. defence industry or oil field 
exploration) and they are allowed ownership, either total or partial, in all other sectors. 
Therefore, even if the government was willing to hand over the nations wealth to its 
creditors in case of default, it would be prevented from doing so by law. To address this 
problem, in the options pricing formula we use as market value the proportion of the 
market value that foreigners can legally appropriate. For example, until 1989, foreigners 
were allowed to own up to 49% of shares of any Mexican company. So, in the options 
pricing formula, the market value used is 49% of the market value of the Mexican 
economy until 1989. These percentages change as the countries in our sample liberalised 
their economies. It should be noted that in most cases, identifying the exact proportion of 
the economy that foreigners are allowed to own is extremely difficult. That is because in 
most countries there are different restrictions on different sectors of the economy20. Since 
20 For example, in 1989, a law introduced in Mexico allowed foreigners to own up to 100% in certain 
sectors (e. g. textiles), up to 49% in other sectors (e. g. fishing) and reserved some sectors for Mexicans only 
(e. g. forestry) (see: Banco Nacional de Mexico, 1989). 
129 
there are no available data to calculate the proportion of each sector in every economy, it 
is not possible to identify exactly the proportion of the economy open to foreign 
investors. In our analysis, the percentages we use are those published by the International 
Monetary Fund. However, in order to accommodate discrepancies due to the different 
restrictions on different sectors, we also estimate the financial risk premium using 
alternative percentages. 
5.4.2. Data 
For the first test, we utilise monthly data of the stock market indexes for Argentina, 
Chile, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. The data are 
constructed by the IFC and are provided by Datastream. The data for Latin America cover 
the period January 1976 to November 1997. The data for the Asian region cover the 
period January 1985 to November 1997. The data we use to proxy the developed markets 
are the monthly S&P 500 Index and the FTSE 100 index, from January 1976 to 
November 1997 
For the second test, we utilise data from six developing countries, namely: Chile, India, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and South Korea. The sample period is from 1967 to 1996. 
The first 18 years, 1967 to 1984 are used for estimation of the economies' return and 
standard deviation. The financial risk premium is then estimated for each year from 1984 
to 1996, except from South Korea where the financial risk premium is estimated until 
1994 due to lack of data. The data for the analysis were obtained from various 
publications. The data for exports and imports were obtained from various volumes of the 
Balance of Payments Statistical Yearbook. The data for the national debts were obtained 
from various volumes of the World Debt Tables. The macroeconomic data (net fixed 
capital formation and interest rates) were obtained from various volumes of the 
International Financial Statistics. Information on ownership levels allowed in each 
country for foreigners was obtained from various annual reports of Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, published by the International Monetary Fund. 
The data used in the analysis are annual. 
5.5. Summary and Conclusions 
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In this chapter we presented and tried to justify the methodologies we follow to examine 
our research questions. The chosen methodologies aim to overcome some of the problems 
involved in the studies of other researchers. 
More specifically, in order to examine the relationship between the financial sectors and 
the real part of the economy, we follow a time series analysis. The chosen methodology is 
the Johansen cointegration methodology because it can i) account for the long run 
relationships between the variables of interest, ii) account for different relationships 
among the variables in the form of separate cointegrating vectors and iii) provide us with 
statistical evidence as to which variables are endogenous. 
For the second research question we adopt two processes from the ARCH family, namely 
the GARCH and the EGARCH process. These two processes have been empirically 
found to be excellent instruments for measuring volatility. They can also deal with the 
usual problems which plague financial data such as skewness and kurtosis. The only 
problem with these processes is that they are atheoretical, i. e. they have no obvious 
theoretical justification. They should, however, be able to provide us with a good insight 
on how the nature of volatility changed after liberalisation policies were implemented in 
these countries regarding their respective stock markets. 
For our third question we employ two methodologies. We examine convergence with 
respect to stock prices and with respect to risk. To examine integration with respect to 
stock prices we employ cointegration analysis. We examine if the indices of the national 
stock markets of the two regions follow a common trend. To examine integration with 
respect to risk we employ a methodology used in the country risk literature. 
Before we present our results, we should explain that one of the problems we face is the 
availability of data. The data we use where the best available proxies for the variables we 
wish to examine. We do not however have a long period of observations and we expect 
that this could affect our results. However, we believe that our results can still provide us 
with a good insight of the issues we examine. Having discussed the theories on the issues 
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we examine and the methodologies we employ to test them, we can now present our 
empirical results. 
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CHAPTER 6: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE STOCK MARKET AND THE REAL ECONOMY. 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we present the results from the empirical analysis on the relationship 
between the financial sectors and the real economy in our sample of countries. The model 
we test is the Boyd and Smith (1996) model presented in chapter two. The model shows 
that the the stock market and the banking sector can affect positively economic growth. In 
turn, as the economy develops it should result in the development of both the financial 
sectors. If the model holds in our sample countries, we should find a that the variables of 
interest follow a common trend. They should also be endogenous since they not only 
affect each other but are also affected by each other. 
The stock market volatility variable is included to account for the negative effect of stock 
market volatility on the real economy, as it is predicted by the theory. Keynesian 
economists have stressed the negative role of the stock market on the economy because 
of increased stock price volatility [e. g. Singh (1992)]. These economists claim that this 
effect should be particularly evident in emerging economies because stock markets there 
are inefficient and very volatile. If this is true, we should find a negative relationship 
between stock market volatility and economic growth. 
The Boyd and Smith (1996) model does not specify the relationship between the two 
financial sectors. It states that at the first stages of development the stock market will 
`steal' market share from the banking sector. In the later stages of development though, 
their role is complementary because they provide different financial services. The 
countries in our sample are most likely not at the first stage of development, so the two 
sectors should be complementary. However, we do not make any such assumptions, so if 
we do not find a positive relationship between the two sectors, we shall not take it as 
evidence that the model does not hold. 
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The methodology we follow is the Johansen cointegration methodlogy which was 
presented is chapter 5. The data used are monthly observations. We should stress again 
that our sample period is not very long so our results should be treated with caution. 
6.2. Empirical results 
We begin the analysis by testing for unit roots for the variables used. The results are 
presented in appendix 2. All the three basic variables (industrial production index, stock 
market value and the banking sector proxy) are I(1) for all countries. The standard 
deviation of stock returns is also I(1) for all countries except South Korea. The South 
Korean government established a stock market stabilisation fund which was used to buy 
and sell shares when the stock market became excessively volatile. It is therefore, 
expected that the volatility of the South Korean index would be stationary. The volatility 
measure for South Korea is not used in the analysis, since it is not likely to explain the 
true volatility of the stock market. 
We then test for the correct lag order of the VAR model for each country. We select the 
order for the VAR using the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion reported by Microfit. However, for some countries, for the chosen lag length 
there is still serial correlation which disappears when we add more lags. The next step in 
the analysis is to find the number of cointegration vectors for each country and choose the 
correct specification with respect to deterministic variables. To find that, we follow the 
methodology discussed previously and the results are reported in appendix 3 and 
discussed for each country separately. 
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6.2.1 Chile 
Table 6.1 presents the results for Chile. There are two cointegration vectors. In the first 
vector two of the variables are endogenous: the industrial production and the banking 
sector, while in the second vector only the stock market development is endogenous. The 
cointegrating vectors are presented normalised on each of the endogenous variables. In 
the first vector, all the variables are significant. The first two equations reported are the 
first vector normalised first on the industrial production and then on the banking sector 
development. 
The first equation shows the relationship between economic growth and the financial 
sectors. As we see, industrial production is positively related to the stock market 
development and negatively related to the banking sector development and the stock 
market volatility. The positive effect of the stock market on economic growth, 
demonstrates the benefits of having a stock market in a liberalised economy. During the 
last two decades, the Chilean economy became an increasingly open economy, with very 
little interference from the state. The stock market was open to both domestic and foreign 
residents. However, capital repatriation was restricted and Chile did not attract as much 
capital as it could. The benefit of this restriction is that Chile was immunised from 
sudden capital flight. This proved especially valuable during the Asian crisis of 1997. 
The negative relationship between stock market development and stock market volatility 
goes to further justify the restriction on capital repatriation. Had Chile opened up its 
capital account completely, it could introduce volatility into its stock market, which 
according to our results would damage the real economy. 
The negative relationship between the industrial production and the banking sector can be 
attributed to the problems faced by Chilean banks. After the 1982 crisis, most Chilean 
banks were unable to service their foreign debt. To avoid bankruptcy, the state bailed 
them out by acquiring their bad loans. For most of the sample period, banks in Chile were 
not very productive. They had to buy back their bad loans from the central bank. They 
also had to compete with alternative sources of finance for firms, such as the privatised 
pension funds and the debt for equity swap programmes initiated by the government in 
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1985, which proved to be very successful. On top of that, the bail out by the state came at 
a high cost. For these reasons, we should expect that the banking sector in Chile did not 
contribute to economic development and hence the negative relationship in our results. 
The fact that the banking sector was a burden to the economy during that period is better 
demonstrated by the fact that it is endogenous in the model. As it is shown by the first 
two equations, there is a bi-directional negative relationship between the banking sector 
and economic growth. The endogeneity of the banking sector also reflects the bad 
practices adopted by the banks (excessive foreign debt and unmonitored lending to 
affiliated companies). The positive relationship between stock market development and 
the banking sector and the negative relationship between stock market volatility and the 
banking sector indicate complimentarity between the two financial sectors, but not in the 
way implied by the Boyd and Smith model. Because of the problems faced by the 
banking sector, it is likely that between the two, the stock market became the primary 
financial sector while the banking sector simply followed, covering the increased need for 
financial services. The fact that the two sectors are not complements is shown by the fact 
that the banking sector is insignificant in the third equation. Therefore, we cannot find 
any evidence suggesting that the banking sector causes growth in the stock market (as it 
is implied by the Boyd and Smith model). 
The third equation, together with the first, shows that the relationship between stock 
market development and industrial production is bi-directional, which supports the 
endogenous growth model of Boyd and Smith. The results for Chile suggest that the 
financial sector in the country is actually enhancing economic growth and as the economy 
develops, the financial sector develops as well. The results would completely agree with 
the scenario provided by Boyd and Smith, except for the role of the banking sector. 
Because the sector was not properly regulated, it nearly went bankrupt and was rescued at 




Cointegration results for Economic Growth and Financial Development in Chile 
from 1982 M1 to 1997 M10 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LCR : Logarithm of deflated credit given to private enterprises by banks 
LVOL : Logarithm of stock market volatility 
Ho: 
rank=p 










P=o 58.87** 53.48 49.95 23.11 28.27 25.8 
p :51 35.77** 34.87 31.93 19.67 22.04 19.86 
p <_ 2 16.10 20.18 17.88 10.73 15.87 13.81 
p <_ 3 5.37 9.16 7.53 5.37 9.16 7.53 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(32,399) = 0.796 [O. 78] 
Weak exogeneity tests 
LINDPR exogenous to the system: 
LMV exogenous to the system: 
LCR exogenous to the system: 
LVOL exogenous to the system: 
Chi-sq(2) = 7.64 [0.02]** 
Chi-sq(2) = 10.84 [0.00]** 
Chi-sq(2) = 7.07 [0.03]** 
Chi-sq(2) = 0.46 [0.80] 
LINDPR exogenous to the first vector: 
LINDPR exogenous to the second vector: 
LMV exogenous to the first vector: 
LMV exogenous to the second vector: 
LCR exogenous to the first vector: 
LCR exogenous to the second vector: 
t-ratio: -2.53 [0.01]** 
t-ratio: -0.68 [0.50] 
t-ratio: 0.70 [0.48] 
t-ratio: -3.52 [0.00]** 
t-ratio: 2.67 [0.01]** 
t-ratio: -0.37 [0.71] 
Joint test of restrictions in the cointegration vector and exogeneity tests: 
Chi-sq (5) = 2.29 [0.81 ] 
Restricted Cointegration results 
LINDPR= 5.22 + 0.21 LMV - 0.93 LCR - 0.35 LVOL 
LCR = 5.62 - 1.08 LINDPR + 0.23 LMV - 0.38 LVOL 
LMV = -15.3 + 5.81 LINDPR 
-The Chi-sq tests for weak exogeneity are LR tests. 
-Numbers in brackets are probability values. 
-Cr. V. means critical value. 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. 
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6.2.2 India 
The results for India are presented in Table 6.2. We can see that the two stock market 
variables (LMV and LVOL) are exogenous to the system and insignificant in the 
cointegrating vector. This is hardly surprising considering the way the Indian economy 
operates. Most industries in India are controlled by the state. These industries are heavily 
subsidised and not allowed to fail. It is therefore, not surprising to find that the stock 
market cannot perform any role in the Indian economy. The primary function of a stock 
market is to act as a pricing mechanism. Provided the market generates enough 
information for market analysts to work with, prices on the stock market should reflect 
the value and prospects of every company. A very important prerequisite for this 
mechanism to work, is a free (or near free) market. In India, this is not the case. Although 
companies may raise capital through the stock market, the government intervenes in the 
market place. Therefore, it is doubtful whether capital raised through the stock market can 
be put in their most productive use. Furthermore, some of the shares traded on the market 
are minority shares of state controlled companies. Since most companies in India are not 
allowed to declare bankruptcy, their share price will reflect not their `true value' (i. e. the 
price they would have " in an efficient market), but it will include the prospect of 
government subsidy in case they are in trouble. 
The cointegrating vector is normalised on the banking variable since this the only 
endogenous variable in the system and we could find clear evidence of error correction. 
The industrial production is exogenous, indicating there is no effect from the financial 
sectors to the real economy. The explanation for the equation in Table 6.2, could be in the 
taxation system in India and the heavily subsidised industries. Tax rates in India have 
always been very high. This is necessary, in order to fund the subsidies given to 
companies and individuals. Since the source of these funds are taxes, the level of money 
available to be distributed as subsidies is directly related to economic growth and the 
performance of companies. The more the economy grows, the more money is available to 
government through taxes. A lot of that money is distributed through the state dominated 
banking system in the form of low interest rate loans. Therefore, industrial production is 
positively correlated to the banking sector development. However, this relationship is 
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uni-directional. The credit provided to companies does not result in economic growth, 
according to our results. This is additional evidence against financial repression, in 
agreement with those presented by Demetriades and Luintel (1996 and 1997). 
Table 6.2 
Cointegration results for Economic Growth and Financial Development in India 
from 1977 M1 to 1997 M11 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LCR : Logarithm of deflated credit given to private enterprises by banks 
LVOL : Logarithm of stock market volatility 
Ho: 
rank=p 










p=0 51.47* 53.48 49.95 19.92 28.27 25.8 
pS1 31.55 34.87 31.93 14.85 22.04 19.86 
p <_2 16.7 20.18 17.88 9.50 15.87 13.81 
p<3 7.20 9.16 7.53 7.20 9.16 7.53 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(112,594) = 1.007 [0.47] 
Weak exogeneity tests 
LINDPR exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 0.16 [0.69] 
LMV exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 0.24 [0.62] 
LCR exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 4.86 [0.03]* 
LVOL exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 1.79 [0.18] 
Joint test of restrictions in the cointegration vector and exogeneity tests: 
Chi-sq (5) = 5.95 [0.31] 
Restricted Cointegration results 
LCR = -0.87 + 0.74 LINDPR 
-The Chi-sq tests for weak exogeneity are LR tests. 
-Numbers in brackets are probability values. 
-Cr. V. means critical value. 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. 
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6.2.3 Mexico 
The results for Mexico are presented in Table 6.3. There is one cointegration vector and 
there are two endogenous variables: the industrial production and the banking sector. The 
volatility variable is insignificant in the vector and therefore dropped. The two equations 
are presented normalised in each of the two endogenous variables. The first equation 
describes the industrial production development. This is positively related to the stock 
market development and negatively related to the banking sector development. Mexico 
liberalised its stock market to a much higher degree than any of the other countries in our 
sample. Foreign investors were allowed to invest in the stock market and repatriate their 
money freely. This resulted in high foreign investment which in 1994 had reached about 
$50 billion. From that money, about half was indirect investment. Although the openness 
in Mexico's market has been blamed by several economists for the 1994 crisis, it resulted 
in investment which affected positively the level of economic growth, as it can be seen 
from our results. 
The banking sector on the other hand, is negatively related with industrial production. 
This comes as no surprise considering the state of the banking sector in the country. Since 
the 1982 crisis, banks never really recovered in Mexico. For the decade which they were 
nationalised, most banks hardly provided any credit to companies and individuals, and 
were run inefficiently. During that decade they were trying to recover from the losses 
they incurred during the 1982 crisis. After they were privatised, most banks took risks 
which nearly drove them bankrupt. The fixed exchange rate encouraged them to borrow 
dollars and lend pesos, a practice which in the devaluation of 1994 proved almost fatal. 
After the 1994 crisis, most banks were almost bankrupt and were bailed out by the 
government. The cost of the bail out was estimated by the Mexican government to be 90 
billion pesos, equivalent to 5% of 1995 GDP. However, Moody's, the credit rating 
agency, estimated that the cost could be three times as high. Therefore, the practices 
adopted by the Mexican banking have proved costly to Mexico's real economy. 
The second equation shows the relationship between the banking sector and the industrial 
production and stock market. The industrial production is negatively related to the 
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banking sector, probably for all the reasons discussed above. Like in Chile, we can find a 
negative bi-directional relationship between the banking sector and the real economy. 
The rest of the equation shows the relationship between the banking sector and the stock 
market. The results show that the two financial sectors are positively related, indicating 
complimentarity. However, the results do not support the complimentarity implied in the 
Boyd and Smith model. In their model, causality goes from the banking sector (which is 
assumed to be the primary financial sector) to stock market development. In Mexico, the 
stock market is exogenous, meaning that it is not affected by the banking sector. Instead, 
the banking sector is driven by the stock market. The most probable explanation for this, 
is that in Mexico the stock market has been a lot more effective in providing finance to 
companies and assessing risk than the banking sector. This could be why our results show 




Cointegration results for Economic Growth and Financial Development in Mexico 
from 1977 Ml to 1997 M8 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LCR : Logarithm of deflated credit given to private enterprises by banks 
LVOL : Logarithm of stock market volatility 
Ho: 
rank=p 










P=O 52.93* 53.48 49.95 35.94** 28.27 25.8 
p1 17.00 34.87 31.93 11.64 22.04 19.86 
p52 5.36 20.18' 17.88 4.13 15.87 13.81 
p :53 1.23 9.16 7.53 1.23 9.16 7.53 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(32,816) = 1.042 [0.40] 
Weak exogeneity tests 
LINDPR exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 11.22 [0.00]** 
LMV exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 2.23 [0.14] 
LCR exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 13.58 [0.00]** 
LVOL exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 1.08 [0.30] 
Joint test of restrictions in the cointegration vector and exogeneity tests: 
Chi-sq (3) = 5.70 [0.13] 
Restricted Cointegration results 
LINDPR= 5.01 + 0.18 LMV - 0.21 LCR 
LCR = 24.07 + 0.86 LMV - 4.8 LINDPR 
-The Chi-sq tests for weak exogeneity are LR tests. 
-Numbers in brackets are probability values. 
-Cr. V. means critical value. 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. 
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6.2.4 South Korea 
Table 6.4 presents the results for South Korea. The constant is restricted and there are no 
trends in the model. There is only one cointegration vector. From the variables used only 
the industrial production is endogenous. All variables are significant in the cointegrating 
vector. The interpretation of the equation for industrial production is rather 
straightforward: the stock market and the banking sector contributed positively to 
economic development, which is what the financial liberalisation advocates support. 
However, the results do not support the endogenous growth model of Boyd and Smith 
because this positive relationship is not bi-directional. In the case of South Korea it is 
easy to interpret the results and understand why this is what we should expect. It is well 
known that the South Korean government has intervened in the economy with great 
success. During the sample period which we examine, thanks to central planning of the 
economy, South Korea became one of the biggest exporters in the world. Both the stock 
market and the banking sector operated in such a way as to promote ecdnomic growth 
(always under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance). The banking sector provided key 
industries with cheap finance and the stock market was artificially boosted by debt-equity 
limits and foreign borrowing ceilings. Both financial sectors performed well and helped 
industries expand. The reason we do not find a bi-directional relationship (both financial 
sector variables are exogenous) is because the financial sector in South Korea did not 
develop according to market demand but according to government plan. Therefore, even 
if there was increased demand for financial services, these sectors could not expand and 
grow together with the economy because the state dictated their development. 
The results presented here support what other researchers have found. The South Korean 
government has been very successful in manipulating the economy unlike several other 
governments which chose to follow interventionist policies and financial repression. 
However, if we accept that the path to economic growth is through the model presented 
by Boyd and Smith, then clearly the South Korean economy would face problems. The 
model suggests that economic growth requires a developing financial sector to service it 
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and the South Korean market does not show any evidence of that. Of course, with the 
benefit of hindsight, it is easy to see how this affected the South Korean economy and 
resulted in its collapse. The 1997 crisis, which is not included in our sample, was partly 
the result of huge accumulated debts by South Korean conglomerates. The development 
of a financial market could have prevented that by allowing market forces to operate and 
limit credit to already overstretched companies. Of course, if this was the case during the 
last twenty years, it is unlikely that the South Korean economy would grow at the rate it 
did. The stock market and banking sector served their purpose well in providing 
companies with cheap capital and accelerating growth. However, the results presented 
here on the interrelationship of the financial sector and the real economy show that this 
could not be sustained. 
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Table 6.4 
Cointegration results for Economic Growth and Financial Development in South Korea 
from 1976 Ml to 1997 M11 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LCR : Logarithm of deflated credit given to private enterprises by banks 
Ho: 
rank=p 










P=o 42.30** 34.87 31.93 28.11** 22.04 19.86 
p :51 14.18 20.18 17.88 12.34 15.87 13.81 
p: 5 2 1.85 9.16 7.53 1.85 9.16 7.53 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(18,560) = 1.412 [0.12] 
Weak exogeneity tests 
LINDPR exogenous to the system: 
LMV exogenous to the system: 
LCR exogenous to the system: 
Chi-sq(1) = 15.67 [0.00]** 
Chi-sq(1) = 1.15 [0.28] 
Chi-sq(1) = 0.15 [0.70] 
Joint test of restrictions in the cointegration vector and exogeneity tests: Chi-sq (2) _ 
1.58 [0.45] 
Restricted Cointegration results 
LINDPR = -0.83 + 0.045 LMV + 0.71 LCR 
-The Chi-sq tests for weak exogeneity are LR tests. 
-Numbers in brackets are probability values. 
-Cr. V. means critical value. 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. 
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6.2.5 Taiwan 
The results for Taiwan are presented in Table 6.5. There is one cointegration vector and 
the stock market and industrial production variables are endogenous'. After imposing 
restrictions, we find that all four variables are significant in the cointegrating vector. We 
could find evidence of error correction for both the endogenous variables, so the vector is 
normalised on the LINDPR and LMV. 
Not surprisingly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the stock market 
development proxy and the real economy. We should expect that because of the structure 
of the Taiwanese economy and its stock market. Taiwan experienced rapid economic 
growth because of its exports. The companies which generated that growth were not big 
corporations - like in South Korea - but the thousands of small and medium size 
enterprises which were not listed in the stock market. The negative relationship between 
the stock market and the economy can be attributed to the role of the stock market in 
Taiwan. During the late 1980s, the Taiwanese stock market experienced a spectacular 
boom. It was then viewed as a way to get rich fast. The boom was sustained for some 
years because of the huge amounts that residents invested in equity. Since the stock 
market offered very high rates of return it became a more attractive form of investment 
than physical investment. The negative relationship shown in the first equation of Table 
6.5, could reflect this effect. It is surprising, however, to find a positive effect between 
industrial production and stock market volatility. 
In the first equation, we can also see a positive relationship between the banking sector 
and industrial production. At the beginning of the sample period, the banking sector in 
Taiwan was relatively underdeveloped compared to other developing countries. However, 
during the late 1980s the sector was slowly liberalised, and more able to perform its role 
in the economy. It should also be noted that the variable we use in this analysis, does not 
represent the banking sector development only. It also captures the large number of credit 
houses which offered loans to Taiwanese businesses (legally or otherwise). In total, both 
t Using the max-eigenvalue statistic, at the 10% level there are two cointegration vectors. However, after 
running several tests on the second vector, it was found to be insignificant. 
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the official and unofficial financial institutions provided credit to businesses and helped 
them expand. 
The vector normalised on the stock market proxy (2nd equation), shows that the stock 
market is positively related to its volatility and the M2 money supply and negatively 
related to the industrial production. This equation describes the relationship between the 
two financial sectors. It shows complimentarity since they are positively related. 
However, it is doubtful whether this complimentarity indicates the sectors' role in 
companies financing. Given the huge black economy in Taiwan, the speculative nature of 
its stock market, the capital restrictions which created the booms and busts in the stock 
market and the size of the underground financial service sector, it is more likely that this 
complimentarity simply reflects the transfer of money from one sector to the other when 
investors chased higher short term returns. The results for Taiwan support the financial 
liberalisation thesis, because they indicate that the repressed financial sector is 
unproductive and isolated from the real economy. 
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Table 6.5 
Cointegration results for Economic Growth and Financial Development in Taiwan 
from 1977 M1 to 1997 M11 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LM2 : Logarithm of deflated M2 money supply 
LVOL : Logarithm of stock market volatility 
Ho: 
rank=p 










P=o 66.90** 48.88 45.70 39.80** 27.42 24.99 
p1 27.11 31.54 28.78 21.07* 21.12 19.02 
p2 6.04 17.86 15.75 5.30 14.88 12.98 
p :53 0.73 8.07 6.50 0.73 8.07 6.50 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(112,713) = U. 971 LU. 56J 
Weak exogeneity tests 
LINDPR exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 12.59 [0.00]** 
LMV exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 5.35 [0.02]* 
LM2 exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 1.80 [0.18] 
LVOL exogenous to the system: Chi-sq(1) = 3.15 [0.07] 
Joint test of restrictions in the cointegration vector and exogeneity tests: Chi-sq (2) _ 
4.22 [0.12] 
Restricted Cointegration results 
LINDPR = 5.46 LM2 - 1.5 LMV + 0.973 LVOL 
LMV = 3.64 LM2 - 6.66 LINDPR + 0.65 LVOL 
-The Chi-sq tests for weak exogeneity are LR tests. 
-Numbers in brackets are probability values. 
-Cr. V. means critical value. 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% level respectively. 
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6 . 3. Discussion of empirical results 
The results show some similarities across countries and some interesting differences. For 
the three Asian economies, we cannot find any strong evidence indicating a positive 
effect from the financial sector to the real economy. Instead, the results for these 
countries highlight their weaknesses. The results for the three Asian countries are similar 
in the sense that they do not show any significant interactions between the financial 
sectors and the real economy. In each case, we could only identify one cointegrating 
vector with only one endogenous variable (except from Taiwan), meaning that the 
variables in the model do not act as a system (each one affecting the other) but rather in 
isolation. Our results probably reflect the economic policies followed by the national 
governments of these countries. In all three countries economic policy has placed severe 
restrictions on the economy. 
The results for South Korea indicate a positive effect from the financial sectors to the 
economy, which however, cannot be sustained for long. The weakness of the financial 
system in that country became clear during the 1997 crisis. The main culprits for this 
crisis were the weak financial institutions which were not allowed to develop along with 
the real economy based on market forces. Instead, their lending was based on government 
policy. However, it should be noted that had this thesis been written three years ago, it 
would not be clear how the weaknesses of this system would manifest themselves. 
The effect of restrictions on the economy are most evident in India where the state 
interferes with the operation of virtually the whole market. Since companies are not 
allowed to declare bankruptcy, any sense of market mechanism is eliminated. It is 
doubtful that the creation of a stock market can have any positive effect on the real 
economy in such an environment because the most important prerequisite for the proper 
function of a stock market is market forces. Even if private companies could raise capital 
through the stock market, the price they would have to pay for that capital would be 
severely distorted. 
The Taiwanese economy is more liberal that the Indian economy, but the restrictions 
which are in place make the function of the stock market very difficult. To begin with, it 
is doubtful whether the creation of a stock market is appropriate for an economy such as 
the Taiwanese economy. The success of Taiwan was based on the thousands of small 
enterprises which became major exporters in the world market. Since most of these 
companies are too small to be listed on a stock exchange, the benefits from creating one 
are not obvious. The fact that the stock market was not a success in Taiwan (in terms of 
helping companies to raise finance and act as a pricing mechanism) could be seen from 
the small number of companies which sought a listed on the exchange. Of course given 
time, as the most successful companies grow, they could seek a listing on the stock 
exchange and then its existence could indeed serve a purpose. What we argue here, is that 
the creation of the Taiwanese stock market was rather premature. However, it would 
probably not earn the reputation of a casino had the government not put restrictions on 
the country's capital account. Since residents could not find an outlet for the fortunes they 
made from their exports, the stock market and the property market were prime candidates. 
What followed was a series of speculative booms and busts. One positive aspect of this 
situation was that these booms and busts did not threaten the real economy since it was 
not directly related to the stock market. However, the speculation fever which overtook 
Taiwan during the early 90's did have a cost. A lot of money was chasing quick profits 
instead of being put into the production process. This can probably justify the negative 
effect of the stock market on the economy. 
The results for the two Latin American countries present a completely different story and 
provide an insight on the interaction between the financial sectors and the real economy 
in these countries. In both countries the stock market has a positive effect on economic 
development. Also, in both countries the banking sector has a negative effect on 
economic development. Another similarity between the two countries is that the banking 
sector is endogenous in the model and is negatively related to the economy and positively 
related to the stock market. Both Chile and Mexico liberalised their economies to a much 
greater extent than most other developing countries (certainly a lot more than the Asian 
countries examined here). Both Chile and Mexico tried to create a market driven 
economy with some success. Since the stock market was allowed to play its role as a 
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pricing mechanism, it could possibly contribute to the economic development of the two 
countries. 
The negative effect of the banking sector to the economy can be attributed to the bad state 
of the banking sector in Chile and Mexico. The banking sectors in these countries came 
into serious trouble during the debt crisis in 1982. The main reason was excessive risk 
taking and very poor supervision of the banks by the government. The fact that both 
Chile and Mexico had fixed their currencies with the dollar added to the problem since 
banks were encouraged to increase their foreign liabilities. For the most part of our 
sample period, most banks in Chile and Mexico were not profitable and were relying on 
state aid in order to survive. It is therefore not surprising to find a negative relationship 
between the banking sector and the real economy in both countries. 
The third similarity between the two countries is the positive relationship between banks 
and the stock market. This relationship does not necessarily indicate complimentarity 
since it is uni-directional (the stock market causes the banking sector but the opposite is 
not true). In the Boyd and Smith model, the banks are the primary source of finance for 
companies while the stock market follows. Our results suggest the opposite: the banking 
sector follows the stock market development. The most probable explanation is the bad 
state of the banking sector in both countries. Since banks are unable to provide finance to 
companies, it is natural that in a free market other types of financial institutions will play 
that role. It is not unreasonable to say therefore, that between the two sectors used in this 
analysis, the stock market became the primary source of finance for companies while the 
banking sector was relatively inactive. The results can be justified on the basis that banks 
were following the stock market in terms of development. This result becomes more 
justifiable if we consider that towards the beginning of our sample period banks got into 
trouble and it is only towards the end of our sample period that most banks in the two 
countries sorted out their problems and became profitable. 
The similarities in the results of the two countries end there. There are two important 
differences to consider. One is that in Chile the stock market development is endogenous 
and positively affected by the real economy and the second that the stock market 
volatility in significant only for Chile. A possible explanation for both of these 
differences is the capital repatriation restrictions in Chile that were in place for most of 
our sample period. These restrictions shielded the Chilean stock market from external 
shocks. For example, the Mexican stock market suffered losses in 1982 when the US 
economy went into recession. US interest rates jumped to 17% and suddenly emerging 
markets did not look very profitable to investors any more. A lot of money left Mexico, 
as well as other emerging economies. It would be difficult for Chile to be affected by 
factors that are not directly related to its economy, through its stock market. Because of 
the restrictions, most investors who invested in the Chilean market went in for the long 
term. Therefore, the prospects of the national economy became a major force behind the 
performance of the stock market. This can explain the endogeneity of the stock market in 
our model. 
The significance of the volatility variable can also be attributed to the same reason. The 
volatility variable has a negative sign in both equations for Chile, indicating that lower 
volatility is associated with higher stock market development. A lot of investors who 
entered other emerging stock markets tried to take advantage of short term volatility in 
order to make a quick profit. In these cases, volatility would not be negatively related to 
the development of a stock market (despite of the consequences for the economy). In 
Chile however, whose market has- been rather stable during the last twenty years, most 
investors were in for the long term (because of the economy's recovery), but there was 
also hesitation to enter the market because as any emerging market the risk was rather 
high. Since the stock market was shielded from the world economy, any excessive 
volatility would make investors nervous because it would signal economic problems. 
That is a likely explanation of the significance of the volatility variable in the Chilean 
model. In Mexico, on the other hand, volatility is not significant. This is probably 
connected to the fact that the Mexican stock market is affected by factors not directly 
related to its economy (as discussed above). Considering also that the Mexican economy 
had several ups and downs during our sample period, it is only reasonable to assume that 
investors were expecting short term volatility and it did not influence their long term 
investment decisions. 
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Our results do not reject the proposition that the real economy and the financial sectors 
can cause each other to grow, although we have failed to find strong evidence of that 
happening. In the Asian countries, the results support the liberalisation thesis. Financial 
depression has isolated the financial sectors from the economy and made them 
unproductive. Of course, this does not mean that if reforms are implemented the financial 
sector will definitely become productive. They indicate however, that change is needed. 
Our findings for the Asian countries justify Shaw's argument that the initial step towards 
development is financial deepening. First the government can liberalise the economy and 
let interest rates reach their equilibrium level, and then start thinking about the creation of 
a stock market. In a distorted economic environment, a stock exchange can only prove 
costly without actually contributing to the economic development of the country. As far 
as the banking sector is concerned, the results also justify the liberalisation thesis. The 
banking sector (state led and depressed) has failed to contribute to the economic 
development of the Asian countries in our sample. Only in South Korea, it was found to 
be effective, but at a huge cost which was revealed in the 1997 crisis. Otherwise, as a 
result of subsidised loans to favoured industries, interest ceilings and restrictions in the 
economy, the banking sector in these countries remained underdeveloped and failed to 
fulfil its role as a provider of finance for companies and a monitoring body of companies' 
performance. 
For the two Latin American countries of our sample, the picture is completely different. 
The stock market is beneficial to both economies and our results support the endogenous 
growth scenario given by Boyd and Smith. This is evidence in favour of liberalisation. 
With respect to the banking sector, however, the results show the need for tight 
government regulation. It is interesting to see that when left to self regulation, it is the 
banking sector and not the stock market that is prone to crashes. However, the differences 
between the results of the two countries suggest that certain restrictions may be beneficial 
to an economy. More specifically, placing restrictions on short term capital movement 
has proved a source of stability for the Chilean economy; something that the Mexican 
economy has not experienced in the last twenty years. A problem with these restrictions 
could be that Chile attracted less foreign investment than it would have, had it completely 
liberalised capital movement. The question is therefore, how beneficial and how desirable 
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short term capital is. Based on the results presented here, we feel that short term capital 
can be damaging. When an economy is growing, it is expected that it will encounter 
certain difficulties. Having to deal with capital flight can only add to problems, which 
may be only temporary. By restricting short term capital movement, Chile effectively 
invited only investors with a long term view. This has served well in not destabilising the 
economy and making the stock market an effective pricing mechanism, as it is implied by 
the third equation for Chile. 
Our results also demonstrate the problems inherent in cross country regressions. We 
believe that by aggregating the data, researchers lose a lot of information which is of 
paramount importance in this kind of studies. Our results agree with most researchers 
results that financial development can lead to economic growth2. However, by examining 
every country individually and taking into account the special features of each country 
when interpreting the results, we see that this does not apply to all countries. We feel that 
more important than- determining if financial development can help economic 
development is to establish the conditions under which this can happen. This is 
impossible to do using cross country regressions and our results justify researchers such 
as Arestis and Demetriades (1997) who argue that time series analysis may be more 
appropriate in examining this issue. 
On the whole, our results suggest that the endogenous growth model of Boyd and Smith 
can take place on certain conditions. It can be beneficial to let the financial sectors free to 
assign prices and interest rates based on market forces. Then they can fulfil their purpose 
and assist economic development. The evidence presented here, suggest that this is true 
for countries where the government does not interfere with the pricing and allocation of 
capital (at least not very much). It should however, act as a monitoring body, regulating 
these industries and preventing them from taking excessive risk or adopting bad practices. 
If the government fails to do so, it could cause a major crisis, as the one experienced by 
the Latin American countries. 
2 For references see chapter 4. 
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6.4. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we examined the relationship between the financial and the real sectors of 
the economy. Our results offer some interesting insights into the scope for stock market 
development in emerging economies. From the five countries of our sample, in three the 
stock market is significant and positively correlated with the real economy, namely in 
Chile, Mexico and South Korea. The two Latin American countries are the most 
liberalised in our sample. They have both pursued liberal economic policies and opened 
up their economies to foreign investment to a much higher degree than the Asian 
countries in our sample. What is important is that in both countries, government 
intervention in the market place was steadily reduced and both countries' governments 
were committed to financial liberalisation. The results show us that in such an 
environment the stock market can play a positive role in the growth of the economy. 
However, the banking sector is negatively related to the real economy which reflects the 
banking crisis in these countries during the early 1980s. 
In India and in Taiwan we failed to find a positive relationship between the stock market 
and the economy. In India the stock market development variable ' is insignificant and in 
Taiwan it is exogenous and negatively correlated with the real economy. These results 
seem to suggest that the development of the stock market was not beneficial to the growth 
of these countries. It could be construed as evidence either against financial repression or 
against the development of a stock market in a financially repressed system. 
In South Korea, both the banking sector and the stock market are positively related to 
economic growth and are exogenous. This reflects the role of the government in 
managing the economy. Since the financial sector is not free to develop it could not grow 
with the economy. However, we see that even in a financially repressed environment the 
stock market can be a source of growth if it is appropriately managed. 
The evidence on the effect of stock market volatility on the economy is not clear. The 
volatility variable is significant only in Chile and Taiwan. In Chile it is negatively related 
to the economy, while in Taiwan it is positively related to the economy. On the whole, 
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the results do not support the Keynesian argument that stock market volatility affect 
negatively economic growth. However, even if it can affect it is not obvious whether 
stock market volatility increased after liberalisation. If it did not, it could be the case that 
the level of volatility in the sample" countries is low and therefore, harmless. We should 
examine then if volatility increased after stock market liberalisation or not which is the 
subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STOCK MARKET 
VOLA TILITY BEFORE AND AFTER LIBERALISATION 
7.1. Introduction 
Our results so far indicate that the stock market can be a source of growth under certain 
conditions. In the last chapter we saw that in Chile, Mexico and South Korea the stock 
market was positively related to the real economy. We also saw that the volatility variable 
was significant and positively related to the economy only in Chile. This can be seen as 
evidence against the Keynesian criticism on the development of the stock market in these 
countries. It seems that stock market volatility was not a problem in the development of 
the countries in our sample. The question is: does stock market volatility not affect 
economic growth in general, or did stock market volatility in these countries fell 
following liberalisation and could not therefore harm the economy? Both of these 
arguments run against the Keynesian theory which claims that stock market volatility 
should increase as a result of stock market development and it should prove harmful to 
the economy. In view of the results in the previous chapter, the question becomes: did 
stock market volatility increase following liberalisation or not? Examining this question 
is interesting because it should help us understand the effect of liberalisation on stock 
market development. 
We attempt to provide an answer to this question using the methodology outlined in 
chapter 5. Specifically we utilise a GARCH and an EGARCH process to examine how 
the nature of volatility changed after the most important liberalisation policies were 
implemented in our sample countries. The reason we use the GARCH process to capture 
volatility is because it has been empirically found to be a very effective tool for capturing 
volatility. Several studies show how a GARCH (1,1) process can successfully model the 
volatility of most financial time series'. The one feature that cannot be captured by a 
GARCH process is the asymmetry between volatility caused by positive and negative 
1 For references see chapters 4 and 5. 
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news. For this reason we utilise the EGARCH process which can successfully account for 
this effect. 
7.2. Results from the GARCH estimation 
Following the methodology outlined in chapter 5, we obtain the unpredictable part of the 
stock returns by employing a procedure similar to Pagan and Schwert (1990), as 
discussed above. More specifically, Table 7.1 reports the results from regressing returns 
on a constant and four dummy variables (covering from Tuesday to Friday), and Table 
7.2 reports the results from regressing the residuals from this regression on its lagged 
values. The results presented in these tables have implications for the informational 
efficiency of the sample stock markets. A market is said to be informationally efficient 
when it is not possible to consistently generate abnormal returns. There are three degrees 
of efficiency [Fama, (1965)]: weak form efficiency, which implies that prices follow a 
random walk; semi-strong form efficiency, which implies that all public information is 
incorporated in stock prices when it becomes available; and strong form efficiency, which 
implies that all private information is incorporated in stock prices. For a market to be 
efficient in the weak sense, prices must not exhibit any trends. However, recent studies 
have suggested daily effects in stock returns which are not consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis. More specifically, an anomaly known as the Monday effect has been 
documented by, several researchers [Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989), Garrett and Spyrou 
(1998) and Lee et. al. (1990)]. The Monday effect suggests that returns on Mondays are 
lower, while returns on Fridays are higher. 
From Table 7.1 we can see that for all markets except India and Taiwan, the sign of the 
coefficient of the constant is negative, while the sign of the coefficient of the Friday 
dummy is positive for all markets except Taiwan. Although most of the coefficients are 
not significant, these results may suggest a Monday effect, consistent with the previous 
empirical findings mentioned above. This is especially true for Mexico, where all days 
except for Monday show a significant positive return, while the sign of the Monday 
coefficient is negative, but significant only at the 10% level. Returns on Fridays are 
higher in Chile, Mexico and Philippines. The Monday effect is extended on Tuesdays in 
India, Korea and Philippines, which is in line with Aggarwal and Rivoli (1989) findings. 
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The only exception is Taiwan, where returns on Tuesdays are indeed lower than the other 
days of the week, but Monday returns are the highest in the week. 
The adjustment for serial correlation in Table 7.2, confirms that none of the countries is 
efficient since for all of them there are significant lag returns. The least inefficient are 
South Korea and Philippines, where only the first lag is significant. The least efficient is 
Pakistan where every lagged return up to the fourth is significant, with the first, second 
and fourth lag being significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the Karachi stock 
market has a long memory from which abnormal returns can be generated. Such 
behaviour is contrary to the weak form efficiency and there are several possible 
explanations for it (e. g. infrequent trading, illiquidity). From the other markets, the 
Chilean and the Indian exhibit first and fourth order serial correlation (the fourth lag is 
significant at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level). The other three markets (Argentina, 
Mexico and Taiwan) also exhibit serial correlation with order higher than one. However, 
the investigation of the efficient market hypothesis for the sample markets is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, thus, no further tests are employed to test this hypothesis. 
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Table 7.1 
Adjustment procedure for the day-of-the-week effect. 
xt =c+ b1DTue + b2Dwed+ b3DThu + b4DFri + ut 
C Due DWed DThu DFrI 
Argentina -0.703E-3 0.0049** 0.0103*** 0.0049** 0.0024 
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Chile -0.332E-3 0.0010* 0.0013** 0.0016** 0.0026*** 
(0.40E-3) (0.57E-3) (0.57E-3) (0.57E-3) (0.57E-3) 
India 0.424E-3 -0.162E-3 -0.314E-3 -0.634E-4 0.0014 
(0.74E-3) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Korea -0.257E-3 -0.228E-3 0.711E-3 0.176E-3 0.682E-3 
(0.68E-3) (0.96E-3) (0.96E-3) (0.96E-3) (0.96E-3) 
Mexico -0.0013* 0.0026** 0.0027** 0.0044*** 0.0041*** 
(0.73E-3) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Pakistan -0.872E-3 0.0025** 0.0022** 0.0020** 0.260E-5 
(0.58E-3) (0.82E-3) (0.82E-3) (0.82E-3) (0.82E-3) 
Philippines -0.838E-3 -0.131E-3 0.0020** 0.0015 0.0028** 
(0.70E-3) (0.98E-3) (0.98E-3) (0.98E-3) (0.98E-3) 
Taiwan 0.0021** -0.0034** -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.827E-3 
(0.93E-3) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Notes to Table 7.1. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 7.2 
Adjustment procedure to remove autocorrelation. 
u, =c+dlu, _l+d2ut_2+d3ut_3+d4ut-, i 
+dsuts+ Ct 
C Ut-1 U1-2 ut-3 ut-4 ut-5 
Argentina 0.54E-4 0.130*** -0.046** 0.097*** 0.017 0.020 
(0.73E-3) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0194) 
Chile -0.16E-4 0.287*** 0.019 -0.017 0.042** 0.026 
(0.17E-3) (0.0194) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0194) 
India 0.488E-5 0.142*** 0.0068 0.0045 0.0436** 0.0098 
(0.33E-3) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0211) 
Korea -0.134E-4 0.0498** -0.0033 0.0055 -0.0238 -0.0155 
(0.30E-3) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Mexico 0.49E-4 0.236*** -0.056** 0.007 0.074*** -0.014 
(0.31E-3) (0.0195) (0.0199) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0193) 
Pakistan -0.146E-4 0.137*** 0.0559** 0.0504** 0.094*** 0.0053 
(0.25E-3) (0.0211) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0211) 
Philippines -0.552E-5 0.228*** -0.0215 0.0077 0.0275 -0.0132 
(0.30E-3) (0.0195) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0195) 
Taiwan -0.126E-4 0.0626** 0.0615** 0.0348* -0.74E-3 -0.0215 
((0.42E-3) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195) 
Notes to Table 7.2. 
ut are the residuals from the day-of-the-week adjustment procedure, see Table 5.2. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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Table 7.3 
Basic statistics for the unpredictable returns. 
Max Min StDev Skew Kurt Norm Ljung-Box(5) St 
Argentina 0.364 -0.652 0.038 -0.513 41.884 193,374.9 0.306 
Chile 0.060 -0.124 0.009 -0.587 18.559 38,096.8 0.257 
India 0.165 -0.091 0.016 0.755 12.784 15,570.0 0.082 
Korea 0.100 -0.118 0.016 0.196 5.775 3,691.1 0.027 
Mexico 0.143 -0.138 0.016 0.201 8.952 8,846.6 0.196 
Pakistan 0.070 -0.097 0.012 0.019 6.464 3,926.4 0.056 
Philippines 0.097 -0.096 0.016 0.044 4.357 2,092.1 0.222 
Taiwan 0.130 -0.103 0.021 -0.078 2.768 846.61 0.029 
Notes to Table 7.3. 
The statistics are: max: maximum return, min: minimum return, StDev: standard deviation, 
skew: skewness, kurt: kurtosis, norm: normality (Jarque-Bera test) and the Ljung-Box (5) 
statistic for serial correlation. 
Table 7.3 presents some sample statistics for the unpredictable returns of the sample 
countries (figures 7.7-7.14). Argentina shows the most extreme maximum and minimum 
unpredictable returns. It is also the most risky market with the highest standard deviation. 
The results for skewness vary with some of the countries displaying skewness to the right 
and other to the left. However, skewness does not seem to be a big problem since all 
statistics are close to 0. Excess positive kurtosis is found for all' countries indicating 
thicker tails than a normal distribution. The Jarque-Bera test for normality indicates 
significant departures from normality for all countries' returns. The Ljung-Box statistic 
for 5th order autocorrelation is not significant for any country. 
The results from testing for ARCH effects in the volatility of returns of the eight 
emerging markets are reported in Table 7.4 and indicate that there are significant ARCH 
effects in all countries in both subperiods, except for the pre-liberalisation period in 
Argentina. Thus, there is evidence of time varying volatility in the sample markets. 
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Table 7.4 
Lagrange Multiplier Statistic for ARCH effects in the Conditional Volatility 
of adjusted stock price returns in the sample countries 
4 
h2 =w+ alu2 
i=t 
Ho: al=... =aq=0 
H1: al#0,..., aq; 6 0 
x2 (1) x2 (12) 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation liberalisation 
Argentina 0.705 33.64*** 7.82 197.64*** 
(0.401) (0.000) (0.799) (0.000) 
Chile 5.776**. 170.142*** 7.863 285.811*** 
(0.016) (0.000) (0.796) (0.000) 
India 6.576*** 42.402*** 67.652*** 78.805*** 
(0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Korea 95.578*** 79.336*** 137.007*** 378.162*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mexico 0.284 312.994*** 25.040** 335.563*** 
(0.594) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
Pakistan 27.586*** 60.725*** 30.755*** 94.596*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Philippines 11.203*** 71.868*** 73.781*** 144.357*** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Taiwan 16.653*** 20.470*** 63.717*** 82.672*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes to Table 7.4. 
The Lagrange Multiplier Statistic is distributed as x2 (q). 
The null hypothesis is no ARCH effects. 
Figures in parentheses are probabilities that the null is accepted. 
***, ** and * reject the null hypothesis at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
Only , V2 
(1) and X2 (12) tests are reported. 
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Having established ARCH effects in the volatility of the sample data, we next turn our 
attention to the existence of GARCH effects. To this end, we estimate a GARCH model 
for the whole sample period (Table 7.5). Results from the whole sample period show that 
the ARCH effect is present in all countries. In other words, large (small) price changes 
follow large (small) price changes of either sign. The ARCH coefficient (a) is less than 
unity in every case indicating that volatility is not explosive. The sum a +c which 
measures persistence is significantly different from unity only for Korea, Mexico and 
Taiwan at the 1% significance level. This suggest that any shock to volatility is 
permanent in the other five countries. The Ljung-Box tests for serial correlation do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, except for a few cases (the statistic rejects 
for Argentina, Chile and India at the 1% significance level). However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution because when ARCH is present in a series, the 
standard tests for autocorrelation tend to over-reject the null [Taylor (1986)]. 
The next step in the analysis, is to test for structural shifts. Results from these tests are 
presented in Table 7.6. The dummy variable of the variance equation is significant for 
Korea and Pakistan only. This implies that the stock markets in India, Philippines and 
Taiwan did not become more volatile during the crash. Furthermore, none of the Latin 
American countries seems to be affected by the crash as far as volatility is concerned. The 
coefficient of the dummy variable for both Korea and Pakistan is positive, suggesting an 
increase in the conditional variance of stock returns in both countries. We can also find a 
structural shift in the mean equation for Chile. This indicates a jump in the stock returns 
process. Since there is a structural shift in the equations of Chile, Korea and Pakistan, the 
subperiod 1/9/97 to 28/2/98 for these countries is excluded from the analysis that follows. 
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Table 7.5 
GARCH(1,1) estimation for daily returns of the eight emerging stock markets for the 
whole sample period. 
hý = co +a1 ui-i +C1 hi-r 
co a c a+ c Ljung-Box Iter 
St. 
Argentina 0.512E-5* 0.122*** 0.883*** 1.005[. 518] 28.53[. 001] 32 
(0.289E-5) (0.018) (0.013) 
Chile 0.456E-5* 0.259*** 0.709*** 0.968[. 105] 37.48[. 000] 28 
(0.240E-5) (0.036) (0.022) 
India 0.301E-5 0.102*** 0.894*** 0.996[. 482] 32.74[. 000] 86 
(0.285E-5) (0.014) (0.01) 
Korea 0.96E-5*** 0.126*** 0.830*** 0.956[. 000] 14.09[. 169] 43 
(0.240E-5) (0.014) (0.012) 
Mexico 0.16E-4*** 0.151*** 0.793*** 0.944[. 000] 6.38[. 783] 28 
(0.262E-5) (0.022) (0.016) 
Pakistan 0.377E-5 0.147*** 0.843*** 0.990[. 179] 13.87[. 179] 128 
(0.264E-5) (0.019) (0.014) 
Philippines 0.159E-5 0.058** 0.938*** 0.996[. 293] 7.84[. 645] 252 
(0.654E-5) (0.023) (0.020) 
Taiwan 0.557E-5** 0.071*** 0.915*** 0.986[. 000] 16.00[. 100] 122 
(0.283E-5) (0.010) (0.008) 
Notes to Table 7.5. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
Numbers in brackets are probabilities that a +c is not significantly different from unity, given by 
a Wald test. 
Ljung-Box St. is the Ljung-Box (10) statistics for serial correlation. 
The last column reports the number of iterations after which convergence was reached. 
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Table 7.6 
Tests for structural shift in the unconditional variance and mean of stock returns 
in the sample countries. 
yt = %30+ d1 D1+ß1yt-1 +ur 
h av +d2D+au2+ch2 
HO: d=O 
HI: d# 0 
d, d2 Iterations 
Argentina 0.111E-3 0.768E-5 39 
(0.00135) (0.11OE-4) 
Chile -0.00104** 0.859E-6 22. 
(0.526E-3) (0.829E-5) 
India -0.912E-4 0.271E-5 27 
(0.00113) (0.966E-5) 
Korea -0.00267 0.48E-4*** 27 
(0.00224) (0.122E-4) 
Mexico 0.164E-3 0.142E-4 37 
(0.00124) (0.106E-4) 
Pakistan -0.294E-3 0.38E-4*** 49 
(0.00123) (0.107E-4) 
Philippines -0.457E-4 0.215E-4 38 
(0.00177) (0.877E-4) 
Taiwan -0.368E-3 0.737E-5 28 
(0.00160) (0.102E-4) 
Notes to Table 7.6 
Number in parentheses are standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The last column reports the number of iterations after which convergence was reached. 
The sample period is the post liberalisation period for each country. 
The subperiod for which a structural shift is examined is 1/9/97 to 28/2/98. 
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Having determined the appropriate sample period, we now examine which model is the 
best to describe volatility pre- and post-liberalisation. For each subperiod and country, 
five models are estimated with different orders, namely: (1,1), (1,2), (2,1), (0,2) and (2,2). 
Based on the empirical evidence found in the literature, it is unlikely that a 3rd or higher 
order process is needed to describe volatility, therefore, the higher order process that we 
test is the second. The results are reported in Tables 7.7 and 7.8. The empty cells in the 
tables mean that the particular models did not converge. These models are the 
GARCH(1,2) for Argentina and Mexico, the GARCH(2,2) for Mexico and Taiwan, and 
the GARCH(0,2) for Chile, during the pre-liberalisation period and the GARCH(1,2) for 
Philippines during the post-liberalisation period. The results from the other models 
clearly indicate that a (1,1) process is enough to capture volatility in these markets. This 
is consistent with the observation by Bollerslev that for most financial series, a 
GARCH(1,1) process can adequately describe the data. 
Table 7.7 
Equation log likelihood function for different orders of the GARCH process 
for the pre-liberalisation period. 
(191) (192) (291) (092) (2,2) 
Argentina 570.5649* 568.2360 558.8974 563.5303 
Chile 1,251.9* 1,239.7 1,249.3 1,237.9 
India 1,925.8* 1,921.9 1,923.0 1,866.6 1,907.8 
Korea 2,465.8* 2,446.3 2,464.2 2,438.6 , 2,406.8 
Mexico 321.3281* 320.8706 313.7061 
Pakistan 825.4169* 814.1875 823.5588 812.6338 813.8404 
Philippines 2,187.6* 2,176.6 2,174.1 2,165.6 2,174.4 
Taiwan 1,404.5* 1,397.2 1,401.3 1,381.3 
Notes to Table 7.7. 
The models with the highest values are selected. 
* indicates the highest values 
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Table 7.8 
Equation log likelihood function for different orders of the GARCH process 
for the post-liberalisation period. 
(191) (1,2) (2,1) (0,2) (2,2) 
Argentina 4,940.5* 4,922.2 4,910.4 4,766.6 4,903.9 
Chile 6,614.3* 6,577.0 6,598.2 6,506.0 6,558.1 
India 3,684.0* 3,668.1 3,676.3 3,639.7 3,659.7 
Korea 3,868.2* 3,865.4 3,862.9 3,836.6 3,853.9 
Mexico 6,039.9* 6,011.5 6,026.3 5,977.7 6,005.2 
Pakistan 4,681.8* 4,656.3 4,670.9 4,639.3 4,648.8 
Philippines 4,372.3* 4,365.3 4,297.7 4,350.3 
Taiwan 4,767.1* 4,761.8 4,745.3 4,739.2 4,760.3 
Notes to Table 7.8. 
The models with the highest values are selected. 
* indicates the highest values 
The next step in the analysis is to determine which distributional assumption is 
appropriate for the sample data. All models are estimated assuming a normal distribution 
and alternatively at distribution. Although the results obtained from the two assumptions 
are similar, in every case both the AIC and the SBC favour the assumption of at 
distribution (Table 7.9). The only exception is the pre-liberalisation period for Taiwan 
where the model can only be estimated assuming a normal distribution (with a t- 
distribution it does not converge). Therefore, the AIC and the SBC assuming at 
distribution cannot be calculated and we accept the assumption of a normal distribution. 
Tables 7.10 and 7.11 report the results from the GARCH estimation for the pre- and post- 
liberalisation period. None of the models seems to be misspecified; the Ljung-Box tests 
for serial correlation reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation only for India and 
Mexico for the pre-liberalisation period and Chile for the post-liberalisation period at the 
5%, but not at the 1% significance level, but these results should be interpreted with 
caution, as mentioned earlier. Note that, although we could not find any ARCH effects in 
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the volatility of Argentinean stock returns during the pre-liberalisation period, the ARCH 
coefficient in the GARCH model is now significant, indicating that the ARCH effect is 
present. 
Table 7.9 
Selection criteria values for different distributional assumptions for the GARCH models 
estimated. 
Pre-liberalisation Post liberalisation 
Normal t-distr. Normal t-distr. 
Argentina AIC 541.7379 557.3095* 4897.8 4935.1* 
SBC 534.3982 548.1314* 4886.7 4921.2* 
Chile AIC 1190.0 1250.1* 6117.3 6145.5* 
SBC 1182.1 1240.3* 6106.4 6131.8* 
India AIC 1905.2 1945.2* 3634.0 3679.0* 
SBC 1896.2 1933.9* 3623.9 3666.0* 
Korea AIC 2431.1 2460.8* 3849.8 3863.2* 
SBC 2421.6 2449.0* 3839.5 3850.3* 
Mexico AIC 309.1702 315.3677* 5956.3 6034.4* 
SBC 303.3448 308.0496* '5944.9 6020.3* 
Pakistan AIC 805.5275 820.4169* 4601.6 4676.8* 
SBC 798.8333 812.0491* 4591.0 4663.4* 
Philippines AIC 2131.8 2182.6* 4319.6 4367.3* 
SBC 2122.5 2171.0* 4309.0 4354.1* 
Taiwan AIC 1400.5 4661.6 4762.1 * 
SBC 1391.8 4650.8 4748.5* 
Notes to Table 7.9. 
The first line for every country reports the Akaike Information Criterion and the second line is 
the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. 
The models with the highest AIC and SBC values are chosen. 
* indicates the highest values. 
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Comparing the results from the pre-liberalisation and post-liberalisation period, we see 
that the ARCH effect is statistically insignificant for Mexico and Pakistan in the pre- 
liberalisation period but becomes significant during the second period. The opposite 
happens in Philippines where the significant pre-liberalisation ARCH effect becomes 
insignificant during the second period. Again, the ARCH coefficients for both periods are 
not unity for any country, indicating non-explosive volatility. 
The volatility persistence indicator is higher in the second period for four countries 
(Chile, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan) and lower for the remaining four. However, the 
statistical significance tests suggest that except from Mexico, volatility persistence 
remains the same before and after liberalisation: significantly different from unity for 
Korea and Taiwan and insignificantly different from unity in every other country. Only in 
the case of Mexico, the hypothesis that a +c equals unity, becomes from strongly 
accepted, strongly rejected. For Korea, although volatility persistence is not permanent in 
any period, during the post liberalisation period it is higher than in the first period: it 
increases from 0.80 to 0.931. 
So, in terms of volatility persistence, Mexico is the only country which benefited from 
liberalising its stock market (since any shock to volatility is absorbed by the market at a 
faster pace than before). What these results mean for Mexico is that, while during the 
first period a shock to volatility decays at the rate of 0.991 per day, during the second 
period it decays at the rate of 0.927 per day; after six weeks the proportion of the shock 
remains at 0.8604 (0.99130) during the first period, while it remains at 0.1029 (0.92710) 
during the second period. 
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Table 7.10 
GARCH(1,1) estimation for daily returns of the eight emerging stock markets for the pre- 
liberalisation period. 
hý=w+ a1 u', _i + cl 
h', 
_t 




Argentina 0.46E-4*** 0.133** 0.868*** 1.001[. 970] 3.64 16.34[. 090] 24 
(0.113E-4) (0.054) (0.037) (1.08) 
Chile 0.23E-4*** 0.387** 0.480*** 0.867[. 240] 3.68 17.69[. 060] 30 
(0.575E-5) (0.142) (0.082) (0.64) 
India 0.106E-4 0.112** 0.872*** 0.984[. 688] 3.05 23.19[. 010] 38 
(0.606E-5) (0.053) (0.033) (0.51) 
Korea 0.48E-4*** 0.282*** 0.512*** 0.800[. 000] 4.45 11.41[. 326] 27 
(0.403E-5) (0.060) (0.047) (0.76) 
Mexico 0.135E-4 0.145 0.846*** 0.991[. 939] 3.62 18.38[. 049] 27 
(0.205E-4) (0.157) (0.070) (1.62) 
Pakistan 0.437E-5 0.399 0.577*** 0.976[. 907] 3.43 15.34[. 120] 30 
(0.870E-5) (0.245) (0.100) (1.03) 
Philippines 0.32E-4*** 0.250*** 0.700*** 0.950[. 295] 3.69 10.74[. 378] 25 
(0.432E-5) (0.061) (0.039) (0.54) 
Taiwan 0.39E-4*** 0.168** 0.753*** 0.921[. 000] - 16.56[. 084] 27 
(0.589E-5) (0.041) (0.032) - 
Notes to Table 7.10. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Numbers in the brackets are probabilities that a +c is not significantly different from unity, 
given by a Wald test. 
Ljung-Box St. is the Ljung-Box (10) statistics for serial correlation. 
The last column reports the number of iterations after which convergence was reached. 
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Table 7.11 
GARCH(1,1) estimation for daily returns of the eight emerging stock markets for the 
post-liberalisation period. 
hý =w +a, ul-r +c1 hi-r 




Argentina 0.641E-5** 0.128*** 0.866*** 0.994[. 441] 7.02 11.57[. 353] 24 
(0.314E-5) (0.021) (0.016) (1.08) 
Chile 0.258E-5 0.204*** 0.768*** 0.973[. 083] 7.41 23.08[. 020] 23 
(0.324E-5) (0.038) (0.027) (1.33) 
India 0.511E-5 0.123** 0.854*** 0.978[. 180] 4.73 14.72[. 142] 24 
(0.509E-5) (0.041) (0.029) (0.83) 
Korea 0.103E-4** 0.091*** 0.840*** 0.931[. 000] 8.20 11.16[. 345] 20 
(0.401E-5) (0.026) (0.023) (1.94) 
Mexico 0.19E-4*** 0.152*** 0.775*** 0.927[. 000] 5.07 11.87[. 294] 34 
(0.273E-5) (0.025) (0.020) (0.58) 
Pakistan 0.13E-4*** 0.222*** 0.746*** 0.968[. 319] 3.66 6.92[. 733] 33 
(0.326E-5) (0.047) (0.029) (0.42) 
Philippines 0.385E-5 0.102 0.885*** 0.987[. 441] 4.94 7.88[. 640] 40 
(0.940E-5) (0.071) (0.055) (0.89) 
Taiwan 0.94E-5*** 0.057*** 0.901*** 0.966[. 000] - 13.67[. 189] 27 
(0.321E-5) (0.010) (0.009) - 
Notes to Table 7.11. 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Numbers in the brackets are probabilities that a +c is not significantly different from unity, 
given by a Wald test. 
Ljung-Box St. is the Ljung-Box (10) statistics for serial correlation. 
The last column reports the number of iterations after which convergence was reached. 
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Another interesting finding is that the degrees of freedom increased during the post- 
liberalisation period for all countries (except Taiwan, where the assumed distribution is 
normal). This indicates that during the post-liberalisation period the tails of the 
distribution of the residuals became thinner, indicating less volatility. Another way of 
measuring volatility persistence is the half life of a shock [Koutmos et al (1994)]. This 
measurement indicates how many periods it takes for a shock in volatility to reach its half 
life. This statistic is calculated as: 
log(O. 5) 
log(a + c) 
Note that the statistic applies only when volatility is not explosive or permanent, i. e. 
when (a +c) <_ 1. If volatility persistence is permanent, then the denominator of the 
statistic becomes zero and the statistic is not defined; if volatility is explosive, then the 
denominator of the statistic is a positive number while the nominator is negative and the 
statistic is meaningless. In the present analysis, volatility is explosive only for Argentina 
in the pre-liberalisation period, therefore the half life of volatility is not calculated. 
For the other countries the statistic is reported in Table 7.12. In four countries, namely 
Chile, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan, the half life of a shock has increased in the post- 
liberalisation period, while for three countries is has been reduced (India, Mexico and 
Pakistan). The most dramatic change occurred in Mexico where the half life of a shock 
becomes from approximately 76 days in the pre-liberalisation period, only 9 days in the 
post-liberalisation period. For the other countries the reduction or increase in the half life 
of a shock is significant, since in most cases the statistic has either more than doubled or 
halved. The only exception is Pakistan, where the statistic has been reduced for the 
second period from approximately 29 days to 21 days. 
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Table 7.12 
Half life of a shock pre- and post-liberalisation. 
The statistic is calculated as: 
log(O. 5) 
log(a + c) 
Pre-liberalisation Post-liberalisation 
Argentina 115 
Chile 5 24 
India 43 28 
Korea 3 10 
Mexico 76 9 
Pakistan 29 21 
Philippines 14 53 
Taiwan 9 16 
Notes to Table 7.12. 
The statistics are expressed in days. 
All numbers have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
Comparing the two coefficients (a and c) before and after liberalisation, we see that in 
most cases the ARCH coefficient has decreased and the lagged conditional volatility 
coefficient has increased. More specifically, for Argentina, Chile, Korea, Pakistan, 
Philippines and Taiwan the ARCH coefficients are lower in the second period and for 
India and Mexico are higher (the increase is, however, small in both countries). Also, for 
Chile, Korea, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan the lagged conditional volatility 
coefficients are higher in the second period and for Argentina, India and Mexico are 
lower. Furthermore, the constant of the variance equation is lower post-liberalisation for 
five countries (Argentina, Chile, Korea, Philippines and Taiwan) and higher for the 
remaining three. Table 7.13 reports Wald tests for equality of coefficients for the two 
periods. The results suggest that at the 5% significance level, the ARCH coefficient (a) 
has changed in five countries only, namely: Chile Korea, Pakistan, Philippines and 
Taiwan, and in each one of these countries it has been reduced. Furthermore, the 
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coefficient of the lagged conditional volatility (c) has changed in six countries, namely 
Chile, Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines and Taiwan, and with the exception of 
Mexico, it has increased in every one of these countries. This suggests that the reduction 
in the ARCH coefficient and the increase in the lagged volatility coefficient is significant. 
Table 7.13 
Wald tests for equality of a and c coefficients before and after liberalisation. 
(a+c)I=(a+c)2 (A, =0)2 ai=a2 C1 =C2 DFB=DF2 
Argentina 1.01[. 315] 158.38[. 000] 0.72[. 788] 0.16[. 898] 9.85[. 002] 
Chile 47.85[. 000] 40.79[. 000] 23.08[. 000] 112.1[. 000] 7.89[. 005] 
India 0.17[. 680] 1.12[. 290] 0.06[. 803] 0.36[. 549] 4.09[. 043] 
Korea 240[. 000] 88.28[. 000] 55.34[. 000] 203[. 000] 3.72[. 054] 
Mexico 23.06[. 000] 3.97[. 046] 0.81[. 776] 12.77[. 000] 6.33[. 012] 
Pakistan 0.07[. 795] 6.82[. 009] 14.24[. 000] 34.28[. 000] 0.31[. 578] 
Philippines 4.34[. 037] 8.72[. 003] 4.34[. 037] 11.19[. 001] 
, 
1.99[. 159] 
Taiwan 103[. 000] 84.70[. 000] 114.9[. 000] 4531[. 000] - 
Notes to Table 7.13. 
The Wald test is a chi-square (1) test. 
Numbers in brackets are probabilities that the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients is 
accepted. 
The constant of the conditional volatility equation - which is a measure of the 
unconditional volatility - has changed significantly in all countries except India. With the 
exception of Mexico and Pakistan, it has been reduced. Changes in the volatility 
persistence indicator are mixed: for Argentina, India and Pakistan all tests indicate that it 
remains equal to unity and the same in both subperiods; for Korea and Taiwan it is 
different from unity and it has increased in the post-liberalisation period, the opposite 
happens for Mexico, while for Chile and Philippines the tests in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 
indicate that it is not statistically different from unity, while the tests in Table 7.13 
indicate that volatility persistence changed following liberalisation. The degrees of 
freedom changed significantly in four countries (for Mexico the hypothesis of equality in 
the two sub-periods is barely accepted at the 5% significance level). These countries are 
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Argentina, Chile, India and Mexico and in all these countries the degree of freedom are 
lower after liberalisation. 
The above results present some evidence on how the nature of volatility changed after 
liberalisation in the markets examined., The Mexican market absorbs shocks to volatility 
at a faster pace than before. Also, past unexpected news have a lesser impact on volatility 
than before liberalisation in five countries. This suggest that news in any of these five 
markets induce a lower level of volatility than before liberalisation. However, the impact 
of past conditional volatility seems increased in five countries, apart from Mexico where 
it has been reduced. The past conditional volatility can be interpreted as an infinite order 
geometrically declining ARCH process. Therefore, this parameter captures the weight of 
the markets memory. In the five countries where it has been increased, it suggests that 
older news have an increased effect on volatility after liberalisation, where in Mexico, the 
reduced coefficient suggests that old news induce less volatility after liberalisation than 
before. The change in the degrees of freedom suggests that in the countries in which it 
occurs, volatility has fallen after liberalisation. Higher degrees of freedom mean thinner 
tails for the distribution of the residuals, which can be interpreted as fewer outliers; thus 
less volatile returns. The above results suggest that the Mexican market has benefited 
from liberalising its stock market in terms of lower volatility (note, however, that the 
constant of the variance equation for this country is higher during the second period, but 
the increase is small), but for the other six markets the results are not clear. 
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7.3. Results from the news impact curves estimation 
Tables 7.14 and 7.15 present the results from the EGARCH equations for the six 
countries2 pre and post liberalisation, as well as the unconditional variance for each 
equation. The parameters of the EGARCH process have changed but not uniformly. It is 
therefore not possible to make any inferences on whether volatility increased or decreased 
from these results. Only the change in unconditional variance seems to follow a trend. It 
has fallen in Argentina, India, South Korea and Taiwan, while it has increased in Pakistan 
and slightly in Philippines. 
Table 7.14 
EGARCH(1,1) estimation for daily returns for the pre-liberalisation period. 
1o h) = co +, ß log(hr-1) +y g(r - 




hý-1 _2 ir 
co 13 y a Iterations m 
Argentina -0.147 0.975 0.047 0.168 42 2.79E-3 383 
(0.092) (0.014) (0.034) (0.052) 
India -0.065 0.991 0.05 0.148 58 1.12E-3 1022 
(0.054) (0.006) (0.018) (0.035) 
Pakistan -7.03 0.333 0.004 0.619 108 2.89E-5 10 
(1.837) (0.173) (0.112) (0.17) 
Philippines -0.122 0.984 -0.04 0.071 53 4.14E-4 553 
(0.082) (0.01) (0.017) (0.021) 
S. Korea -1.15 0.865 -0.084 0.324 40 1.92E-4 70 
(0.563) (0.065) (0.03) (0.061) 
Taiwan -1.14 0.854 -0.236 0.204 33 4.78E-4 62 
(0.296) (0.038) (0.047) (0.058) 
Notes to Table 7.14: 
- Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
- o1 is the unconditional return variance. 
- The last column reports the number of terms used in the product in equation (19) (chapter 4) until 
convergence was reached. 
2 For Chile and Mexico the estimation procedure did not converge for one of the subperiods. Thus, we 
exclude the two countries from the analysis. 
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Table 7.15 
EGARCH(1,1) estimation for daily returns for the post-liberalisation period. 
lo h) =+ß log(h, -1) 
+Y Et -1 +aI- il -2 
co ß y a Iterations d m 
Argentina -0.183 0.975 -0.046 0.297 52 8.37E-4 406 
(0.046) (0.006) (0.014) (0.028) 
India -0.19 0.977 -0.002 0.169 39 2.42E-4 418 
(0.075) (0.008) (0.014) (0.028) 
Pakistan -0.516 0.94 0.026 0.269 56 2.14E-4 161 
(0.145) (0.016) (0.016) (0.035) 
Philippines -0.138 0.983 -0.053 0.225 41 4.71E-4 562 
(0.066) (0.008) (0.013) (0.035) 
S. Korea -0.412 0.953 -0.038 0.169 30 1.7E-4 198 
(0.137) (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) 
Taiwan -0.631 0.924 -0.074 0.161 28 2.7E-4 120 
(0.231) (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) 
Notes to Table 7.15: 
- Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
- o? is the unconditional return variance. 
- The last column reports the number of terms used in the product in equation (19) (chapter 4) until 
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Figure 7.6. News impact curves for Taiwan 
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Figures 7.1-7.6 present the news impact curves for the sample countries. The vertical axes 
represent the level of current volatility and the horizontal axes represent the lagged 
residuals from the EGARCH models. The curves confirm that in most cases `good news' 
and `bad news' of the same magnitude result in different levels of volatility. However, in 
the pre-liberalisation period for Argentina and India, it seems that `good news' resulted in 
more volatility than `bad news' of the same magnitude, which is at odds with the negative 
relationship between current returns and future volatility observed by Black (1976). In 
most other cases though, this negative relationship is confirmed. There are several 
similarities as well as differences among countries. The level 'of volatility for s,. ] =0 has 
clearly been reduced in only two countries after liberalisation, namely: Argentina and 
India, and to a lesser extent in Taiwan. In Pakistan volatility increased following 
liberalisation, while in Philippines and South Korea the curves seem to pass from the 
same point of the vertical axis for st_ j=0 before and after liberalisation. It is interesting 
though, to see that in the two sub-periods the parameters of the EGARCH models have 
changed, which means that news have a different impact on volatility before and after 
liberalisation. Thus, in India, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan the curves are flatter 
after liberalisation. This means that `big news' cause less volatility during that period 
than before liberalisation. In Argentina, the shape of the curve is not different in the two 
sub-periods, while in Philippines the curve is flatter before liberalisation. 
7.4. Discussion of empirical results 
In this chapter we examined the impact of financial liberalisation on the stock market 
volatility of selected emerging markets. Previous research on this area is scarce and tends 
to concentrate on whether volatility increased or decreased after liberalisation. In the 
present analysis we take the view that examining the changes in the nature of volatility 
instead of the level of volatility can provide us with a better insight on the effect that 
opening up a stock market has on its volatility. Changes in volatility following 
liberalisation have serious implications for the economic stability and growth of the 
country undertaking the reform policies. The present analysis serves as a preliminary 
insight into the subject since financial liberalisation was implemented recently in most of 
the countries examined and its true effect may take several years to materialise. 
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The results suggest that the nature of volatility has not changed dramatically after 
liberalisation. The lag structure of the GARCH process used remains the same in both 
subperiods, (1,1), indicating that there are no significant changes in the memory of these 
markets; i. e. old news (two days or older), as expressed by the residuals of the mean 
equation, do not have a different significance pre- and post-liberalisation for any country. 
Volatility persistence remains pretty much the same in both subperiods. For Argentina, 
Chile, India, Pakistan and Philippines an IGARCH process is suggested for both 
subperiods, indicating that any shocks to volatility are permanent. For Korea and Taiwan 
the volatility persistence indicator is lower than unity in both subperiods. Only for 
Mexico does the persistence of shocks to volatility changes dramatically. The parameters 
of the variance equation for the two periods indicate some trends in the changes of 
volatility. During the post-liberalisation period the constant is lower for five countries, 
the ARCH coefficient is significantly lower for five countries and the lagged conditional 
volatility coefficient is higher for five countries and lower for Mexico. The constant can 
be interpreted as an indicator of the level of volatility, which has been mainly reduced 
after liberalisation. The ARCH coefficient expresses the significance of past news on 
volatility. Since this parameter is lower after liberalisation, we can infer that the markets 
are becoming less volatile after liberalisation, i. e. news of the same importance induce 
less volatility in the market post-liberalisation than pre-liberalisation. The reason for this 
change could be increased liquidity due to the increased numbers of traders in these 
markets, according to the model presented by Tauchen and Pitts (1983). However, the 
coefficient of the lagged conditional volatility has increased in most cases, indicating that 
older news induce proportionately more volatility after liberalisation than before, for 
which there is no apparent explanation. The only exception to this trend is Mexico, 
where this parameter is lower after liberalisation, which together with the other results 
indicate a lower level of volatility for Mexico altogether. 
Furthermore, in Argentina and India, past news of every magnitude result in lower levels 
of volatility, as indicated by the news impact curves. Also, in India the news impact curve 
is flatter after liberalisation indicating that `big news' generate less volatility during that 
period. In South Korea the level of volatility has not changed and in Taiwan it has been 
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slightly reduced, but in both countries the curves during the second period are flatter 
suggesting again that `big news' generate less volatility in that period. The same is also 
true for Pakistan, although the curve has shifted higher in the second period. This may not 
be a bad thing since in the pre-liberalisation period the minimum point of the curve is 
very near zero, which could indicate that during that period the stock market was 
relatively inactive. Only in Philippines volatility seems to be higher during the second 
period. Although the curves for both periods have a minimum at the same level on the 
vertical axis, the curve is flatter during the first period indicating a lower level of 
volatility during the pre-liberalisation period. 
Our results contradict the evidence presented by Aitken (1996) and Grabei (1995) among 
others, who found that volatility in emerging stock markets increased following 
liberalisation. While our results do not provide a clear answer as to whether volatility 
changed after liberalisation, overall the evidence seem to weigh in favour of the 
liberalisation advocates, especially for Mexico. For the other countries, the increased 
lagged conditional volatility parameter suggests an increase in volatility, while the rest of 
the results suggest a decrease. The news impact curves also suggest a decrease in 
volatility following liberalisation, except for Philippines. On the whole, the above results 
do not give conclusive evidence as to whether stock market volatility increased after 
liberalisation or not. 
7.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we examined if the nature of stock rparket volatility changed after 
liberalisation in a sample of emerging economies. These are Argentina, Chile, India, 
Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan. We included three more 
countries in our sample because we only need the stock market index for the present 
analysis, which is available for more countries. We employed two methodologies, namely 
a GARCH and an EGARCH process to model volatility in these stock markets. The 
significant parameters of the models used, indicate that both models perform well in 
capturing volatility in these markets. 
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The results from the GARCH process show some uniform changes in the nature of 
volatility in the countries examined. Specifically, the constant of the process and the 
ARCH coefficient are statistically lower in five countries, and the lagged conditional 
volatility coefficient is statistically higher for five countries and lower for Mexico. Also, 
the degrees of freedom in five countries is lower. Since we examine changes in the nature 
of volatility, we cannot actually claim that volatility increased or decreased after 
liberalisation. However, the results indicate a lower level of volatility, except for the 
higher lagged conditional volatility coefficient. The ARCH coefficients suggest that 
recent past news cause less volatility after liberalisation than before. However, the lagged 
conditional volatility coefficients suggest that older news cause more volatility after 
liberalisation than before. This can be attributed to a number of reasons. Incomplete 
liberalisation could increase volatility as a result of continuing bad practices such as 
insider trading. Also, it could be that the markets are becoming more inefficient after 
liberalisation since older news are incorporated slower into prices. The results are open to 
interpretation because as we have said the drawback of using ARCH-type processes is 
that they are not supported by theory. 
The news impact curves are more informative in that the position and shape of the curves 
can indicate higher or lower volatility after liberalisation. The results here are not 
uniform. Only in Argentina and India the level of volatility clearly fell., while in Pakistan 
it increased. The news impact curves are flatter during the second period for India, South 
Korea and Taiwan, while it is flatter during the first period only for Philippines. 
Overall the results seem to indicate that volatility has actually reduced after liberalisation 
in most countries of our sample. In any case, it does not seem to have increase. This is 
consistent with the neo-classical theory which predicts that the riskiness of these markets 
as represented by their volatility should reduce after liberalisation, reflecting higher stock 
prices and lower returns. This however, is the case only if the individual national stock 
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CHAPTER 8: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STOCKMARKET 
8.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we examine if emerging stock markets became integrated following 
liberalisation. Integration is examined at the regional level as well as with the Standard 
and Poor's 500 index. The S&P500 is used as a proxy for a developed market. Stock 
market integration should be a consequence of the liberalisation of foreign investment in 
these markets. As it was discussed in chapter 3, liberalisation should bring these markets 
more in line with each other and with developed stock markets. Stock markets have two 
characteristics: returns and risk. If liberalisation had a positive effect on these markets we 
should be able to find integration with respect to both return and risk. We employ two 
methodologies to examine this issue. The first is to test for cointegration among the 
national stock indices and the second is a novel approach used in the country risk 
literature. 
8.2. Integration with respect to the stock prices 
The methodology we follow allows us to examine regional integration of the emerging 
stock markets, as well as integration of these markets with the US market as proxied by 
the S&P 500 index. We also test for changes in the cointegration relationship (if any) 
after liberalisation was implemented. In most countries, stock market liberalisation was 
implemented during the early 1990s [see Table 5.1]. Therefore, we test for common 
trends before and after liberalisation was implemented. Unfortunately, for the Asian stock 
markets we do not have enough data to split it into two subperiods (the sample period 
starts at 1985). Therefore, for the Asian stock markets we test for common trends for the 
whole period and then for the period January 1990 to November 1997. If indeed the 
markets were segmented before liberalisation was implemented, we should find weaker 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship for the whole period. If the markets became 
integrated after liberalisation we should find at least one cointegrating relationship with 
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all the variables significant in the cointegrating vector, during that period. For the Latin 
American countries we have enough observations to test for common trends before and 
after liberalisation. The first period is January 1976 to December 1989, and the second 
period is January 1990 to November 1997. We should expect to find no cointegrating 
relationships for the first period and at least one for the second period. 
8.2.1. Other implications of stock market integration 
Integration among national stock markets has serious implications for the efficiency of 
these markets and the diversification potential offered by these markets. These issues 
were discussed in the literature review and although it is not our purpose to examine them 
extensively here, we feel we should explain what our results would imply with respect to 
these issues. 
One of the reasons foreign investors enter emerging stock markets is the diversification 
potential offered by these markets [e. g. Divecha et. al. (1992), Speidell and Sappenfield 
(1992)]. By investing in these markets, investors can achieve higher expected returns and 
lower risk because the returns in these markets are uncorrelated with returns in developed 
markets. If however, we find that these markets are cointegrated with the US market, then 
there is no diversification benefits in the long run. Cointegration implies co-movement, 
and diversification requires the opposite. However, Kasa (1992) demonstrates that 
diversification benefits do not necessarily disappear if two or more stock markets are 
cointegrated. The crucial factor in this case is the speed of adjustment (the a matrix). If 
the elements in this matrix are large values, then the markets are moving towards a 
common trend fast and there is little scope for diversification. If the values in the matrix 
are small, investors with finite horizons should not be affected by any co-movement 
towards the common trend'. 
The results of our tests also have implications for the efficiency of these markets. 
Efficiency implies that the movement of the prices in a stock market cannot be predicted 
(i. e. it is random) [Fama (1965)). Therefore, if two markets are collectively efficient in 
1 For this reason, several researchers focus only in the short term when they examine the potential for 
diversification [e. g. Levy and Samat (1970) and Solnik (1974)]. 
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the long run, their indexes cannot cointegrate. In this case there is a potential for arbitrage 
[e. g. Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993)]. This is because cointergation implies that these 
markets move towards a common trend, so predictability cannot be ruled out. The 
Johansen methodology has been used by some researchers to examine long run collective 
efficiency among stock markets, mainly developed ones [e. g. Chan et. al. (1997)]. 
8.2.2. Empirical results 
The first step in the analysis is to test for unit roots. The results from the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests for the stock market indices are presented in Table 8.1. All variables 
have a unit root except the S&P 500 index. This however, is highly unlikely since 
rejection of a unit root would imply that the market is inefficient in the weak-form. Since 
this is improbable, we investigate it further. The graph of the S&P 500 index and its first 
difference is presented in Appendix 6. The graph indicates that the index itself is not 
stationary while its first difference does not appear to have a unit root2. Furthermore, the 
null hypothesis of a unit root is not strongly rejected (the statistic is only a little higher 
than the critical value). We can therefore conclude that the variable is I(1) and can be 
included in the estimation. 
Table 8.1. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for unit roots in stock market 
indices and their first differences 
Index First Difference 
Argentina -0.797 (3) -8.542 (2) 
Chile -0.328 (0) -4.592 (7) 
India -2.146 (0) -13.063(0) 
Mexico -1.153 (8) -5.063 (7) 
Pakistan -1.471 (0) -12.348 (0) 
Philippines -1.711 (0) -7.384 (1) 
South Korea -1.783 (1) -9.075 (0) 
Taiwan -2.621 (3) -5.812 (3) 
US 3.132 (10) -5.443 (4) 
Notes to 7 able 6. j. 
- Figures in parentheses are the lag orders chosen by the AIC and the SBC. 
- The critical value for both columns is : -2.8732 
2 The rejection of a unit root in the levels when it is clear that there is one, can be the result of a break in 
the series. 
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Table 8.2 Cointegration results for the Latin American and US markets 
January 1976 - December 1989 








p=0 70.37** 53.48 49.95 32.91** 28.27 25.80 
pS1 37.45** 34.87 31.93 30.23** 22.04 19.86 
p: 52 7.23 20.18 17.88 5.55 15.87 13.81 
p< 3 1.67 9.16 7.53 1.67 9.16 7.53 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(32,521) = 0.84 [0.7152] 
Cointegrating Vectors (Normalised on Argentina and Chile): 
Argentina Chile Mexico US 
1 -2.31 2.16 0.94 
-12.13 1 10.55 -13.23 
Notes to Table 8.2. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively 
Table 8.2. presents the cointegration results for the Latin American and the US markets 
for the first period (Jan. 1976 - Dec 1989). There are two cointegration vectors, signifying 
that the markets were integrated even before they were completely liberalised3. However, 
cointegration alone does not mean that all four markets have a common trend during that 
period. Table 8.3. presents the tests of significance for the coefficients in the 
cointegrating vectors, as well as tests of significance for the speed of adjustment 
coefficients. Since we have two cointegrating vectors, we have to test which variable is 
endogenous in which vector, and then present the restricted equations. The methodology 
followed is the same as in chapter 5, where the restrictions on the a and ß matrices are 
estimated jointly. 
3 The order of the VAR for all tests for cointegration is determined by the AIC and SBC reported by 
Microfit4.0 when we run the VAR. In several cases, for the chosen VAR length we still have serial 
correlation, so we add more lags until it disappears. 
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Table 8.3. Testing restrictions on the a and ß matrices from Table 8.2 
Weak exogeneity tests to the system Weak exogeneity tests for each vector 
aArgentina =0 )C2 (2) = 
14.998** aArgentina =0 aArgentina #0 
CtChile =0 X2 (2) = 28.475** aChile ý0 aChilc =0 
(! Mexico =0 X2 
(2) = 1.041 aMexico 0 aMexico =0 
aus =0 x2 (2) = 9.769** aus =0 aus ý0 
x2 (3) = 1.288 
Test on restrictions on ß matrix 
Vector 1 Vector 2 
PArgentina =0 X2 (1) = 14.84** PArgentina =0 X2 (1) = 12.16** 
PChile =0 x2 (1) = 24.38** IChile =0 X2 (1) = 4.664** 
PMexico =0 x2 (1) =1.999 PMexico =0 X2 (1) = 24.13* 
Pus =0 X2(1)=5.79** Pus =0 X2(1)=5.48** 
Notes to Table 8.3. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
The restrictions reveal that in the first vector only Mexico is insignificant and in the 
second vector all indices are significant. The endogeneity tests suggest that only Mexico 
is exogenous to the whole system. This means that changes in the Mexican stock market 
prices can explain changes in the other markets but the opposite is not true. Both the 
Argentinean and the US markets are exogenous and significant in the first vector. Chile is 
significant and endogenous in the first vector. This implies that although the three 
markets cointegrate, only the Chilean stock market responds to changes in the other two 
markets. The second vector suggests endogeneity for the Argentinean and the US stock 
market. Also all four markets are significant, which suggests that the Chilean and the 
Mexican stock market have some explanatory power for the Argentinean and the US 
stock markets. Taken jointly, the two vectors suggest integration among all four stock 
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markets. They also suggest that every market can explain part of the variation of every 
other market, except Mexico. 
Since the four markets were integrated prior to liberalisation, we could argue that there 
would be limited scope for diversification for the international investor. As discussed 
earlier, an analysis of the diversification benefits is beyond the scope of this thesis. Such 
an analysis would require the examination of the elements of the a matrix and their size. 
Additionally, we should examine the behaviour of short term movements in these 
markets. Using the present results, we can only infer that the potential for diversification 
is more limited than it would be if the markets were not integrated, at least for the long 
term investor. 
With respect to efficiency, the results suggest that only Mexico is efficient relative to the 
other three markets. Argentina, Chile and the US stock market, can each be modelled as a 
function of the other two markets and their lagged price movements. Although this result 
is not unexpected for the Argentinean and the Chilean stock markets, it is surprising that 
the US stock market is also endogenous in the model. It is unlikely that the S&P500 
index 
can be affected by either the Argentinean or the Chilean stock market, so the results 
should be treated with caution. 
Table 8.4 Cointegration results for the Latin American and US markets 
January 1990 - November 1997 
Ho: 
rank=p 








P=O 45.64 53.48 49.95 24.18 28.27 25.80 
P< 1 21.46 34.87 31.93 11.59 22.04 19.86 
p:: 5 2 9.87 20.18 17.88 5.70 15.87 13.81 
p53 4.17 9.16 7.53 4.17 9.16 7.53 
NOW to I Me 6.4. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 8.4. presents the cointegration results for the period Jan 1990 to Nov 1997 for the 
Latin American and the US stock markets. The results suggest that there are no 
cointegrating relationships among the four variables. In other words, during this period 
the four stock markets were moving in separate directions without following a common 
trend. There are several explanations for this. One could be that our sample period is too 
short. This period includes the 1994 Mexican crisis. The crisis hit other Latin American 
stock markets too, but the effect of the crisis varied from country to country. Since we do 
not have a longer period it is possible that the crisis could dominate our estimates and 
show that the markets move in separate directions. Another possible explanation could be 
that the markets were indeed used for speculation purposes by foreign and domestic 
investors, in which case, there is no reason why they should follow some common trend. 
Table 8.5 Cointegration results for the Asian and US markets 
January 1985 - November 1997 
Ho: 
rank=p 








p=0 99.27** 95.87 91.40 37.56* 39.83 36.84 
p<1 61.72 70.49 66.23 28.89 33.64 31.02 
p< 2 32.83 48.88 45.70 18.85 27.42 24.99 
p: 5 3 13.99 31.54 28.78 11.11 21.12 19.02 
p :! g 4 2.87 17.86 15.75 2.86 14.88 12.98 
p:: 5 5 0.017 8.07 6.50 0.017 8.07 6.50 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(72,713) = 1.13 [0.2315] 
Cointegration Vector (Normalised on India): 
India Pakistan Philippines South Korea Taiwan 
1 -1.36 0.016 -0.658 0.352 
US 
0.508 
Notes to Table d. J. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively 
Table 8.5 presents the results for the Asian stock markets. The sample period covers 13 
years from 1985 to 1997. If the markets became more integrated after liberalisation we 
should expect to find no cointegrating relationship for this sample period because it 
195 
includes a few years when the Asian stock markets were not liberalised. The results 
indicate the existence of one cointegration vector, meaning that the markets were 
integrated even before liberalisation. However, we should be cautious in explaining these 
results because we do not have a long sample period. We know that the stock markets in 
Asian countries introduced most of the biggest liberalisation reforms during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, the sample we have does not go back long enough to 
allow us to argue that there is indeed a large pre-liberalisation period in our sample. 
Additionally, most Asian stock markets were open to foreign investors up to a limited 
point even before the 1990s. Therefore, some degree of integration could exist before the 
1990s. 
Table 8.6 Testing restrictions on the a and ß matrices from Table 8.5. 
Weak exogeneity tests to the system Tests on restrictions in the vector 
aIndia =0 X2 (1) = 0.566 Plndia =0 x2 (1) = 0.148 
aPakistan =0 X2 (1) = 0.034 PPakistan =0 X2 (1) = 0.797 
aPhilippines =0 X2 (1) = 
8.063** PPhilippines =0 i. 
2 (1) = 0.476 
aS. Korea =0 x2 (1) = 5.641** 
PS. 
Korea =0 X2 (1) 10.45** 
aTaiwan =0 x2 (1)=4.001** PTaiwan =0 X2 (1) = 10.89** 
aus =0 x2 (1) = 5.578** Pus =0 x2 (1) = 2.388 
Notes to I able (f. Ö. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% level and 10% level respectively. 
The restrictions on the a and ß matrices are presented in Table 8.6. The exogeneity tests 
reveal that there is regional cointegration among the South East Asian markets of our 
sample. The only exogenous stock markets in the model are India and Pakistan. Also, the 
US stock market is endogenous. The restrictions on the coefficients in the vector, suggest 
that only the South Korean and the Taiwanese markets are significant. The Filipino and 
the American markets are not significant (although they are endogenous). The results 
suggest that during the whole sample period there is some degree of regional integration, 
with two South East Asian markets integrated and endogenous in the system. There is no 
global integration since the US market is statistically insignificant in the vector. 
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Table 8.7 Cointegration results for the Asian and US markets 
January 1990 - November 1997 
Ho: 
rank--p 










P=O 124.9** 95.87 91.40 45.12** 39.83 36.84 
P: 5 1 79.76** 70.49 66.23 41.18** 33.64 31.02 
p: 5 2 38.58 48.88 45.70 17.02 27.42 24.99 
p< 3 21.56 31.54 28.78 11.48 21.12 19.02 
p: 5 4 10.09 17.86 15.75 9.96 14.88 12.98 
p<5 0.129 8.07 6.50 0.129 8.07 6.50 
Vector autocorrelation test: F(72,228) =1.015 [0.4551] 
Cointegration Vectors (Normalised on India and Pakistan) 
India Pakistan Philippines South Korea Taiwan 
1 -0.934 0.059 -0.064 -0.149 





Notes to Table 8.7. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 
5% and 10% level respectively 
The picture after liberalisation changes dramatically, as it is shown from the results in 
Table 8.7. Both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics increase by a third and 
there is strong evidence of two cointegration vectors, instead of one. The results signal 
that the markets became more integrated during the 1990s. Again, these results should be 
viewed with caution because the sample period is rather small. However, comparing the 
results from the whole period and the second period, it is obvious that the relationships 
between these markets changed dramatically. 
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Table 8.8 Testing restrictions on the a and ß matrices from Table 8.7 
Weak exogeneity tests to the system Weak exogeneity tests for each vector 
alndia =0 7Z (2) =11'77** a India 
0 alndia =0 
aPakistan =0 x2 (2) = 
2.53 a' Pakistan =0 aPakistan ", 40 
aPhilippines =0 X2 (2) = 
12.17** a Philippines =0 aPhilippines *0 
aS. Korea =0 X2 
(2) = 7.56** aS. Korea =0 aS. Korea *0 
aTaiwan =0 X2 (2) = 3.61 aTaiwan =0 aTaiwan =0 
aus =0 x2 (2) = 4.73* aus ý0 aus =0 
x2()= 
Test on restrictions on matrix 
Vector 1 Vector 2 
ßIndia =0 X 2(1)=14.3** 
ßIndia =0 x2(1)1.9 
=0 P x2 (1) =16.1** ß Pakistan =0 X2 
(1) = 0.007 
Pakistan 
P 
Philippines =0 X2 
(1) = 0.86 ß Philippines =0 X2 
(1) = 8.84** 
0 P X2 (1) =1.396 Korea =0 ßS X2 (1) = 0.22 S. Korea . 
P Taiwan =0 X2 (1) = 0.237 
ß 
Taiwan =0 X2 (1) . 31.03** 
Pus =0 x2(1)=9.64** ßus 0 x2(1)=15.2** 
Notes to Table 8.8. 
- ** and * indicate significance at the 5% 
level and 10% level respectively. 
These changes become apparent in Table 8.8. The results suggest that there are two 
regions and both are, integrated with the US market. The first vector indicates 
cointegration among India, Pakistan and the US. The results for the whole period suggest 
that India and Pakistan did not enter the cointegrating relationship. The above table 
suggests that after liberalisation, integration between the two markets increased. Also, the 
US market is significant in the first vector, suggesting that the two Asian markets have a 
common trend with the US stock market. The exogeneity tests show India and the US 
markets to be endogenous in the first vector. While India could be endogenous, it is rather 
unlikely that the US stock market reacts to changes in the Indian and the Pakistani stock 
markets. 
198 
The results for the second vector show integration within another regional block: the 
South East Asian stock markets. There are a few differences with respect to the whole 
period. The South Korean stock market is not significant in the vector anymore, which is 
another reason why we should be cautious with the results. Since the South Korean and 
the Taiwanese stock market followed a common trend for the whole sample period, this 
common trend should appear in any estimation using sub-periods. However, this is not 
the case. Again, one reason why this could happen is because of the small sample period. 
The results for the 1990s suggest that the Filipino, the Taiwanese and the US stock 
markets follow a common trend. From the three markets, only the Filipino market is 
endogenous in the system, which is a plausible result. Both the Taiwanese and the US 
economies are bigger than the Filipino economy, so it is not surprising to find that the 
latter may react to changes in the two former markets. Apart from the endogeneity of the 
US in the first vector, the results for the 1990s are not implausible, and suggest the 
existence of two regions in Asia. 
With respect to diversification, the results provide some limited evidence. The Asian 
stock markets seem to be more integrated after liberalisation, so the scope for 
international diversification using these markets may be diminished. The Latin American 
markets present the opposite picture: some integration before liberalisation which 
disappears afterwards. Therefore, international investors could achieve higher returns 
with lower risk by including these markets in their portfolios. However, for reasons 
discussed before, one should be cautious when drawing conclusion from cointegration 
analysis for international diversification potential. At best, the results apply only to 
investors with long term horizons and more tests are needed to show by how much the 
diversification potential is affected by the common trend. 
With respect to efficiency, cointegration implies that there is long term predictability 
among the markets, so they are not collectively efficient in the long run. It should be 
noted that we do not reject efficiency based on our results. The evidence we have with 
respect to the long run efficiency of these markets is extremely limited and more tests are 
needed if we are to draw any conclusions on this matter. 
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8.3. Empirical analysis of convergence between emerging and developed countries' 
risk premium 
8.3.1. Introduction 
In this section we examine if the risk premium of the developing countries in our sample 
converged to that of the US. Actually, because the US is assumed to be the safest 
borrower (in dollars), its risk premium is assumed to be zero. The methodology we apply 
here is used to examine country risk and not stock market risk, therefore we should 
justify why we use it. 
The methodology utilises the option pricing formula. We feel that this is appropriate 
because we want to examine risk and the options pricing formula is one of the most 
advanced tools in the analysis of risk. However, the variables we must use to apply the 
formula are not stock market data, but national data. This is because we have to measure 
riskiness using the debt level of every market and there are no available data on the debt 
level of the companies listed on the emerging stock markets of our sample. Debt data are 
available for national economies only, so we examine the riskiness of national economies 
instead of the riskiness of national stock markets. This is not a problem, if we assume that 
the stock market of an economy is a good proxy of the economy itself. Indeed, in more 
developed markets, the stock market is one of the main indicators of economic 
performance. Therefore, we feel that we can use the economy and the stock market 
interchangeably. Lower economic risk would imply lower stock market risk. 
Convergence in the level of risk after liberalisation should come because the emerging 
markets should attract funds from abroad, which means increased investment and 
increased revenue. In other words, the value of the economy will increase. Another effect 
of liberalisation should be the reduction of debt or the rescheduling of debt. If the 
emerging economies benefit from liberalisation, then part of the gap between savings and 
We understand that this is a rather strong assumption. It is only valid if the stock market is a very good 
representative of the economy. If most of the firms comprising the market of a country are not listed on the 
stock market, then changes in the index will not necessarily reflect changes in the economic situation of the 
country examined. 
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investment should be filled by foreign capital instead of foreign debt (as was the case 
prior to liberalisation). The debt-equity ratio should decline making companies in these 
countries a safer bet. However, we recognise that debt could increase instead. Higher 
investment could increase the demand for capital goods which the emerging economies 
are unlikely to produce. In this case, foreign debt could increase to cover the demand for 
the imported capital goods. However, since the economy will be seen to becoming more 
productive, these loans from abroad can be obtained on better terms; i. e. lower rates and 
longer maturities. In this case, although debt will increase, the value of the economy will 
increase by more than the debts. 
Finally, the economy's growth should be relatively stable. Since the emerging economy 
offers higher returns, foreign investors should enter the country for the long term; i. e. 
until the country's profitability is equalised to that of the developed markets. In this case 
the economy's growth should be stable and higher than the developed economies'. 
Our methodology is appropriate, because it responds to changes in the three variables of 
interest: market value, debt level and stability of returns. If liberalisation yields the 
desired effects, the options pricing formula should give a lower price year by year. If the 
effects are not the desired ones (e. g. growth which results in increased spending and 
foreign indebtedness like in Mexico in the late 1970s, or opportunistic foreign 
investment, entering a country for the short term resulting in unstable returns for the 
economy) then the options pricing formula will give a stable or increasing price for the 
country during our sample period. 
Finally, the methodology is appropriate in examining convergence, because it allows us 
to compare an emerging country with a developed one. The developed country's growth 
is exogenous in the analysis; i. e. it is not affected by the emerging economy's growth. 
This is accounted for in the present analysis, because the financial risk premium is 
derived using the US government offered interest rate. By comparing this rate to the 
respective interest rate of the emerging economy year by year, we examine not only if the 
s Since it will be used for productive purposes, the net present value of the debt and the investment carried 
out by this debt will be positive. 
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emerging economy is growing, but if it is growing faster than the developed economy, 
which in this analysis is the US. 
The financial risk premium is calculated and plotted for every year of the sample period 
for every country. If it decreases year by year, we can conclude that the results favour the 
liberalisation thesis. If the financial risk premium does not decrease during the sample 
period, this would imply that the liberalisation process did not result in convergence of 
the risk level among developing and developed countries. 
8.3.2. Calculation of the financial risk premium for the sample countries 
We begin the analysis by constructing the variables. The first variable is the market 
value. As was explained in Chapter 5, we have to estimate the market value of each 
economy for the year preceding the first year of our sample. To obtain these estimates we 
run regression (29) for each country in our sample for the 18-year period 1967-1984. 
The results are presented in Table 8.9. The results seem reasonable, except for Mexico 
and Pakistan where the constant (which represents profits for 1966) is negative. 
Inspecting the diagnostic tests, we see that the regression for Mexico suffers from serial 
correlation and the DW statistic is very low (actually the DW statistic is low for all 
regressions, but above 1. Only for Mexico is the DW below 1). Since we cannot get a 
reasonable estimate for the value of the Mexican economy, we assume that it is equal to 
zero6. Also the constants for Pakistan and South Korea and strongly insignificant so, the 
market value of these countries in 1966 is also assumed to be zero. In Chile, the constant 
is significant only at the 11.4% significance level. Because the variables we use are 
macroeconomic estimates which are by their nature inaccurate, it is better to accept low 
levels of significance in these regressions. Therefore, we accept that the profits of the 
Chilean economy in 1966 were 10.1 billion escudos. All regressions have a high R2 
which means that the regressions explain a large percentage of the variation in profits. To 
6 Assuming that the market value for 1966 is zero has very little effect on the estimates of expected rates of 
return and variance. Most of the countries in our sample experienced high rate of inflation so, the effect of 
the constant disappears anyway after a few years [see: Clark (1991) p. 80]. 
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find the market value for these countries in 1966, we capitalise the profits for that year at 
the economy's estimated rate of return (the coefficient of the independent variable). 
Table 8.9 
Results for 1967 - 1984 for the regression 
Xt-Nit +(Vt+l-Vj=c+r(VO 
The constant (c) represents profits for 1966 and r represents the rate of return for the 
sample period. 
c r DW LM test for R 
autocorrelation 
Chile 10.1 0.146 1.295 2.03 0.837 
(1.67) (9.055) 
India 25.57 0.1 1.038 4.13 0.979 
(6.47) (27.55) 
Mexico -0.3054 0.49 0.5 11.55 0.967 
(-3.01) (21.78) 
Pakistan -1.77 0.137 1.74 0.00 0.918 
(-1.02) (13.38) 
Philippines 3.76 0.126 1.67 0.07 0.943 
(2.28) (16.2) 
South Korea 142.75 0.204 1.05 4.02 0.978 
(0.51) (26.97) 
Notes to Table 8.9 
The figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
The figures in brackets are probabilities. 
All values are expressed in local currency. 
The LM test for autocorrelation is distributed as x2(1). 
The market value for 1966 is used as a starting point to construct the market value for the 
countries in our sample. The next step is to estimate the debt of the six countries for the 
sample period (see also appendix 4). The estimated markets values and total debts are 
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All values in figures 8.1 - 8.6 are expressed in billions of dollars. The estimates of the 
market value of these economies reflect the economic development of these countries 
during the sample period rather well. Chile and South Korea enjoyed high and relatively 
constant growth rates during this period which is reflected by the smooth upwards sloping 
curves representing the market value in the plots. India and Pakistan also experienced 
some growth, but the rate of growth was much lower as we can in figures 8.2 and 8.4. 
Mexico's growth was rather turbulent. From 1984 until 1987 the value of the economy 
did not grow at all. From 1987 when Mexico started implementing liberalisation policies 
growth accelerates at a much faster pace. This, however, stops in 1994 because of the 
peso crisis. The market value of the economy drops by about 30% from 1993 to 1995, 
and then it starts growing again. In Philippines, growth was very slow until 1990 but it 
accelerates from 1991, when Philippines opened up the economy to foreign investors. 
The other interesting point is the growth of the market value in relation to debt. If the 
foreign debt of these countries was used for investment then, market value should grow 
faster than the debt. If this is not the case, it means that either the money borrowed were 
used in non-productive ways (e. g. consumption) or the money was invested in inefficient 
projects which yielded less than the interest on the debt. As we can see, in Chile and 
South Korea (and to a lesser extent in Philippines), the'market value of these economies 
grew faster than their respective foreign debts. In Philippines, this trend appears after 
1991, the year that important liberalisation policies were introduced. In Chile and in 
South Korea, the debt does not grow during the sample period. This is evidence that these 
countries were reaching some stage of industrialisation. In India and Pakistan, market 
value and debt grow together. This indicates that these countries are either at the initial 
stages of development or they use the money borrowed from abroad inefficiently'. 
7 In other words, they are beyond the stage of development where they run increasing deficits in order in 
order to accumulate physical capital. 
8 It is more likely that both countries do not use their foreign debt efficiently. India has a long history of 
inefficient investment and welfare measures which damage more than they benefit the economy (see 
chapter 2). In the case of Pakistan, foreign debt has not contributed to economic growth [see: Chaudhary 
and Ali (1993)] 
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Once we constructed all the necessary variables, we can use them to find the value of 
each economy owned by the residents'. If we subtract this value from the total value of 
the economy, we get the market value of each country's debt. The results are plotted in 
figures 8.7 to 8.12. The value of the residents equity is calculated assuming that 
foreigners can appropriate 100% of the economy's value. In reality, in most countries, 
foreigners can legally acquire less than that. Therefore, in the estimation of the financial 
risk premium, we take into account the percentage of each economy which can legally be 
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Figure 8.12. Value of residents equity and market value of debt in South Korea. 
Figures 8.13 to 8.18 show the financial risk premium for the six countries of our sanmple. 
This is the premium on their foreign debt based on the countries' macroeconomic values. 
The values on the vertical axes are rates (a value of 0.05 is 5'%, ). Since we are unable to 
identify exactly the percentage of the market value which is open to foreigners in these 
countries, we estimate the financial risk premium under different assumptions about this 
percentage' 
0. 
The most noticeable feature from the plots is that the financial risk premium for most 
countries falls dramatically after the liberalisation policies where implemented. 't'his is 
the case in all countries except India. In Chile foreign ownership was always free during 
the sample period (subject to approval). However, as Chile liheraliscd more its economy, 
the premium that lenders should demand fell sharply. In Mexico the risk premium also 
dropped after liberalisation. In 1994, it increased due to the crisis but it did not reach the 
pre-liberalisation levels. In Pakistan, the risk premium slowly increases until 1991 and 
then drops to zero. This increase probably reflects the accumulation of foreign debt by the 
country. In Philippines the risk premium initially reduces slowly and then collapses to 
zero. In South Korea, the financial risk premium is at very low levels from the start. liven 
the dotted line (which at 1984 assumes that only a 33.1% slice of the market value can be 
appropriated by foreigners) starts from only a 4.5% level. The only country for which the 
10 Although estimating the financial risk premium accurately is not possible, the aim of this analysis is to 
examine the changes in the financial risk premium as liberalisation policies were introduced. 't'herefore, a 
small bias in our results should not affect the analysis. 
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risk premium increases after liberalisation is India. This is probably the result of the very 
mild nature of reforms that were implemented in the country (see chapter 2). Another 
probable cause for the increase of India's risk premium, is the management of the funds it 
borrowed from abroad. A lot of the money borrowed were used either for welfare projects 
or for subsidies to favoured industries. Since the money were not used for productive 
purposes, it is expected that India's prospects deteriorated and future borrowing should 
cone at a higher cost11. So, in India's case, it can be argued that liberalisation did not 









[- 00 Q*I O 
00 00 00 00 00 00 Cý 0`1 Olý 011 0ý Oý 011 
Figure 8.13. Financial risk premium for Chile's foreign debt for various levels of foreign 
investment ownership. The solid line assumes that the market value that can he 
appropriated by foreigners is 100%, the dashed line assumes a 90% and the dotted line 
assumes an 80%. 










Figure 8.14. Financial risk premium for India's foreign debt for various levels of foreign 
investment ownership. The solid line assumes that the market value that can be 
appropriated by foreigners is 40% until 1990 and 51%, alter, the dashed line 30% until 









Figure 8.15. Financial risk premium for Mexico's foreign debt for various levels of' 
foreign investment ownership. The solid line assumes that the market value that can he 
appropriated by foreigners is 49% until 1988 and 100% after, the dashed line 39% until 
1988 and 90% after and the dotted line 29% until 1988 and 80% after. 
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Figure 8.16. Financial risk premium for Pakistan's foreign debt lör various levels of 
foreign investment ownership. The solid line assumes that the market value that can be 
appropriated by foreigners is 50% until 1990 and 100% after, the dashed line 30% until 
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Figure 8.17. Financial risk premium for Philippines' foreign debt for various levels of 
foreign investment ownership. The solid line assumes that the market value that can he 
appropriated by foreigners is 40% until 1990 and 100% after, the dashed line 3()'!;, until 










Figure 8.18. Financial risk premium for South Korea's foreign debt liar various levels of 
foreign investment ownership. The ownership levels which the soli(l line represents are 
based on the percentage of liberalised sectors in the country' . 
The dashed line assumes 
15% less than the solid line and the dotted line assumes 30% less than the solid line. 
8.4. Discussion of empirical results 
The cointegration results showed increased integration among the Asian stock markets 
and increased segmentation among the Latin American markets after liberalisation. "I lie 
Latin American stock markets all enter a cointegrating vector and it seems that until the 
1990s each reacted to changes in the others. Also, they all colntegrate with the I JS stock 
market which indicates some degree of integration between the region and global stock 
markets. During the 1990s we failed to find any cointegrating relationships among these 
markets. These results suggest increased segmentation which could have many causes. 
One of the causes could he increased speculation. 
The results for the Asian markets suggest the existence Of two regions in the area. The 
Indian and the Pakistani stock markets follow one trend and the Philippines and Taiwan 
follow another. Also, the US stock market is cointegrated with both regions, which again 
signifies some degree of integration with the global markets. These relationships though, 
12 See appendix 5. 
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appear only during the 1990s. The results for the whole sample period suggest that only 
South Korea and Taiwan cointegrate. Therefore, we can conclude that integration among 
the Asian markets increased following liberalisation. Also, the US market is significant in 
the vectors only during the 1990s which shows that these markets do react in changes in 
the US stock market. It should be noted that the results for the 1990s should be viewed 
with caution because the sample period may be too short to reveal which are the true long 
run trends. 
The results on the riskiness of the countries suggest that following liberalisation the 
riskiness of the sample countries dropped, except from India. In the other five countries, 
the financial risk premium implied from the analysis dropped to very low levels. We can 
conclude therefore, that financial liberalisation had a positive effect on five of the six 
countries in the sample. In the economic development literature, foreign investment is 
proposed as an alternative to debt for developing countries. This analysis shows that by 
freeing direct or indirect inwards investment, developing countries can, not only rely less 
on debt but enhance their position in the international credit market. Financial 
liberalisation made these countries less risky and as a result they could negotiate lower 
interest rates on their borrowing. 
A prerequisite for the positive effects of liberalisation to materialise, seems to be that the 
developing economies use the money they borrow from abroad in productive projects. 
From the six countries in the sample, in four, the market value increased faster than their 
debt during the sample period. In all four countries, the financial risk premium fell 
following liberalisation. India, on the other hand, does not seem to use its borrowed funds 
in the most productive way. It could be that following liberalisation, the risk premium in 
India did not drop because the borrowed funds failed to increase the market value of the 
country. In this case, liberalisation cannot have a significant effect on the country's 
creditworthiness. The only result which is puzzling, is Pakistan's risk premium. Pakistan 
has historically borrowed heavily from abroad without any significant impact on its 
economic growth. During the last decade, several studies in the literature suggest that the 
country may be heading for insolvency. It is therefore puzzling to find that Pakistan's risk 
premium dropped to almost zero following liberalisation. 
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It should be noted that we do not claim that the financial risk premiums obtained from 
this study are accurate. It is unlikely that international lenders should demand the same 
interest rate from Philippines or Pakistan during the 1990's as from the US - the risk 
premium of the two countries is zero according to our results. The countries examined are 
developing countries and as such they carry more risk than developed ones. Even 
developing countries which have transformed their economies to market economies and 
have good prospects are inherently more risky than developed countries such as the US. 
Although the results obtained from this study may not be accurate, they are useful in 
demonstrating the effect that liberalisation policies had on the economies of the countries 
examined. 
Taken jointly, the evidence presented in this chapter are mixed. Some seem to suggest 
increased integration with the world markets and some suggest increased segmentation 
following liberalisation. We believe that the most plausible explanation is the short 
sample period in the analysis. Stock market liberalisation was implemented fairly 
recently. It is reasonable to assume that it will take several years until the effect of these 
policies becomes apparent. So, even if liberalisation does have a uniform effect on all 
these countries with respect to integration, the data may be too few to show it. 
8.5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter we examined the effect of financial liberalisation with respect to 
integration among national stock markets. We used two methodologies, one to examine 
integration with respect to stock prices and one with respect to risk. The first procedure 
examines if the national stock markets follow a common trend. We tested for a common 
trend during the 1990s when most stock markets were liberalised and for another period 
prior to liberalisation, so we could compare the results from the two sample periods. The 
second methodology uses the options pricing formula to measure the value of the 
countries under examination that was held by residents. Following that, we calculated the 
financial risk premium on the countries' foreign debt that was implied by the countries' 
economic situation. From this analysis we were able to draw some conclusions. 
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It seems that liberalisation did not have a uniform effect on the countries examined with 
respect to integration. In fact, the results from the two methodologies seem to be 
contradictory. For the Latin American countries of our sample we failed to find a 
common trend followed by these countries indices. This indicates that the national stock 
markets in these countries became more segmented after liberalisation. The calculated 
risk premia however, indicate that both Chile and Mexico became safer for foreign 
investors during the leter stages of liberalisation, indicating higher integration. These 
results seem to contradict each other. One likely explanation for this is that our sample 
period is rather short. This is further demostrated by the results for the Asian countries. 
While for the whole sample period South Korea enters a cointegrating vector with 
Taiwan, for the shorter sample South Korea is insignificant in this vector. The results 
should therefore be treated with caution. 
From the two methodologies, the calculation of the financial risk premium seems to 
provide us with a better insight on the changes in the level of integration of these 
economies with the US market. The risk premium schedule for its country follows a 
plausible trend given the economic history of its country during the sample period. The 
only implausible result is the level of the risk premium suggested by the analysis. This 
however, is probably just the result of high collateralisation levels used in the analysis. 
In total, our results are not very helpfull in providing us with an answer on whether the 
emerging stock market examined became more integrated with the world capital market 
or not. Our study helps more in highlighting the problems in this kind of analysis the 
most basic of which is data unavailability. 
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has attempted to provide some evidence on the effect of financial 
development on selected emerging economies. The focus of our analysis is on the 
development of stock markets in these countries. At the beginning of our discussion we 
presented an outline of the relevant theoretical approaches and their implications on the 
issues we examine. The development of the stock market in most emerging economies 
was the result of guidelines by the IMF and other international economic bodies. 
However, a clear theoretical model justifying the development of equity markets in these 
countries was lacking. One attempt at filling this gap was made by Cho (1986), but his 
analysis is based on some strong assumptions which do not necessarily hold. It is clear 
that stock market development in emerging economies preceded the theoretical 
justification for its development. A clear theoretical model incorporating the role of the 
stock market as well as the role of the banking sector within the economy and their 
contribution to growth has yet to be developed. The model by Boyd and Smith (1996) 
that we used for our analysis and is presented in chapter 3 attempts to address this 
problem. However, we feel that although the model is convenient for our purposes, it is 
very unlikely that it is based on realistic assumptions. The model is based on the 
assumption that as monitoring costs become higher due to increasing technological 
complexity, investors switch to projects which utilise observable return technology, so it 
is profitable for them to invest through the equity market. In reality though, none of the 
companies listed on the stock market use observable return technology and as investment 
become harder to monitor, investors will switch to debt instruments [Fry (1997)]. 
Even though the development of equity markets is not strongly backed by a relevant 
theory, several emerging economies went ahead with liberalisation policies which aimed 
at stimulating indirect investment both from residents and foreigners. Critics of this 
development argue that stock markets in these countries can only harm economic growth 
because they are inefficient, they fail to increase aggregate savings and they are 
excessively volatile which could undermine the entire economic system [e. g. Singh 
(1992)]. So, the existing theory is not very helpful in determining the benefits from 
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creating a stock market. The effect of the creation and development of stock markets in 
these economies is therefore, an empirical matter. 
Empirical analysis of these issues is particularly important considering the development 
of the stock markets in these countries during the last twenty years. In chapter 2 we 
presented an overview of the development of the stock markets in selected countries as 
well as a discussion on the major economic changes in these countries during the last two 
decades. As we saw, the market capitalisation of both Latin American and Asian stock 
markets increased more than tenfold since the early 1980s. Value traded also increased 
more than tenfold during the same period. Considering the size of these economies, the 
money invested in their stock markets during the sample period should have a significant 
impact on their economic development. If the amount of money which found its way into 
the ESMs was indeed used for productive purposes, then these countries should 
experience much higher economic growth rates than before implementing stock market 
liberalisation. If, however, the predictions of the critics are true and all that money are 
simply chasing high short term returns damaging this way the stability of these 
economies, then economic growth should slow down or even become negative. Research 
in this area is especially important now, in the aftermath of the 1997 South East Asia 
crisis, when most of the Asian `tigers' collapsed. There is a need to establish if the cause 
of the crisis was weak financial institutions or liberalisation itself. 
Empirical research in this area is scarce and this thesis aims to contribute to this growing 
literature. Obviously, the changes in these economies the last two decades have created 
dozens of issues which require analysis. In the present analysis, we concentrate on three 
of these issues. We examine the effect of stock market development on selected emerging 
economies and its relationship to the banking sector, changes in stock market volatility 
before and after liberalisation and changes in integration between the ESMs and the 
international capital markets. 
With respect to the first issue, most studies in the field concentrate on the effect of either 
stock markets or banks on economic growth, bur not both at the same time. We believe 
that if stock markets provide different services to banks and if they have become an 
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important part of the financial system of these countries, then both should be included in 
the analysis in order to identify the separate effect of each on economic growth. The 
methodology most studies in the field use is cross country regressions. Very few studies 
utilise time series analysis to examine this issue [e. g. Arestis and Demetriades (1997)]. 
The problem with cross country regressions is that by aggregating data, valuable 
information is lost. We believe that not all countries which developed stock markets were 
affected in the same way. Surely, the structure of their markets, the level of development, 
the openness of their economies and other features should be fairly important in the 
functioning and the usefulness of a stock market. However, when aggregating data these 
special features are lost. We feel that time series analysis of individual countries is more 
appropriate. Even when we do not explicitly account for these features in the regressions 
[by means of a repression index as in Arestis and Demetriades (1997) or otherwise] the 
results should give us an indication as to the usefulness of a stock market under different 
conditions. 
The methodology we have utilised is the Johansen cointegration analysis which provided 
us with evidence about the relationship between the financial sector and the real 
economy. We only derive the reduce form equations and we do not model the short run 
dynamics. The long run solution of the system should provide us with information on the 
interactions between the financial sectors and the real economy as well as between the 
two financial sectors. In the regressions we also include a stock market volatility variable 
to account for the negative effect predicted by the critics of the liberalisation thesis. 
The results present some evidence that the Latin American countries we examined, 
namely Chile and Mexico, have benefited from the development of a stock market. On 
the other hand, in the Asian economies of our sample, there seems to be no direct effect 
from the stock market to the economy, except from South Korea. The difference between 
the Latin American countries and the Asian countries in our sample is the degree of 
liberalisation that these countries implemented. Chile and Mexico, liberalised their 
economies almost completely, while India, South Korea and Taiwan kept several 
restrictions with respect to foreign investment. Our results suggest therefore, that a stock 
market can be a source of growth if an economy is sufficiently liberal. In financially 
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repressed economies (or less liberal economies), we could not find any evidence that the 
stock market assisted economic growth. Several reasons could be the cause of that, like 
the distortion of prices which do not allow the stock market to act as a pricing instrument, 
or speculation. Whatever the cause, the evidence seem to support that a stock market can 
be effective where market forces are allowed to operate. However, we cannot dismiss the 
advocates of government intervention because of the results for South Korea. South 
Korea was until recently recognised as an economic miracle. Its development was the 
result of government planning. Our results suggest that the government was successful in 
using both the stock market and the banking sector to promote economic growth. 
However, the exogeneity of both financial sectors, indicates that they failed to develop 
with the economy, which could be the reason behind the recent collapse of the South 
Korean economy. 
The evidence for the banking sector suggest that it failed to assist economic growth in 
most of the countries of our sample. The most interesting cases are those of Chile and 
Mexico where the banking sector is actually shown to impede economic development. 
The most plausible explanation for this is the banking crises these countries experienced 
during the early 1980s. At that time, banks in the two countries were left to regulate 
themselves and they failed to do so, taking excessive risks and adopting bad practices. 
Our results confirm the need for tight government regulation and control. For the Asian 
economies, we find some evidence that the banking sector has a positive effect on the 
economic growth of South Korea and Taiwan. Although in these two countries the 
banking sector seems to make a positive contribution to the real economy, the banking 
sector itself is not endogenous in the economic system. In other words, the banking sector 
did not develop with the economy. 
With respect to the volatility of the stock market, we failed to find any evidence that it 
harms economic growth, except for Chile. This is evidence against the critics of the 
liberalisation thesis, since the stock markets of the countries we examine have frequently 
been described in the literature as excessively volatile. In three out of the four countries 
of our sample where stock market volatility was included it is not negatively related to 
the real economy. Therefore, we can conclude that either stock market volatility does not 
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affect economic growth or that the volatility of these market was not high enough to 
become harmful to the real economy. This is the subject of our second test. 
The second issue we examine is the change in stock market volatility before and after 
liberalisation. Stock market volatility is important because it can undermine the whole 
economic system (although in our tests it has not been apparent). The argument often 
seen in the literature is that volatility would increase once these markets are liberalised 
because investors would use these markets for making a quick profit in the short term. 
To examine the issue we employed two tests which complement each other. The GARCH 
process was used because it has been established as one of the best instruments for 
modelling the volatility of financial series. The EGARCH process was used to account 
for the sign effect, i. e. the difference in volatility caused by good and bad news of the 
same magnitude. 
The first set of tests we conducted to examine volatility is on the change of the 
parameters of a GARCH process before and after liberalisation. The results suggest that 
past news cause less volatility in stock prices after liberalisation than before and that old 
news (i. e. news from two periods ago and before) cause more volatility after liberalisation 
than before. The constant of the GARCH process (which is a measure of the 
unconditional volatility) is lower for most countries after liberalisation and the degrees of 
freedom of the models rise after liberalisation. 
The second set of tests we conducted is to examine the change in the news impact curve 
implied by an EGARCH process fitted in the data. The news impact curve relates past 
news to current volatility. A flat curve suggests low volatility for both `big' and `small' 
news. For all countries except from Pakistan and Philippines, the news impact curve after 
liberalisation is either flatter or starts from a lower point than before liberalisation, or 
both. This evidence indicate lower levels of volatility after the markets opened up to 
foreign investors. 
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On the whole, the results indicate that the markets in our sample have a longer memory 
after liberalisation but the level of volatility seems to be lower. The only exception is 
Mexico, where the results indicate that not only the level of volatility but the memory of 
the market has reduced as well. Overall, the results suggest that liberalisation did not 
have the negative effect on volatility that economists feared and some researchers have 
found [e. g. Aitken (1996), Grabel (1995)]. On the contrary, it seems that volatility may 
have fallen after liberalisation. 
The third empirical chapter, provides evidence as to the change in the degree of 
integration after liberalisation policies were implemented. Integration of ESMs with the 
world capital markets is important because it should improve the efficiency and enhance 
the role of stock markets in these economies. Integration implies that domestic assets are 
priced in the world market. This should help an economy direct funds towards the most 
productive projects and become more competitive in the world market. Integration also 
implies that there are no risk premia because of barriers so the required return from 
investment falls in line with similar projects in other countries. 
We examined changes in integration in two ways. First we examined integration of the 
national stock indices. This was tested using a cointegration test [as in Kasa (1992)]. The 
results for Latin America suggest that the three markets included in the analysis were 
integrated during the 1980s but became segmented during the 1990s. Also, it seems that 
the markets were also integrated with the American market which implies integration 
with the global market. The results for the Asian stock markets provided the opposite 
results. Cointegration before liberalisation was accepted only for two countries and 
rejected for the US market. After liberalisation, we found the existence of two regional 
groups which followed a common trend. Both regional groups were also cointegrated 
with the US market. 
The second test for integration, examined the convergence of the riskiness of each market 
to that of the US. The methodology we utilised is used in the country risk literature. We 
estimated the financial risk premium implied by the macroeconomy of each country 
every year of our sample period, and examined if it is falling year by year. The results 
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showed that, except from India, the financial risk premium on the foreign debt of every 
country in our sample became lower towards the end of the sample period. In the case of 
Mexico, Pakistan and Philippines, the risk premium fell sharply after the most important 
policies were introduced. In Chile, the risk premium fell steadily after 1985, and in South 
Korea, it became almost zero after 1985. Only in India the risk premium rose towards the 
end of the 1980s. Considering that India is the country in our sample with the most 
restrictive policies towards foreign investment, we could interpret the results as evidence 
in favour of the benefits of financial liberalisation. 
The two tests for integration provide mixed results. It is not clear whether the Latin 
American countries in our sample became more or less integrated. For the Asian markets, 
the results indicate a higher degree of integration after liberalisation. However, India's 
riskiness seems increased during the latest stages of our sample period although we find 
that it cointegrates with the US market. One possible explanation is that the Indian stock 
market is not representative of the Indian economy. 
Taken together, our results fail to support the fears of the critics of stock market 
liberalisation. Having said that, we should note that it may not always be the case that the 
development of a stock market can help economic growth. As it is demonstrated by the 
results of our first test, it seems that to make a stock market a source of growth, a country 
would have to implement economy-wide liberalisation policies. Alternatively, it could try 
developing a stock market under financial repression (or near financial repression), but it 
would have to be very good at managing the economy, like the South Korean 
government. If it cannot do that, the stock market will probably be a waste of resources 
(like in India and Taiwan). 
The consolation for the advocates of financial liberalisation, is that even if the 
development of the stock market is not helpful, it will not be harmful either (at least not 
in the sense that Keynesian economists predict). The results for the effect of volatility on 
economic growth and from chapter 7 indicate that stock market volatility does not really 
harm economic growth and has not risen after liberalisation. The results presented here 
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are evidence against the predictions that volatility will follow stock market development 
and the economy will be destabilised. 
Finally, it is not clear if liberalisation has helped ESMs integrate with the world capital 
markets. The two tests we carried out provided contradictory results. We feel that the 
results from the cointegration regression are rather suspicious in light of the previous 
results. In chapter 6 we saw that Latin American stock markets were the ones which are 
positively related with economic growth. Considering that these markets were opened to 
foreign investors and their economies liberalised a lot more than in the Asian countries, 
we expected that the Latin American stock markets would show a higher degree of 
integration after liberalisation. Our results however show exactly the opposite. This of 
course, could simply mean that liberalisation does not work. It could be the case that the 
liberalised stock markets attracted a lot of money but for various reasons (e. g. increased 
speculation) they failed to integrate with the world market. Another explanation could be 
that our sample period is rather short and this distorts the results. 
The second test for integration shows however, that in both Chile and Mexico the risk 
premium fell after liberalisation. This indicates a higher degree of integration which taken 
together with the previous results means that stock market development in Latin America 
was successful. The only problem could be the negative effect of stock market volatility 
on economic development found in Chile, but since volatility did not increase following 
liberalisation, we cannot take this as evidence against it. The same test also shows that 
the financial risk premium fell for the Asian countries as well, except India. This result, 
together with the results from chapter 7, indicate that the Asian market included in the 
analysis in these two chapters became less risky which could be a result of higher 
integration with the world markets. 
Having discussed the possible interpretations for our results, we should warn that the 
evidence presented here should be viewed with caution. Our study has several limitations 
which could distort the evidence presented. The most important problem is the limited 
amount of data available. Our data cover about twenty years. A longer sample period may 
be required in order to appreciate the effect of financial liberalisation and stock market 
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development on the emerging economies. In most countries, the reform policies were 
implemented less than ten years ago, and it may take more than that for the benefits or 
problems of liberalisation to materialise. 
Another problem is that the data we used for our analysis are aggregate data. These may 
conceal several features which could affect-our results. In order to examine the effect of 
the financial sectors on the economy, disaggregate data would be more helpful. 
Unfortunately, such data are not available yet. Especially with respect to the stock 
market, disaggregate data for these countries would be much more relevant. Several of 
the stock markets examined here, are relatively small and they tend to be dominated by 
few large companies. It would be more useful to examine the development of the part of 
the stock market which refers to private industries and test its effect on the industries it 
represents. The same limitation applies to the tests for volatility. If the market is 
dominated by a few large companies which tend to be relatively inactive then, our 
estimates will underestimate the true changes in volatility. Again, disaggregation of the 
data would provide a clearer picture of the effect of liberalisation of the stock market in 
these countries. The same applies to the test for integration. Disaggregated data and a 
longer sample period would probably provide better estimates of the relationships in 
these markets. 
Also, to make valid inferences about whether stock market liberalisation has affected the 
developing countries and under which conditions it is more likely to succeed we should 
have more countries in our sample. Unfortunately, the quality and unavailability of data 
for other emerging markets prevented us from including other countries in our sample. 
The limitations of this study, point to future research needed in this area. A lot more 
research is needed on the effects of the financial sector on the economy in developing 
countries, considering that there are hardly any such studies. Research in this field should 
become easier as more data becomes available. Research should examine the effect of 
financial development not only on a national level but on individual industries as well. 
This is particularly important for the developing countries as some sectors of the 
economy are either public or are not represented in the stock market. Another aspect 
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which has hardly been examined is the importance of channels of finance other than 
banks and the stock market (e. g. credit houses in Taiwan and pension funds in Chile). 
There are hardly any studies in the literature which examine their importance in the 
economy and their impact on economic development. However, until data are available 
this will not be possible. It is also important to examine the channels through which stock 
market development affects economic growth. This will require specific modelling of the 
individual channels, but it is doubtful if enough data are available to allow a proper time 
series analysis of these issues. 
Further research on developing stock market volatility and volatility models in general is 
also needed. The ARCH family of processes we use is one of the best tools available to 
measure volatility but it lacks theoretical justification. It is therefore, difficult to explain 
how. volatility changes based on our findings. Advances in the econometric tools for 
volatility are needed not only to measure volatility but also to explain why it changes. For 
the developing countries, researchers should look at disaggregate data to measure 
volatility, especially since these markets are very concentrated in terms of market 
capitalisation and trading activity. 
Despite its limitations, we feel that this thesis has made a positive contribution to the 
analysis of issues of interest in emerging economies. Such studies are of vital importance 
for these economies because of the developments there during the last two decades. Our 
work sheds some light to the importance of the stock market development in some 
emerging economies and adds to this growing literature. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Ratio to moving technique for seasonal adjustment 
The first step is to take a moving average of the data that spans a year. Since our data are 
monthly observations we take a 12-month moving average. Next, the ratio of the raw 
data to the moving average if formed. This is a preliminary seasonal index. To find the 
unadjusted seasonal factor for each month, we find the average for each month from the 
seasonal index, i. e. the average of all the values for January from the index, the average 
for all values for February, etc. Theoretically, the sum of these seasonal factors should 
add up to 12. Because in practice they do not, we calculate an adjustment factor by 
dividing 12 by the sum of the unadjusted seasonal factors. We then multiply the 
adjustment factor with each of the unadjusted seasonal factors to obtain the adjusted 
seasonal factors for each month of the year. Thus, we have a seasonal factor for each 
month with which we multiply our raw data to obtain the seasonal adjusted series. For a 




Unit root tests 
To determine the appropriate lag length of the ADF test, we use the Akaike Information 
Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. If there is a difference in the order of the 
ADF test chosen by the two criteria, then we choose the ADF test with the most lags. We 
prefer a long lag structure because the data are monthly observations. The critical value 
is -2.87. The tests presented here include a constant and no trend. We have run the tests 
including a trend and the results do not change. 
The variables are: 
LINDPR : Logarithm of industrial production index 
LMV : Logarithm of deflated stock market capitalisation 
LM2 : Logarithm of deflated M2 money supply (for Taiwan only) 
LCR : Logarithm of deflated credit given to private enterprises by banks 
LVOL : Logarithm of stock market volatility 
and the variables beginning with D are their first differences. 
Chile 
LINDPR LMV LCR LVOL DLINDPR DLMV DLCR DLVOL 
Statistic -1.62 -0.7 0.66 -1.99 -7.76 -10.64 -6.10 -5.66 
Lags 12 1 8 12 2 1 2 12 
India 
LINDPR LMV LCR LVOL DLINDPR DLMV DLCR DLVOL 
Statistic 0.73 -0.59 -2.37 -1.48 -4.79 -9.89 -4.36 -7.00 
Lags 12 2 11 12 11 1 10 11 
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Mexico 
LINDPR LMV LCR LVOL DLINDPR DLMV DLCR DLVOL 
Statistic -1.52 -0.53 -1.09 -2.82 -8.43 -15.65 -4.44 -13.90 
Lags 3 1 12 3 2 0 11 0 
South Korea 
LINDPR LMV LCR LVOL DLINDPR DLMV DLCR DLVOL 
Statistic -1.22 -1.14 -0.74 -5.36 -3.38 -4.79 -3.51 
Lags 12 - 5 12 12 11 4 11 
Taiwan 
LINDPR LMV LM2 LVOL DLINDP 
R 
DLMV DLM2 DLVOL 
Statistic -1.22 -0.82 -0.69 -2.00 -13.70 -7.51 -3.87 -5.66 
Lags 3 3 6 12 2 2 5 11 
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APPENDIX 3 
Determining cointegration rank and the model for deterministic components. 
Chile 
Trace statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 58.88** 53.48 38.62 48.88 54.81 63.00 
p<1 35.77** 34.78 16.93 31.54 32.92 42.34 
p<2 16.10 20.18 6.15 17.86 15.96 25.77 
p<3 5.37 9.16 0.78 8.07 5.24 12.39 
Maximal eigenvalue statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
, P=O 23.11 28.27 
21.68 27.42 21.89 31.79 
p<1 19.67 22.04 10.78 21.12 16.96 25.42 
p<2 10.73 15.87 5.37 14.88 10.72 19.22 
p<3 5.37 9.16 0.78 8.07 5.24 12.39 
-* and ** indi 
cate significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively. 
-Critical values reported are for the 5% level of significance. 
Using the trace statistic, we find two cointegrating vectors and the appropriate model has 




Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 51.47* 53.48 40.88 48.88 57.20 63.00 
p51 31.55 34.78 20.96 31.54 33.38 42.34 
p _< 2 
16.70 20.18 7.81 17.86 13.75 25.77 
p<3 7.20 9.16 0.49 8.07 6.29 12.39 
Maximal eigenvalue statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 19.92 28.27 19.92 27.42 23.82 31.79 
p51 14.85 22.04 13.14 21.12 19.63 25.42 
p :52 9.50 15.87 7.33 14.88 7.46 19.22 
p53 7.20 9.16 0.49 8.07 6.29 12.39 
-* and ** indi cate significance at the 10% and 5% level respectively. 
-Critical values reported are for the 5% level of significance. 
There is one cointegrating vector (at the 10% significance level). The appropriate model 




Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 52.93* 53.48 43.97 48.88 60.39* 63.00 
p<1 17.00 34.78 13.87 31.54 30.11 42.34 
p<2 5.36 20.18 4.30 17.86 12.69 25.77 
p<3 1.23 9.16 0.71 8.07 3.41 12.39 
Maximal eigenvalue statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
p=0 35.94** 28.27 30.10** 27.42 30.28* 31.79 
pS1 11.64 22.04 9.57 21.12 17.43 25.42 
p<2 4.13 15.87 3.59 14.88 9.28 19.22 
p<3 1.23 9.16 0.71 8.07 3.41 12.39 
-** and * indicate significance at the 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
-Critical values reported are 
for the 5% level of significance. 
Using the trace statistic we can find one cointegrating vector using Model I or Model 3. 
Therefore, we accept that there is one cointegrating vector. To determine which model 
we should choose, we consider the results using the maximal eigenvalue criterion. With 
this criterion, the suggested Model and rank are Model 1 and rank 1. So, we accept that 





Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 42.30** 34.87 31.73** 31.54 47.01** 42.34 
p<1 14.18 20.18 3.78 17.86 17.41 25.77 
pS2 1.85 9.16 0.42 8.07 3.35 12.39 
Maximal eigenvalue statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 28.11** 22.04 27.96** 21.12 23.82 31.79 
p51 12.34 15.87 3.36 14.88 19.63 25.42 
p521.85 9.16 0.42 8.07 7.46 19.22 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 10% level respectively. 
-Critical values reported are for the 5% level of significance. 
We compare the statistics with their critical values starting from Model 1 and rank 0, 
going to Model 2 and rank 0 and then Model 3 and rank 0. We then go to rank 1 and 
carry on from the most restrictive to the least restrictive model. The first time the null is 
not rejected is for Model 1 using the trace statistic. Therefore, we accept that the correct 
specification is the one suggested by Model 1 (restricted constant and no trend in the 
cointegration vector) and we accept that there is one cointegration vector. As was 
discussed before, the trace statistic is more robust than the max-eigenvalue statistic and 




Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 84.91** 53.48 66.90** 48.88 75.81** 63.00 
p<1 36.97** 34.87 27.11 31.54 31.06 42.34 
pS2 15.86 20.18 6.04 17.86 9.91 25.77 
p<3 4.51 9.16 0.73 8.07 1.95 12.39 
Maximal eigenvalue statistic 
Null Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Hypothesis Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value Statistic Critical Value 
P=O 47.95** 28.27 39.80** 27.42 44.75** 31.79 
p<1 21.11* 22.04 21.07* 21.12 21.16 25.42 
p<2 11.36 15.87 5.30 14.88 7.96 19.22 
pS3 4.51 9.16 0.73 8.07 1.95 12.39 
-* and ** indicate significance at the 10% and the 5% 
level respectively. 
-Critical values reported are for the 5% level of significance. 




The World Debt Tables report among other things a projection on the payments of the 
outstanding long term debt of each country for the next ten years after the year for which 
the data are presented. For example, the debt tables for 1996 report the payment schedule 
of all countries from 1997 to 2006. However, the debt of several countries has a maturity 
longer than ten years. Therefore, in order a get a more accurate picture of the debt 
outstanding we have to estimate payments beyond the ten year period. We should state 
from the beginning that an accurate estimation of the remaining debt is impossible 
because the debt originates from several different sources and each source has an 
individual arrangement with the country-debtor for repayment. Since information on the 
individual repayment arrangements is not available, it is impossible to accurately 
calculate the amount of money that every country will pay each year beyond the ten year 
period. 
The World Debt Tables include information on the average maturity, interest rate and 
grace period of the debt undertaken each year by every country. From this information we 
are able to deduce the amount of debt that will extend beyond the ten year period, the 
interest rate paid on that debt and how many years it will take for the debt to be repaid. 
For example, in 1996, Chile total long term debt was $20,421 million and the 
undisbursed debt (debt which Chile had not borrow yet but would borrow in the future) 
was $961 million. The repayment projection showed that within the next ten years (i. e. 
from 1997 to 2006), Chile would repay $19,028 million of the principal plus interest. 
Therefore, assuming that Chile would use the undisbursed debt, it would still have to 
repay principal of $2,354 (20,421 + 961 - 19,028) after the year 2006. 
The next piece of information we use is the maturity of the debt for 1996 and the previous 
years. For example, in 1995, the average maturity of Chile's debt was 18 years, with a 
grace period of 5.4 years. This means that Chile would make payments on the new debt it 
acquired in 1995 until the year 2017; in other words, Chile would have to make 11 more 
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payments after 2006, to repay the debt it acquired in 1995. In the same way, we calculate 
how long it takes Chile to repay debt from previous years so, we find into how many 
payments the $2,354 still owned is divided. Our calculations for Chile showed that it 
would have to make 11 payments for its 1995 new debt (i. e. from 2007 to 2017), 6 more 
payments for the 1994 new debt, 2 more payments for the 1993 new debt, 11 more 
payments for the 1992 new debt, 3 more payments for the 1991 new debt, 5 more 
payments for the 1990 new debt and 3 more payments for the 1989 new debt; a total of 41 
payments spanning from 2007 to 2017. At this point we assume that all these payments 
are equal. So, each payment is $57.415 million (2,354 / 41). Since this is only the 
principal repayments, we still have to calculate the interest payments. From the World 
Debt Tables, we know the average interest rate on every year's new debt. The average 
interest rate on the debt acquired in 1995 was 6.2%. We assume that interest payments 
are spread equally each year. So, in 2007, Chile would have to repay $57.415 million for 
its 1995 new debt and $3.56 million in interest. The same year it would have to pay 
another $344.49 million (57.415 x 6) for principal repayments for the debts acquired from 
1989 to 1994, plus interest on these payments. 
We understand that the results obtained with this method are inaccurate. The debt for 
these countries is amortised, therefore, neither principal repayments, nor interest 
payments will be equal every year. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that all the debt 
acquired in 1995, for example, will mature in 2017. However, with the available data, it is 
impossible to get a precise estimate of the payments that will take place into the future. It 
should also be noted, that the estimated payments count very little towards the estimation 
of the total debt because they take place far into the future so they will be discounted with 
high discounting factors. Anyway, getting an imprecise estimate of the repayments in the 
distant future is better than ignoring them, since some of the debt examined has a very 
long maturity. In this case a significant proportion of the debt would be unaccounted for. 
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APPENDIX 5 
South Korea opened up its economy to foreign investors gradually. During the sample 
period, almost every year the South Korean government made more sectors available to 
foreign investors. Since data to estimate the proportion of each sector in the economy are 
not available, the liberalisation ratio that we use in the analysis, is the proportion of the 
industries open to foreign investors. These are as follows: 
In 1984,660 out of 999 industries were open to foreign investment. In the remaining 
industries, approval was required for a majority foreign participation. The liberalisation 
ratio we use in the analysis is 66.1%. 
In 1985, the number of industrial sectors accessible to foreign investors increased to 762. 
The liberalisation ratio we use for 1985 and 1986 is 76.3%. 
In 1987, the number of industrial sectors accessible to foreign investors increased to 788. 
The liberalisation ratio we use for 1987,1988 and 1989 is 79%. 
In 1990, the number of industries open to foreign investment increased to 793. The 
liberalisation ration we use for 1990 and 1991 is 79.4%. 
In 1992, the number of industries liberalised was 926 out of a total of 1,148 industries 
and the ratio we use is 80.7%. 
In 1993, the number of industries liberalised was 940 out of a total of 1,148 industries 
and the ratio we use is 85.1%. 
Finally, in 1994, the number of industries liberalised was 1040 out of a total of 1,148 
industries and the ratio we use is 90.6%. 
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APPENDIX 6 
Plot of Standard & Poor's 500 Index and its first difference 
4M 
S&P500 
1 21 41 61 81 101 121 141 161 181 201 221 241 261 263 
Observations 
It is clear that the level of the S&P500 index is not stationary. 
DS&P500 
Observations 
The difference of the series appears to be stationary. 
263 
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